

The Impact Of Good Governance On The Lasting Peace And Socio Economic Development Of Local People : A Case Study Of Mali.

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Abstract :

The analysis indicates a positive correlation between good governance, equitable justice and lasting peace, the Good governance put the citizens in a good disposition, citizens know their revenues is well managed. This provide them happiness, it appeases citizens, the equitable justice satisfies all citizens because it avoids the concept of superman or man above the law. The greatest obstacle to peace is injustice, Because if the citizens know they are all equal under the law, that will reinforces peace feeling, The significant increase of civil servants salary is very important because the public administration reflects the government, the government relies on the public servants staff for the implementation of government policy. The public servants are the backbone of the public administration. if the public servants are put in good work conditions it will turn them away from corruption that plagues the administration of several countries, the increased purchasing power of civil servants will push them to work correctly in all fields: equitable justice, good tax collection, performance of public works contracts, good governance .

Key words : good governance; lasting peace; social stabilization; public works contracts, significant increasing of civil servants wage; .good collection of taxes, successful decentralization.

I Introduction

1 Good governance

1.1 Definitions of good governance

Good governance is an indeterminate term used in international development literature to describe how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources. Governance is "the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)". The term governance can apply to corporate, international, national, local governance or to the interactions between other sectors of society.

The concept of "good governance" often emerges as a model to compare ineffective economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies. The concept centers on the responsibility of governments and governing bodies to meet the needs of the masses as opposed to select groups in society. Because countries often described as "most successful" are Western liberal democratic states, concentrated in Europe and the Americas, good governance standards often measure other state institutions against these states. Aid organizations and the authorities of developed countries often will focus the meaning of "good governance" to a set of requirements that conform to the organization's agenda, making "good governance" imply many different things in many different contexts

1.2 Characteristics of Good Governance

1.2.1 Participation

All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.

1.2.2 Rule of law

Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.

1.2.3 Transparency

Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.

1.2.4 Responsiveness

Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.

1.2.5 Consensus orientation

Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.

1.2.6 Equity

All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

1.2.7 Effectiveness and efficiency

Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.

1.2.8 Accountability

Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisations and whether the decision is internal or external to an organisation.

1.2.9 Strategic vision

Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded.

From the above discussion it should be clear that good governance is an ideal which is difficult to achieve in its totality. Very few countries and societies have come close to achieving good governance in its totality. However, to ensure sustainable human development, actions must be taken to work towards this ideal with the aim of making it a reality.

2 LASTING PEACE

The road to peace needs to be carefully re-constructed and followed. Violence and the threat of violence often appear to be short-cuts to reaching the goal. However, as A.J. Muste observed, they are short cuts that become blind alleys. The surest road to peace is the path of empathy, where self interest can give way to shared interest, where separateness can give way to reconciliation, where domination can give way to justice. Helping to build that road and joining with Israelis and Palestinians who choose to walk it, are tasks to which AFSC continues to dedicate itself.

3 The performance of the public works contracts

The primary difference between the public works contract and its immediate predecessor is its inflexibility. This inflexibility is a feature of fixed price, lump-sum contracts that set out clearly defined circumstances where the contract sum or the date for completion may be adjusted.

Under a public works contract, if the circumstance doesn't satisfy one of those criteria, or has not been notified to the

contracting authority within prescribed time limits, then no entitlement arises. Claims can only be determined as set out in the contract and if either party is not satisfied with the outcome, the recourse is to refer the dispute to formal resolution procedures. This inflexibility delivers results where projects and their attendant risks can be defined with reasonable accuracy, but this inflexibility is not suited to projects where the timeframe for delivery, or indeed the nature of the project itself, means that detailed definition of the project is not possible. This must be recognised and addressed as part of the medium term strategy.

Having concluded the review, it is the view of the GCCC that lump sum contracts still have a significant role to play and can be used effectively to deliver the vast majority of publicly funded projects providing;

- 1) that the project is well defined; and
- 2) that adequate information on the risks associated with the project is supplied in the tender competition; and
- 3) regular training and information sessions are provided for all those using and working with the contracts.

Part 2 of this report sets out the GCCC interim recommendations arising out of the review. These include some straightforward amendments to the public works contracts aimed at rebalancing the

Report on the Review of the Public Works Contract 10 level of risk being transferred to the contractor in recognition of the changed economic environment

and the fact that, in many cases, the competitive tendering environment is preventing tenderers from pricing risk.

The medium-term strategy will consider aspects wider than the conditions of contract and will include the development of a risk assessment and management procedure that will determine the tendering and contracting strategy, effectively identify the risks inherent in a public works project and will provide tools to evaluate the market's response to those risks as part of the contract award process. However consideration should be given to developing forms of contract or adopting standard forms published by the bodies mentioned at 1.2.3 that are more suited to delivering projects where proper definition is not possible. These would include projects such as works to heritage properties, refurbishment works to existing buildings, civil engineering projects where risks cannot be accurately quantified and projects which have extremely ambitious delivery periods.

The challenges associated with developing particularly complex, high-value projects have already been recognised by the GCCC and a form of contract, the Public Works

Contract for Early Collaboration (PW-CF10), has already been developed for this category. So too have the issues that arise with small scale maintenance and refurbishment projects and the Term Maintenance and Refurbishment Contract (PW-CF11) was developed by the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government and the local government sector in conjunction with the GCCC.

4 Corruption

4.1 The extent, forms and characteristics of corruption in current China

What is corruption? The notion of corruption varies with time and place. According to Chinese official terminology, the core element of the definition of corruption in today's China is the notion of the use of public authority and public resources for private interests ("Yi Quan Mu Si"). This is a very broad definition, which may include different phenomena and behaviours and may vary with time. Consequently, it can be adapted to include new forms of corrupt practice. Corruption in today's

China is often linked with negative phenomena and unhealthy tendencies within the party and government departments. As a result, anti-corruption effort also includes a fight against all of these phenomena and forms of behaviour.

This definition has three features. First, the core element of corruption is not

"abuse" or "misuse" of public power vis-a-vis legal norms or social standards for

private benefit but the very "use" of public power for private benefit. On the one

hand, this represents a very strict standard for determining what forms of behaviour

can be defined as corrupt since it can include any behaviour utilizing public power

for private benefits. On the other hand, given that legal norms and moral standards

may change with time, the definition may exaggerate the extent of corruption or

arbitrarily label some practice as corrupt.

Another feature of this definition is the ambiguity of the term "private interest"

in contrast to "public interest", that is the interests of whole nation and party. Private benefit includes not only personal

gains, but also the interest of work units, departments and regions when they are given priority over public interest.

Third, the definition leaves open the question of the subject of corruption. It not

only refers to individual public officials, but can also include the relatives of public

officials and retired public officials, and can also refer to some public bodies and

their leaders (as legal rather than natural persons).

MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY

The main objectives of this study are as follows: (1) to show the preponderant role of good governance in achieving lasting peace targets assigned to central government taxes collection (2) to show the advantages of significant increase of public servants wages on the government resources, (3) the importance of equitable justice point of view of citizens, (4) the preponderant role of performance of public works contracts, (5) the advantages of successful decentralization for local citizens through management autonomous and choosing freely their officials, (6) to focus on the consequences of the security crisis in Mali on the macro-economic indicators; (7) show the best way to solve the conflicts in Africa specially in the northern of Mali. (8) to implement a good governance at local, regional and national levels.

2.1 Data collection

The data collected were provided by the National Statistics Institute (INSAT) and the General Directorate of local authorities (DGCT). The INSAT is responsible for data collection at the national level, the DGCT is responsible for the support of communities throughout the national territory. Daily accounting transactions are saved from all directorates using the TABOR public accounting software, that is, state accounting. The software is designed to track daily income and expenditure of all financial administrations. The data is updated on a daily basis.

We chose to collect data by this method because it is modern and its the simplicity, reliability and consistency are advantageous to us. This method is very reasonable because the data can be captured effectively between different structures involved in the chain of command. It has the advantage of taking account balances at the beginning of year, and then continues balancing the accounts with every subsequent transaction. It is for these reasons that when it comes to tax data collection we had preference for this type of method.

2.2 Data Analysis

The data was analyzed through the use of the econometric software EVIEWS. It allows us to employ the following model

$$TY_t = \beta_0 + \alpha_1 TEX_t + \alpha_2 TM2_t + \alpha_3 DN_t + \alpha_4 SAVY_t + \theta \quad (1)$$

The choice of the regression method (Hausmann statistic) we retain econometric panel data because of many advantage she present in the analysis of determinants of growth. It will pair methods used to time series and cuts. For more, the estimation of models of growth requires long data panel econometrics allows for. The choices of econometric of panel require certain number of choice, for precaution and verification. The cylinder panel because it offer a results more relevant than the panels non cylinder.

Two types of precaution are taken, this is to avoid spurious and reassurance that the choice of panels was empirically better than other methods.

In fact, the new panel econometric shows that the macro-panels can lead to spurious regressions. It therefore necessary to reassure the stationary or non variables. There is such a study for two families of tests of stationary. The verification empirical panel econometrics as an appropriate method in the case of our study requires the choice of the specification (homogeneity, heterogeneity). To determine the structure of the panel models with individual effects (fixed effects or random effects).

Finally, to choose between the models of panel fixed effects or random effects we use Hausmann statistic. This allows us to retain the random effects model whose estimate is as follows. To Ministry retain the result to remember is:

Hausmann statistics very indicate to do to declare our case saw the items at the top

2.3 Estimated econometric model

The model to be estimate is borrowed from Amable and Guellec [7] and the linear test equation is given by:

Lasting peace = $c + \beta_1$.décentralization+ β_2 . good governance + β_3 equitable justice + β_4 . Substantial increase of civil servants salary + β_5 good perception of taxes,+ β_6 . The performance of public works contracts + ϵ .

Lasting peace = Good governance, equitable justice, the performance of the public works contracts, good distribution of wealth, good perception of taxes, decentralization

,significant increase of civil servants wages, successful decentralization,

3 Results and finding

3.1 Results

The analysis indicates a positive correlation between good governance, equitable justice and lasting peace, the Good governance put the citizens in a good disposition, citizens know their revenues is well managed. This provide them happiness, it appeases citizens, the equitable justice satisfies all citizens because it avoids the concept of super man or man above the law. The greatest obstacle to peace is injustice, Because if the citizens know they are all equal under the law, that will reinforces peace feeling, The significant increase of civil servants salary is very important because the public administration reflects the government, the government relies on the public servants staff for the implementation of government policy. the public servants are the backbone of the public administration. if the public servants are put in good work conditions it will turn them away from corruption that plagues the administration of several countries, the increased purchasing power of civil servants will push them to work correctly in all fields: equitable justice, good tax collection, performance of public works contracts, good governance .

the civil servants are at every level and stages of national management, thereof would strengthen the peace, the government for to satisfy his citizens' needs resources, large financial resources, large funds , large revenues. The most part of the government's resources come from taxation and the collection of taxes and fees,

The collection of taxes provide immense resources to the government, the government uses these resources for redistribution, and deal with its expenditures. a good perception of taxes the Government will help strongly the government . At municipal, regional and national levels. The northern regions of Mali have a very low tax basis, it generally account on the central government subsidies and the equalization payments,

The correct execution of public works contracts prevent corruption,

3.2 FINDING

Finally all these concepts have a positive correlation with peace, their individual performance avoids crises, discontent, uprisings that may undermine peace, which can be an obstacle to peace. which can constitute a barrier to peace.

The War is a mix of negative elements such as; bad governance, a partial justice, bad performance of the public works contracts, corruption due to low wages of civil servants and finally poor perception of taxes.

Successful decentralization leads to a lasting peace within the population because citizens know they have their own destiny in hand through the choice of their leader and in the management of local resources

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