Personality Factor and Foreign Policy Analysis in Nigeria

Innocent Jooji

Department of Political Science and Diplomacy,
Faculty of Social Science, Veritas University,
Abuja, Nigeria

Abstract

The importance of personality in foreign policy analysis has garnered more emphasis in recent international policy research. Furthermore, a leader's eccentricities remain a critical component in determining foreign policy. As a result, the purpose of this study is to examine the significance of the personality approach in foreign policy analysis using pertinent cases. The data for this study were gathered from secondary sources such as textbooks, journal articles, and other secondary sources, and the data was analysed using content analysis. This research is grounded in Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic philosophy. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that the influence of decision-makers' personalities in the analysis and promotion of foreign policy cannot be overlooked and remains significant in assessing the path of a country's foreign policy.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Personality, Decision, Ideas, State

Introduction

Foreign policy is concerned with the interactions of sovereign players in the international system. Thus, foreign policy objectives may be defined as a collection of desired acts as well as a set of methods adopted by sovereign nations in order to influence the behaviour of other participants in the international system. These players might be governments, international organisations, or any other actors with international personality or standing, such as the Red Cross, PLO, Paris Club, and others. Thus, foreign policy goals may be defined as a course of action or set of principles that governments use to decide or define their relationship with other international players in order to influence their conduct within the international system. Foreign policy as a collection of objectives is the strategy pursued by a country in its relations with other countries in order to attain national goals.

Effective foreign policy is founded on a shared understanding of a nation-role state's in the world, its allies and foes, and its goals and objectives. These basic assumptions are ingrained in national myth and history, evolving slowly over time as political leaders interpret them and external and internal development reshapes them. Many foreign policy practitioners and theorists appear to agree on the relevance of Persephone and identity as psychological frames of reference in international relations (Akindele, 2003).

Any country's foreign policy is inextricably linked to its internal politics at any particular period. As a result, a country's national power has a direct impact on its foreign policy. The country is large and relatively populated, with around 140 million inhabitants. Furthermore, foreign policy behaviour covers a government's deliberate and accidental behaviours and statements that impact its foreign policy (Smith, et al 2008). As a result, any activity between nations, such as agreements, assistance, and alliances, the use of force, political pressures, and acts in international relations, is about foreign policy. These acts may be minor, or they may be undertaken with long-term objectives in mind (Pearson et al 1998). It is against this background, this study seeks to analyse the importance of personality approach in foreign policy analysis using relevant examples.

Conceptual Review: Foreign Policy and Personality

Foreign policy studies are a subset of international relations. Foreign policy refers to a country's policy toward the world beyond its borders (Beasley, et al 2013). Cooper (1972) contends that defining the concept of foreign policy might be challenging. Foreign policy might be defined broadly as any contact between inhabitants of various nations, however this is an overly broad definition since it overlooks the restrictions imposed by the
term 'policy.' The term 'policy' narrows the meaning to the relations between governments. In a broader sense, the phrase might be defined as "a big vision" of the international economic and political order that provides a great framework for, and direction for, the day-to-day decisions that states must make in their dealings with other nations (Cooper, 1972).

According to Russell et al. (2006:134), foreign policy is "a guide to action conducted beyond the limits of the State to achieve the State's aims." In other words, foreign policy is a state's policy that extends beyond its borders in order to preserve and advance its national interests. Norhedges (1968:15) describes foreign policy as "the interaction of the exterior and the interior." Foreign policy, on the other hand, is defined by Professor Joseph Frankel as a "dynamic process of interaction between changing domestic demand and supports and changing foreign circumstances" (Frankel 1975:9).

According to Reynolds (1995), there are three definitions of foreign policy. The first definition is "a spectrum of activities performed by various sectors of a state's government in its contacts with other entities similarly engaged on the world arena to advance the national interest." In his second definition, he defines foreign policy as "the external acts performed by decision-makers with the purpose of accomplishing long-term goals and short-term objectives." Foreign policies are not established in a vacuum, Reynolds says in the final definition. They are formed in respect to other bodies working in the global arena in a similar manner.'

Unlike Reynolds (1995), Lerche et al (1995) believe in two types of foreign policy: status quo and revisionism. A state that pursues a status-quo policy is typically content with its position in the pattern of current international relations. Taking a status-quo policy, however, does not mean that it is not susceptible to modification within the constraints of the power system. As long as the changes do not jeopardise the stability of the state's position, the government is prepared to accept changes that gradually alter the character of the relationships in its favour.

Foreign Policy, in our opinion, may also be defined as the broad rules that guide a country's behaviour in the international system. It typically depicts a State's actions and judgments in respect to other States in the international system.

The policy of revisionism, in contrast to the status quo policy, works against any stabilisation. Such approach invariably leads to crises and disagreements over contentious issues, which aid the state in defining the bounds of the dispute and the borders of the battle. If the debate does not escalate into a war, the revisionist state will have the upper hand in determining the timeline as well. The crisis will last as long as the revisionist state wants it to, which implies until the state achieves its goals. All this does not mean that the revisionist state is not open to proposals to create stability, but this only happens when the state sees an opportunity in it to change the situation to its own advantage, or when the stability helps it to achieve its strategic goals (Lerche et al 1995).

However, personality typically refers to what makes a person distinctive; the features that set him apart from others. Thought, emotion, and conduct do not make a personality; rather, it is the dispositions that underpin these parts that do. Personality indicates predictability about how a person will act or respond in various situations.

Theoretical Framework

Scholars in international relations have created a variety of theories for studying a country's foreign policy, including bureaucratic theory, linkage theory, power theory, and the traditional/classical approach, among others. This research is grounded in Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic philosophy. Psychoanalytic thinkers stress various elements of personality and dispute on the genesis, development, and presentation of personality in behaviour. One of the most significant theoretical systems is Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic thought. According to Boeree (2006:1), a Freudian disciple, personality psychology is the study of the person, the full human individual. He contends that while researching a person's personal psychology, biology, evolution, and genetics, sensation and perception, motivation and emotion, learning and memory, and anything else that may fall through the gaps must all be considered. He referenced Sigmund Freud as saying that our motivation comes from the unconscious, whether it's simple urges for food or sex, neurotic compulsions, or the motivations of an artist or scientist. Nonetheless, we are frequently compelled to deny or fight being aware of these impulses, and they are frequently only available to us in disguised form.
Goldgeier et al. (2005:87) proposed that the function of psychology in defining boundary conditions is particularly important in refining arguments within a specific theoretical tradition. They argue that prospect theory identifies the situations under which we should anticipate more risk-averse or risk-taking conduct than an expected-utility model can explain when a more defensive or offensive realism argument should prevail or when redistributive schemes are more or less appealing. They highlighted that macrolevel theorists discount psychological theories as impeding explanations of broad features of international conduct. The Goldgeier et al. (2005:87), on the other hand, appreciate psychology's assistance in refining ideas in critical discussions about power, institutions, and norms. Surprisingly, perceptions, ideas, and identification are the terms that dominate modern macro-level efforts to refining or advancing theories. Now is the moment for International Relations theorists to use systematic reasoning about psychological aspects to address the psychological elements of their variables more openly.

Influence of Personality Factor on Decision Making in Foreign Policy

Personality refers to the distinctive sets of behaviours, cognitions, and emotional patterns that emerge as a result of biological and environmental variables. While there is no universally accepted definition of personality, most theories centre on motivation and psychological interactions with one's surroundings. Personality, according to the American Psychological Association, refers to individual variances in thought, mood, and behaviour patterns. Personality research focuses on two major areas: understanding individual differences in specific personality qualities such as friendliness or irritability, and understanding how the many pieces of a person work together as a whole (Encyclopedia of Psychology).

From the foregoing therefore, personality approach is understood as the analysis of the effect of differences in characteristic pattern of thinking, feeling and behaviours of leaders on foreign policy decisions, types and models. Spannier (1978) posits that nations and elites have certain “styles” which affect the manner in which they conduct themselves in the international arena, whether they initiate an action or react to what others are doing.

Thus, the idea of style aids an analyst in defining how a country and its policymakers are likely to interpret a certain circumstance, potential course of action, and the courses chosen. In order to understand foreign policy decisions, the personality approach in foreign policy investigates the unique pattern of thinking of leaders individually or as a group. It is used to assess the impact of various individuals on foreign policy formation and international system activities.

Jensen (1982: 14 - 15) states that for personality to have the greatest impact on foreign policy decisions, the leader must demonstrate a high level of interest in foreign affairs, possess high decisional latitude, the situation must be non-routine, and information about the situation must be ambiguous. Margaret Hermann (1980) suggested that by evaluating peculiarities, qualities, and personality, predictions about foreign policy decision-making may be established since such analyses can produce a clear picture of likely human behaviour, i.e. predispositions. According to Rosati (1995), the structure of an individual's cognition is influenced by their background, previous experiences, individual role, and fundamental belief system.

According to Ate (1990), in the Third World's poor countries, where institutional positions and processes are highly individualised and ethnicized, the personality element in foreign policy should have a greater influence than in industrialised society. This means that, due to a lack of robust institutions, the thinking patterns, character traits, belief system, and values of leaders in Third World countries contribute more to foreign policy decisions than leaders in First World countries.

With its predominantly authoritarian, monarchical, and dictatorial politics, the Middle East might be a significant example for the manifestation of personality in foreign policy decision-making. In such regimes, the leader is free to act on his or her own whims, unencumbered by bureaucracy or opposing groups. This situation is ideal for the Middle East and leaders like Saudi King Fahd or the Sultans of the Gulf States. This style of leader is referred to as "dominant" (Hermann 2001:84). According to this understanding, one would assume that Israel as a bureaucratic democracy would be less subject to the effects of personality on foreign policy decision-making than other States in the Middle East. However, Israel should perhaps be viewed as the exception rather than the rule. In contrast to many bureaucratized democratic States, Israel politics is highly militarized with a significant number of high-ranking politicians and decision-makers emanating from long standing military careers.
When analysing a state's foreign policy, one of the important variables that influences the success or failure of various activities ranging from military campaigns to organisational performance in business and management, to the character and quality of a nation-foreign state's and domestic policies, should be taken into account. For example, the more charismatic, authoritative, democratic, and so on a leader is, the more positively he or she impacts the state's foreign policy. Different political analysts draw different contrasts, but the most prevalent is that political leaders and foreign policy decision-makers are classified as either aggressive or conciliatory leaders. Other classifications for decision-makers include pragmatists, crusaders, ideologues, and opportunists. Personal factors such as beliefs, motivations, decisional style, and inter-personal style might be used to categorise decision-makers into either category (Hermann (2001:86).

When dealing with international relations, national leaders might apply a set of norms to different situations. Pearson and Rochester classify foreign policy decisions as Macro-Decisions, Micro-Decisions, and Crisis Decisions. Macro-decisions are the sort of concept whose description is more in accordance with what one would anticipate from a policy. These are choices made primarily on topics that occur over a longer period of time and include a bigger number of participants, such as the nuclear deal between the P5+1 states and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Micro-decisions, also known as 'administrative' decisions, are typically actions that are 'relatively' narrow in scope, pose a low threat, and are handled at lower levels of the bureaucracy, such as the Bakassi Peninsula talks between the Nigerian and Cameroonian roundtable discussions to trash out the details of the Green Tree Agreement. The third type of decision is a crisis decision, which is defined as "characterised by a sense of high threat (including the possibility of military hostilities), a finite time frame, and involvement of officials at the highest levels," such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over ballistic missiles stationed in Cuba by the Soviets (Pearson et al 1998).

Logical decision-making necessitates '(1) information about the situation; (2) substantive knowledge of cause and effect relationships relevant for assessing the expected consequences of alternative courses of action; and (3) a method of applying the value and interest engaged by the problem at hand in order to judge which course of action is 'best' and/or least costly and should thus be chosen.’ In practise, these prerequisites are frequently not satisfied. 'The policymaker must proceed with the handicap of a severe constraint on the possibility of meeting these requirements of rational decision making.' 'Between dynamic and cognitive psychology, the leader's psychology and information processing, and the theory of high-quality decisions and their actual accomplishment.' (1992, George).

However, according to Rourke et al. (1998), foreign policy decision-making comprises three general aspects: How differences in the kind of government, policy, or situation impact the policy process; The influence of political culture on foreign policy, as well as the roles of various political activities in determining foreign policy. Concerning the sort of circumstance, they stated that crisis conditions are one component that influences how policy is developed. A crisis is a situation in which decision makers are taken aback by events, feel threatened (particularly militarily), and believe they have only a short time to make a choice. They described how leaders must make sensible judgments. They described how the disparities between the current situation and the past situation. They emphasised that different sorts of policy are determined by distinct issues, subject areas, decision makers, and policies. They said that the impact of political leaders in domestic policy is less than in foreign policy due to the existence of many elements such as interest groups and lawmakers. The second is on foreign policy political culture, which is based on two sources. The first is national historical experience, followed by national belief systems. The last issue concerns the involvement of political actors in foreign policy formulation (Rourke et al 1998).

According to Hagan (2001), decision-making is an essential occurrence in international relations. He uses the examples of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War to demonstrate how decision-makers shift the course of events and give the entire process a new direction. Throughout all of these battles, "the leadership in these nations was reacting to every actual systemic challenge," including "the degree of uncertainty they caused, the value trade-offs they induced, and the dispersion of decision authority they confronted." Hagan emphasises the uncertainty of political events and how leaders respond to them. Depending on the complexities of the issue and how the leadership responds to the political process of events, the situation may take a different turn (Hagan, 2001).
In a distinct perspective, Grove (2007) focuses on the many ways leaders develop support among their constituencies. He classified the techniques used by leaders into four categories: enlarging the audience, paying off, tying hands, and presenting threats. The first is the 'broadening audience' approach, which refers to the methods used by leaders to enlarge their coalition with others in order to build legitimacy for his political aims, either locally or intentionally, or to create a common identity for a large number of followers. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad employs such a policy toward Israel and the United States in order to earn support in Middle Eastern countries, while Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez employs a similar technique to achieve favour overseas. The second decision-making approach is 'buying off.' To implement this technique, leaders pay off people who may play a part in the political process in order to acquire support by "using material resources or promises of those riches to co-opt opponents overseas or at home." These leaders rely on economic and military help, as well as investment possibilities, from other nations or non-state entities, whether local or worldwide (Grove, 2007).

Last, is the 'tying hand' tactic which is a technique for convincing the audience that particular judgments must be taken because there are no other options. George W. Bush's approach to persuade his cabinet and the American public to attack Iraq following September 11 is a prime example of such a strategy. The last tactic is 'framing threat,' in which leaders portray particular political players as an opponent or threat in order to secure popular support for their own agenda (Grove, 2007).

Crisis Decision Making and Personality Factor in Foreign Policy: Nigerian Experience

Decision-makers have extreme time restrictions during a crisis. The regular decision-making procedures, including checks on bad judgments, may not work. Communications grow shorter and more stereotypical, and material that does not meet the expectations of decision makers is more likely to be ignored simply because there is little time to analyse it. To save time, the most obvious solutions are being considered, since an emergency circumstance necessitates an immediate reaction. Examples are so rare that we must focus on Nigerians' foreign policy crisis decision-making from Balewa to Buhari. The Balewa regime's first policy action on African decolonization was made immediately after independence in October 1960, in response to the Sharpeville event in South Africa, which lost 69 lives and left hundreds injured. This event sparked widespread outrage throughout Nigeria (Akiba, 1998).

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the head of the opposition Action Group (AG), has urged the Nigerian government to take fast and decisive action against the Apartheid system in South Africa. Following the fatal Sharpeville tragedy, the Nigerian Prime Minister was specifically requested to evacuate all white South Africans and economic interests from Nigeria immediately. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Nigeria's opposition leader, also urged Prime Minister Balewa to work toward South Africa's expulsion from the British Commonwealth, claiming that there could be no affinity or family ties with a sadist and barbaric regime that had "displayed a sadism and barbarism which are rare in the annals of man" (ibid).

In an apparent attempt to appease the populace's desires, the Balewa government made rapid measures toward South Africa, banning the South African Dutch Reformed church from Nigeria. A private member's bill was also approved on April 5, 1960, urging "the Government to take appropriate action to prohibit the entry of South African commodities into the nation." This was followed by additional actions such as the discontinuation of the appointments of white South Africans in the Nigerian Federal Government. The Nigerian government requested that all regional administrations follow suit. The Balewa administration also cancelled contracts previously handed to South African companies, vowing that no white South African would be hired by the regime again (ibid). As a result, apartheid South Africa was compelled to resign from the British Commonwealth in 1961 due to the combined power of other progressive nations such as Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ghana, Pakistan, Malaysia, Tanzania, and India (Akiba 1998; Duke, 1999).

Following the removal of the apartheid state from the Commonwealth, an infuriated South African Prime Minister Verwoerd launched a rhetorical assault on the nations that supported South Africa's expulsion from the organisation. The then-South African apartheid leader referred to them as "detractors," "vindictive," and "hypocritical" elements. He specifically targeted the Nigerian Prime Minister for his stance on issues of white/non-white relations in South Africa. Prime Minister Verwoerd attacked and labelled Balewa a fanatic for not being realistic in his appraisal of South Africa's racial policy (Duke, 1999).
Another critical decision-making under Balewa arose with the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Balewa and Nkrumah competed to see who could speak for Africa at global fora. No surprise, the Balewa backed the Monrovia group while Nkrumah supported the Casablanca group in the run-up to the founding of the OAU, with the Monrovia group wanting gradual decolonization while the Casablanca group was in agreement with radical decolonization (Duke, 1999).

Nigerian support for UN-led anti-Lumumba forces in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) was countered by Ghana's hard stance against UN intervention in the Congo under the auspices of the UN without fully supporting embattled Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who had cried out for support from fellow African countries following the bombardment of his country by Cold War forces (Dukobo 2010). These were some of the manifestations of Nigeria and Ghana's long-standing struggle for African leadership. The competition between the two nations was summed up by Nkrumah's hardline pro-communist leanings and support for radical opposition parties in Nigeria. Anti-Nkrumahism was a key topic in Nigeria's foreign policy in the first half of the twentieth century (Osita, 2010).

Under General Gowon's regime, the Nigerian leadership felt misled by the posture of its West African neighbor's specific Benin Republic, which was sympathetic to the Biafra movement, and ordered the immediate/partial closing of its border with the republic of Benin. Nigeria also severed diplomatic ties with Gabon, Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, and the French government, which had recognised the Biafra administration (Duke 1999). However, following the civil war, Nigeria displayed its willingness to heal the hatchet by restoring diplomatic ties with Nigeria's wartime foes, especially Zambia, Benin Republic, Tanzania, and Cote'd Ivoire; African governments who recognised Biafra during the civil war.

Nigeria's African-centered stance was notably visible under this government, particularly in the handling of the Angola conflict, which catapulted the Muritala regime into worldwide prominence as a dictatorship strongly devoted to the African cause regardless of whose ox was gored. Nigeria's interest in the Angolan conflict stemmed mostly from the conflict's engagement by racist South Africa. In keeping with the OAU's position, Nigeria formerly backed a government of national unity in Angola comprised of the three committed liberation groups, namely the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA (Sotumbi, 1990).

Nigeria was on the sidelines watching and calculating on which course to take in the coming game as the aforesaid event unfolded. After learning that apartheid South Africa had sent troops to Angola to fight with the FLNA and UNITA, the Nigerian government opted to support the MPLA (Garba, 1987: 49). The goal of South Africa and its allies was to install the FLNA and UNITA as a "puppet reactionary dictatorship." Nigeria genuinely believed that the MPLA had the lawful right to preserve the ambitions of the Angolan people, which is why the Nigerian government provided moral, financial, and diplomatic assistance to them.

Concerned about the Muritala/Obasanjo regime's policy on the issue, as well as the OAU's decision to recognise the MPLA, President Ford of the United States wrote personal letters and deployed the country's (US) diplomatic machinery to African leaders and governments at the time to discourage them from following Nigeria's steps in Angola. The US urges countries who have recognised the MPLA to rescind their choice. The Muritala/Obasanjo dictatorship responded more forcefully to US manoeuvrings. Nigeria reacted angrily and made its response public. When the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was scheduled to visit Lagos, the dictatorship took drastic steps against the US.

When the Nigerian government took over the US Information Service facility and radio monitoring centres in Lagos and Kaduna, the regime's relationship with America worsened. On January 11, 1976, General Muritala Mohammed, Nigeria's Head of State, delivered a powerful speech reaffirming Nigeria's, and Africa's, position on the Angolan crisis and its support for the MPLA's quest for leadership at the extraordinary summit of the OAU in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, where he harshly criticised the West for aiding and abetting colonialism, as well as for paying lip service to the African colonial predicament and failing to take (ibid).

Other active obligations expressed by the regime against apartheid in particular and colonialism in general included Nigeria's hosting of the first United Nations Conference Against Apartheid in 1977 and the nationalisation of British petroleum and Barclay's Bank by the Nigerian government in 1979, when it became clear that Britain was not supportive of Zimbabwean independence. The decision to go against British economic interests in Nigeria was made to push the British government to persuade Zimbabwe's leadership to abandon power (Aluko, 1980).
Nigeria continued its vigorous anti-colonial campaign in Southern Africa throughout Muhammadu Buhari’s government, however the sole diplomatic severance occurred between Nigeria and Morocco. On November 11, 1984, Nigeria under Buhari recognised the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), whose territory Western Sahara had been illegally occupied by Moroccans since the Spanish departed the nation (ibid).

In an attempt to match words with actions, General Babangida maintained Nigeria's apartheid policy, which he inherited from his predecessors. The regime exemplified steadfastness and unwavering dedication to the abolition of apartheid. Nigeria led the list of 32 Commonwealth countries boycotting the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, Scotland in July 1986, owing to its avowed anti-colonial aims. The decision of Nigeria and its fellow Commonwealth member countries to boycott the games resulted from the refusal of the then British Prime Minister, Margret Thatcher, to enforce sanctions on South Africa, as agreed previously at the mini- Commonwealth Summit held in 1986. As a result, Nigeria proceeded quickly to add legitimacy to the country's Afro-centric foreign policy, which aimed to present Nigeria as the most influential black African state (Duke, 1999).

Apart from those whose membership is confined to African member nations, to which Nigeria participates, the Commonwealth and the United Nations are two of the most prominent organisations. The execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists on November 10, 1995, while Commonwealth leaders gathered in Auckland, New Zealand, prompted an unprecedented decision, with only one dissenting vote (that of the military government of the Gambia), to suspend Nigeria from the organisation for two years, pending its "return to compliance" with the principle of the Harare Declaration of 1991, in which all members-states pledge to foster democracy. This punitive approach was highly supported by South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as the British Prime Minister, David Cameron who denounced the Nigerian government for having perpetrated 'judicial murder'. However, South Africa's role in Nigeria's exclusion from the Commonwealth infuriated the military juntas in Nigeria, who quickly withdrew the Super Eagles from participation in the African Nation Cup held by South Africa the following year (ie, 1996). (Ogunlesi, 2013).

On a whole, the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa where Nigerians were brutalize tempted one to ask if Nigerians deserve such brutality taking into cognisance the fundamental roles played by the country in dismantling apartheid (Eke 2009: 138) informed that Nigeria-South Africa’s relations has been marked by discrimination against Nigerian in South Africa. He noted that the Nigeria’s consulate in South Africa confirmed that many Nigerians were killed in 2007 extra-judicial circumstance. Finally, in March 2012, South African authorities demanded that 125 Nigerians - an entire plane load - be detained at Oliver Tambo International Airport, reportedly for holding false Yellow Fever cards. The Nigerian government, enraged, instantly activated its emergency response mechanism. Within days, Nigeria had equalised, prompting 136 South Africans to return to their beloved nation, presumably to avoid acquiring the yellow fever that is to blame for Nigeria's dysfunction. One of the more amusing new reports at the time was that 'South African prostitutes' were being deported from Nigeria. Few people knew that South African economic interests in Nigeria extended to the sex trade until that point.

Conclusion
In the context of struggle and participation, governments fight for few resources in the international arena, and conflict and crisis develop, which, if not correctly or successfully handled, can lead to a foreign policy decision-making crisis. Most crises imply a high level of armed hostility, which governments prefer to prevent by peaceful diplomatic methods in order to maintain a safe and secure international environment. As people make private decisions, governments, as sovereign entities, make decisions that may be normal or crisis-prone.

We have explored the link that the article seeks to represent crisis decision making in foreign policy with special regard to the Nigerian foreign policy decision making process since independence as a case study.

References