Abstract

Research on the Kabiyè language has already explored,to some extent, the injunction in the chapters that deal with the verb. Nevertheless, it remains relative to postulate that the ambiguity of the intercurrent amalgam between the expression of the negation and that of prohibition is clearly removed since the terminology used in French language ("négation à l'impératif ", "formesnégatives de l'impératif et du jussif", Etc.) still bears clues to the survival of this vagueness. However, in Kabiyè, theenunciative operation of injunction is carried by the imperative and jussive modes with a conative scope which results from the injunctive behavior of the speaker. Prohibition is not,in that language, an avatar of the expression of an inadequacy, but a result of the injunction when it becomes deterrent or suspensive. It is introduced by the morpheme taa- /BB/ and can be nuanced or even reinforced with absolutive adverbs depending on the intention to act on the co-announcer that the speaker has assigned to himself.

Research on the Kabiyè language has already explored,to some extent, the injunction in the chapters that deal with the verb. Nevertheless, it remains relative to postulate that the ambiguity of the intercurrent amalgam between the expression of the negation and that of prohibition is clearly removed since the terminology used in French language ("négation à l'impératif ", "formesnégatives de l'impératif et du jussif", Etc.) still bears clues to the survival of this vagueness. However, in Kabiyè, theenunciative operation of injunction is carried by the imperative and jussive modes with a conative scope which results from the injunctive behavior of the speaker. Prohibition is not,in that language, an avatar of the expression of an inadequacy, but a result of the injunction when it becomes deterrent or suspensive. It is introduced by the morpheme taa- /BB/ and can be nuanced or even reinforced with absolutive adverbs depending on the intention to act on the co-announcer that the speaker has assigned to himself.

Résumé

La description du kabiyè a déjà abordé quelque peu l’injonction dans les chapitres réservés au verbe. Néanmoins, il demeure relatif de postuler que l’équivoque de l’amalgame intercurrent entre l’expression de la négation et celle la prohibition est nettement levé tant la terminologie usitée (« négation à l’impératif », « formes négatives de l’impératif et du jussif », etc.) porte encore des indices de la survivance de ce flou.Or, en kabiyè, l’opération énonciative de l’injonctionest prise en compte par les modes impératif et jussif à portée incitative mue par le comportement injonctif du locuteur. La prohibition est dans cette langue, non un avatar de l’assertion exprimant une

Inadéquation, mais une résultante de l’injonction quand celle-ci devient dissuasive ou suspensive, bref une interdiction. Elle est introduite par le morphème taa-/BB/ et peut être nuancée, voire renforcée au moyen d’adverbes absolutifs selon l’intention d’agir sur le co-énonciateur que s’est assigné le locuteur.

Mots clés : prohibition, injonction négation, gur, kabiyè.

exhortation, prayer, assertion (the way of expressing adequacy or inadequacy), etc. are often used. These are embedded in one or other of the enunciative borrowed from Kabiyè, the language of EasternGurunsi in Togo, focuses on the particularity of prohibition in the injunctive

operations specific to a language: assertion, questioning and injunction. The present contribution, whose analytical data are operation known under the other name of

Introduction

In any communication, the speaker aims, among other things, to affect the physical, moral or psychological integrity of the recipient. In order to act through the content of the message on the interlocutor, modalities such as order, questioning,"imperative operation". Indeed, in the injunction, as in the case of other enunciative operations such as assertion, which may be positive or negative depending on whether it expresses an adequacy or an inadequacy, there is an alternative of a "stimulating" expression in the form of an incitement to take action and an expression, for its part, which is repulsive in the form of a more or less formal prohibition. This second facet of the injunctive operation, the purpose of which is to prohibit, prevent, defend or interrupt the carrying out of a trial, the very face that has a deterrent purpose, is prohibition. Our interest in the problem of prohibition stems, on the one hand, from the amalgam which is often made between denial and prohibition and, on the other hand, from the need to systematically identify and describe the mechanisms for implementing the prohibitive enunciation in Kabiyè. The following questions will be of particular interest as we move forward in the analysis: (1) what properties make it possible to characterize prohibition in the context of the enunciative operation of the injunction? What typology can be established of prohibition in Kabiyè? (3) Is prohibition always explicitly expressed in discourse?This study is carried out in a descriptive approach that uses field data to highlight the mechanisms of implementation of prohibition in Kabiyè from the general framework of the injunction. It draws inspiration from Creissels (2006a) in the conceptualization of the injunctive sentence and Searle (1972) for the determination of prohibitive undertones. The data on which this study is based are collected from native speakers of Kabiyè in Kara, Togo.

The İnjunction: Some Properties İn Kabiyè

The injunction is used in the expression of the intimation. It is presented as an incitement by the speaker to the interlocutor to perform an action, to act according to the content of the message. In previous studies by Searle (1979, 1990: 358-360), the injunction is an independent category in the list of its (five) illocutionary acts. Its properties are defined by its illocutionary purpose, which consists inpushing the interlocutor to carry out a future action. The speaker tries to get things done. The essential defining element is this illocutionary aim of the injunctive act: to try to make the world conform to the propositional content. The injunctive act expresses the speaker's desires, will and intention. The conditions of sincerity are therefore the wishes, desires and will of the speaker(Minh, 2015). To achieve its illocutionary goal, the injunctive utterance necessarily carries the will of the speaker, whose desires and wishes it expresses in the form of various orders in terms of constraints: the order may be of a more modest (invitation, proposal or suggestion), ... vigorous (insistence or prayer) or peremptory (order, authorization or command). Thedifferent degrees of injunctive expression correspond to illocutionary acts that Searle (1990: 359-360) associates with the verbs to order, command, ask, require, pray, solicit, beg, as well as to permit, advise, invite, etc. (Minh, 2015). In the present study, the injunction is perceived through the injunctive statement, the prohibitive type of which is circumscribed by the preaching in Kabiyè as a particularity to be explained. In order to do so, we first present an overview of the injunctive relief statement in Kabiyè.

The İnjunctive Relief Statement

It concerns all language production in a situation of communication and corresponds to"an enunciative modality by which the speaker expresses his will to obtain a certain behavior from the addressee, and tends to make him realize the propositional content of his utterance" (Bréüs 2002: 51). It always appears, on the part of the speaker, what Charaudeau (1983: 60) calls "injunctive behaviour", which implies modalities such as ordering, prohibiting, suggesting, warning, etc., as giving the speaker the status of absolute authority and the co-enunciator the status of submission (Desnica, 2016: 260-261) or an obligation to perform.Thus, among the statements below, (1a) and (2a) are injunctive in the strict sense of the term since the order is directly respondent to the imperative. The same applies to statements (3a) and (4a) which, loaded with prohibitive content introduced by the morphemes -taa- (3a) and -ŋ- (4a) in the pre-verbal environment, are injunctive, because of the implicitly injunctive scope of their predicates. Furthermore, in (5a) the nonverbal statement mɩ́nɩ́wʊ́ caɖaɣ́which is an explicit order for a gourd whose content (the drink) is worth a hundred francs is alsoinjunctive, as is the volitional use of the adverb ʈasam "quick (done)!" (6) and the pronoun ñɛ_́ "you! " (7). These are directive acts. In contrast, statements (1b), (2b), (3b), (4b) and (5b) are mere assertions, which are the most important evidentiary acts.

1. ʈasamquick.Interj Quickly (done)!
2. ñɛ́you.Interj You!

Of the above statements, the injunctive scope is direct in (1a), (2a), (3a), and (4a) and

some extent, especially because of their appellative (Bühler, 1934)) or conative (Jakobson, 1963) function, in (6) and (7)). Smith (2007) considers that the expeditious field, which involves interjections, and the deictic field (or deictic procedures) are "directly" involved in language activity, to varying degrees, but in such a concrete way that it is possible to see in their use an intention on the part of the enunciator to act on the enunciate. The interjections thus establish a direct link ("direktenDraht", [...]) between the enunciator and the enunciatee by relying on an expeditious procedure whose appellative character recalls the appellate function in Bühler (1934) and the conative function in Jakobson (1963). The link between form and function is close in the sense that expedited procedures are self-sufficient, that is to say that their implementation dispenses with recourse to other linguistic means and syntactic integration (Smith, 2007: 79).In contrast, the injunctive nature of the utterance (5a) is a derivation of the underlying direct act of language generated by the context.Moreover, it should be noted that the injunction is usually accompanied by an imperative. This is at least what emerges, for example, from Dubois (2007: 250), who observes that the imperative is one of the forms of injunctive relief, from Fontaine (2012: 417), who speaks of the "injunctive imperative" as if there were an imperative mode that differs from the injunctive type, or from Nicole (2018: 139), who reserves the description of the injunction only to an exclusive interest in the imperative. Dufeu’s (2000) comment on the semantic vagueness of the imperative signifier in the linguistic tradition should also not be overlooked:D’autres, sans nier la diversité des réalisations formelles de l’injonction, maintiennent malgré tout l’équivalence sémantique commode que semble livrer l’étymologie, en parlant de l’impératif comme de l’expression « privilégiée » de l’injonction : on peut comprendre ainsi l’étude particulière de L. Wainstein sur L’expression du commandement dans le français actuel, ou encore l’article d’H. Lewicka sur « La modalité de la phrase et l’emploi des modes en français », qui évoque l’expression de la modalité volitive comme la « fonction primaire » de l’impératif (Dufeu, 2000 : 12).In the present study, any statement of a directive nature is considered injunctive, representing, as Oyharçabal (2000) states, "informally the act of speech corresponding to the expression of an order, regardless of the person supposed to carry it out: the speaker or a group including the speaker but not the enunciator (imperative), one or more third parties (jussive), or even the enunciator possibly associated with the speaker and/or one or more third parties."4.Thus, the injunctive utterance subjects the verb to the TAM constraints of imperative and jussive.

Imperative Mode İn Kabiyè

In Kabiyè, the imperative mode is characterized as being able to present a perfective or imperfect form (Kassan, 1987: 59-64) and described in relation to the jussive (Lébikaza, 1999: 345-347). Even if the definitions proposed (id, 345) as a prelude to their descriptions seem more or less confused, Lébikaza establishes details on the expression of the two modes: "L’impératifest le mode de l’injonction, de l’ordreformel. Les formes de l’impératif n’existent qu’à la deuxième personne du singulier…Le jussif est le mode de l’injonction et du souhait. La marque du jussif est un ton haut sans support segmental" Lébikaza's confusion in the definition of the imperative and the jussive results on the one hand from the vagueness created (inadvertently (?)) through the expressive imprecision he shows, in particular when he indicates that with the jussive mode, one can give an order or make a wish to the first, 2^ndor 3^rdperson in the singular or plural, including persons not participating in the communication or when it is not decisive from a descriptive point of view with expressions such as "...mode of the injunction, of the formal order" and "...mode of the injunction and of the wish", the difference in terms of content being non-existent.Nevertheless, the fact of considering the imperative and the jussive as modes of expression of the injunction is very remarkable in linguistic description when we know that most authors neither venture to define it nor to adapt it to the specificity of the language described.On the other hand, it also remains to be understood why Lébikaza (1999) chose to consider as strictly imperative only injunctive statements in the second person singular, whereas Kassan (1996: 299) implies the first person plural. It is not a trivial question why the second person singular and not the plural, especially since the latter also expresses the formal order ((8b)-(9b)) in the same way as the first ((8a)-(9a)).

Moreover, as it can be seen in statements (8b) and (9b), the high tone of the second person pronoun is not only in the jussive mode, if at least it is accepted that both statements are imperative. And we can take our curiosity a step further to show that even in the indicative, in an assertive ((10a), (10b)) or interrogative ((11a), (11b)) operation, whether it expresses an adequacy ((10a), (11a)) or an inadequacy ((10b), (11b)) with a second person plural pronoun as its subject, the second person pronoun always has a high tone that is characteristic of it and not in the jussive mode.

Other works, (Kpézou, 2019), following Ernst (1994), and especially Lébikaza (1999) for Kabiyè, have favored the direct order addressed to a single person, the second person singular, as a mark of the imperative in Kabiyè. Ernst (1994), for the Kakɔ, indicates in fact that "the forms of other persons, namely the 1^st 2^nd and 3^rd person plural, as well as the 1^st and 3^rd person singular, belong to a second category which we call injunctive" (Ernst, 1994: 4).To avoid falling into dead-end speculation, it is indeed essential, in order to define the imperative object, to characterize what distinguishes it from nearby signifying objects. Therefore, the present study is based on linguistic data from the productions of native speakers, as it aims at theorization of a satisfactory level of descriptive adequacy. To this end, we fully endorse the characterization of the imperative made by Dufeu (2000):Le mode impératif n’a pas vocation à fournir une indication à propos d’un sujet (implicite). Sa fonction propre est d’instituer l’interlocuteur comme agent nécessaire du procès. Dans cette opération linguistique d’imposition du procès, et d’institution de l’interlocuteur comme sujet, le verbe impératif, qui n’est pas un prédicat, n’indique pas de programme chronologique. La nécessité d’obtempérer est immédiate, orientée vers un avenir indéfini. Elle apparaît avec l’énoncé même, sans représentation construite du temps. A la modalité de prédication, de laquelle relèvent les modes subjonctif et indicatif, nous avons donc opposé une autre modalité, de laquelle relève le mode impératif, et que nous avons proposé de baptiser « institution » (Dufeu, 2000 : 466).

It follows that the imperative mode is operative only insofar as the trial is imposed on the interlocutor, whether singular or plural, instituted as a subject who must comply immediately. It therefore becomes possible to adopt the logic that distinguishes the imperative form (as is the case with Oyharçabal (2000), among others), that which corresponds to the second person, as is the case in Basque, from other forms. Thus, the forms of the imperative vary according to whether the verb is actualized in the utterance with the modality "institution"(Dufeu, 2000: 466) or with other values in addition.

The İnstitution Modality

The trial intimates a direct order to a third party to the second person without any additional indication whose semantic value would nuance its realization or interpretation.

When another value (continuative, expectative, adversative (Lébikaza, 1999)) is associated with the 'institution' modality, the process remains in imperative mode, but with an additional semantic nuance.

1. Continuing value The trial must continue.

(16)yɔ́kʊ́-ʊteláyéḿyɔbɩ

break.2Sg.IMPER-CONTmonkey.loavesfor.no.reasoncarefree

Continue to break the monkey loaves carelessly!

Expected value

The order is directed to the addressee to act pending an explicitly expressed hypothetical action ((18b)-(19b)) or not ((18a)-(19a)). The expectant imperative is assumed by the morpheme tɩ́ɩ́- of tonal scheme HH.

1. Adversarial value

The adversarial modality of the imperative expresses an unconditionality: the enunciatee must perform whatever condition prevails or opposes the action envisaged. It is introduced by the morpheme tɩɩ- /BB/.

The jussif

The previous section has tried to show how difficult it is to distinguish, in many descriptions, between the imperative and the jussive. Of course, variations in content may depend on contexts or language types since, as Italia (2005: 197), for example, shows, depending on the age and educational level of Gabonese pupils, jussive is confused with imperative in their reported discourse because, she says, the internal jussive modality is translated into theimperative mode. It is also normal to take into consideration the fact that situations do not present themselves in the same light from one language to another. Bentolila (1998) examines the issue with the case of Amharic, a very illustrative example:Jussif et impératif sont très proches l’un de l’autre, au point qu’on a pu parler de "jussif-impératif ". Tous deux servent à exprimer l’injonction ; l’impératif pour la 2è personne […] le jussif pour les autres personnes […] Malgré cette proximité formelle et sémantique du jussif et de l’impératif en amharique, nous préférons poser deux unités car le jussif est susceptible d’apparaître en énoncé interrogatif alors que l’impératif y est exclu.(Bentolila, 1998: 173). Moreover, both the jussive and the imperative express the injunction in Kabiyè. In the context of this description, it is retained that the jussive is characteristic of prescriptions, requirements and wishes. But what are its intrinsic properties? Lébikaza (1999: 347) highlights the boundaries of this mode, but says no more beyond that: "Le jussifestassezproche du subjonctif, sans luiêtreidentique. Nous avons évité le terme “subjonctif” parce qu’il recouvre des formes qui ne s’emploient pas seulement dans les énoncés exprimant une injonction ou un souhait". For my part, I consider the jussive to be governed by syntactic and semantic properties.Indeed, the jussive utterance is basically a verbal utterance with a left-selected argument which is a pronoun whose presence is obligatory even in the presence of a nominal phrase to which it refers ((22a)-(25a)). It is therefore updated, as in ((22b)-(25b)), with the system of substitute pronouns (Pali, 2015b: 296-297).

On the other hand, with personal pronouns, the jussive statement has some syntactic features. It is a dependent proposition which expresses the wish or the injunction (of the enunciator) whereas it carries the injunctive content which explicitly expresses the reaction expected from the addressee. The first proposition is the one that Lébikaza (1999: 346) called the introductory proposition, which he reduced to the following sentence: pʊ-wɛɛ́se "It is necessary that ". But the utterances ((26a)-(26c)) show that Kabiyè attests to other introductory propositions, depending on the verb chosen to preach according to the injunction or wish of the enunciator.

What the above statements have in common is that the proposals, pʊ-wɛɛ́se "It is necessary that", halʊ́ ñɩ́ŋaase "The woman demanded that" and pʊ-pɔzaáse "It demands that", play the same role in (26a), (26b) and (26c) to the extent that they can switch to the same position. Similarly, they all carry an injunction addressed to a third party, here má(ń)- (1Sg), the enunciator himself.

Moreover, the introductory proposal is not always mandatory. It is necessarily expressed when the subject is a first person pronoun, a second person pronoun in the singular or a second person pronoun in the plural.

From a pragmatic point of view, the ungrammaticality of (27d*) and (27e*) depends on the communication situation. Indeed, if these statements take the form of assertive enunciative operations, their ungrammaticality would be recorded. On the other hand, in an interrogative operation, the said statements are not only attested as such as interrogative injunctions ((27g), (27h)), but they may also be formally marked by interrogatories such as yááwé ((27i), (27j)), na ((27k), (27l)). On the other hand, the statement (27f*) does not fit in isolation (without the introductory proposition) in an interrogative context and does not actualize itself as an injunction with the interrogative words. Does it depend on a particularity, a restriction (?), on the pronoun of the second person plural in the jussive? It is too early to provide a sufficiently well-equipped explanation. What can be said at this stage is that in the interrogative form of the jussive (see (27m), (27n)) of the statement (27f), the subject pronoun ɛ́- designates the third person singular (3Sg). The jussive interrogative form is not attested with the second person plural ((27o*), (27p*)).

(27g)

máń-

saŋ

1Sg

wash.hands

Do I have to wash my hands?

(27h)

ń-

saŋ

2Sg

wash.hands

Do you have to wash your hands?

(27i)

máń-

saŋ

yáawé

1Sg

wash.hands

Inter

Copyrights & License Copyright © 2020 Tchaa PALI this is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. How to Cite PALI , T. . (2020). The Prohıbıtıve Injunctıon In Kabıye. International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention, 7(11), 6263–6280. https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsshi/v7i011.02 More Citation Formats ACM ACS APA ABNT Chicago Harvard IEEE MLA Turabian Vancouver PDF Download Citation Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS) BibTeX