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Historical Development Of Comparative Politics In The United States

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Abstract

The paper concentrates on the historical development of comparative politics in the United States, taking into cognizance; the past and present of comparative politics in the US. The discussion is organized around three distinct issues: the definition of the field's subject matter, the role of theory, and the use of methods. These three issues are the basis for an identification of distinct periods in the history of comparative politics and for assessments of the state of the field. Attention is also given to the link between comparative politics, on the one hand, and other fields of political science and other social sciences, on the other hand, and, more briefly, to political events and the values held by scholars of comparative politics in and around the United States.

Introduction

"Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed" (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1945)

Comparative politics is one of the sub-fields within the academic discipline of political science as well as an approach to the study of politics and development across countries. Comparative politics draws on the comparative research method, what Mill characterized as "the method of agreement" and "the method of difference" or, more commonly, most similar (e.g. American-Nigerian democracies) and most different (e.g. democracy versus authoritarianism) systems. By drawing on the comparative method, comparative politics attempts to provide a systematic study of the world's polities, and seeks to explain both similarities and differences among and between political systems. It is a systematic, comparative study of the world's politics which seek to explain both similarities and differences among these political systems (Wiarda, 2007; Lijphart, 1971; Hopkin in Marsh, D. and G. Stoker, 2002).Arguably, comparative politics is defined more by its methodology, rather than by its substantive or even theoretical areas of focus, which are quite heterogeneous. Comparative politics concentrates on areas such as democratization, state-society relations, identity and ethnic politics, social movements, institutional analysis, and political economy. It addresses these themes from a number of theoretical perspectives such as rational choice theory, political cultural, political economy, as well as institutionalism. As argued by Kesselmanet al (2007), comparativists often analyze political institutions or processes by

looking at two or more cases that are selected to isolate their common and contrasting features. Studies in comparative politics can be single-country case studies, comparisons of two or more countries, and/or studies of some dimensions of the entire global universe of countries (Wiarda, 2007).In this respect, a comparative study is drawn upon across political scientist's sociologists, anthropologists, among other disciplines.Comparative politics draws a better understanding of how politics work as well as rules about politics. McCormick refers to Comparative Politics as a tool to understand ourselves, i.e. gaining knowledge of the self, through knowledge of others. Thus, by studying the ways in which other societies govern themselves, we can better understand the character, origins, strengths and weaknesses of our own system of government (Ibid). Moreover, comparative politics explores how interest groups relate to the state or government, political culture and political values in different countries. Wiarda notes further that comparative politics studies the processes by which countries become developed, modern, and democratic; how civil society emerges in different countries; and the effects of economic growth and social change on the developing nations.

As a field of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system (Lim, 2006, 5).It is not necessarily about deciding which political system is best or worst, but learning more about how and why different systems are different or similar. In this respect, comparative politics helps us to understand the effects of both differences and similarities in different political systems. In fact, the real world of comparative politics can be viewed as a laboratory for political scientists to critically and systematically assess what works and what does not, as well as to demonstrate important theoretical relationships among different political variables. Sartori (1970) makes a similar point arguing that "to compare is 'to assimilate' i.e. to discover deeper or fundamental similarities below the surface of secondary diversities". This is based on the fact that, we can only obtain comparability when two or more items appear 'similar enough' to the extent that they are neither identical nor utterly different (Ibid).Just like other social science disciplines and fields of study, political science has undergone remarkable changes following the end of World War II (Lim, 2006). In part, this was driven by the importance of knowing about other countries so as the militarystrategic interests of the United States (US) could be better protected. As Wiarda (as cited by Lim, 2006: 9) noted, the rise of fascism and military in Germany, Japan and Italy and the rise of communism in Russia and China, had a profound impact on the field of comparative politics and political science as a whole. More recently, the end of the Cold War opened the window of opportunity that has resulted not only

in some remarkable political changes, but also in a closer integration of the world's economies than ever before (Green and Luehrmann 2007). Lim tells us that this historical gen of comparative politics informs us clearly that the field is not immune to a host of subjective, mostly hidden social and political forces and that, "what is true of the past is almost assuredly true of the present" (p11). While the field of comparative politics continues to change over time, it is important to note that its definition too changes. comparative politics as defined by many authors focuses on what happens inside countries, while international relations basically focuses more on what happens outside countries or more accurately relations among states. However, it is interesting to note that the renewed interest in the globalization among political scientists during the 1980s occurred almost parallel with changes in the role of the state in society in most Third World countries. Held (2000) alongside many scholars, argues that "we are in a new 'global middle ages', which though the nation states still have vitality, they cannot control their borders and therefore are subject to all sorts of internal and external pressures"

Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological Debates on Comparative Politics

Questions and issues relating to what to compare, why compares, and how to compare are the major concern of any comparativist. Comparative politics and comparative methodologies are, thus, well suited for addressing such questions. Addressing these questions does not only provide extensions of knowledge, but also a strategy for acquiring and validating new knowledge (Sartori, 1970). Making comparisons is a natural human activity. Comparing the past and present of nation X, and comparing its experience with that of other nations, deepens the knowledge and understanding of both nations, their policies, histories and experiences that are being compared (Almand and Powell, 1996). Comparative politics, inter alia, aimsto describe the political phenomena and events of a particular country, or group of countries (Landman, 2003).Comparative methods is a powerful and adaptable tool which enhances our ability to describe and understand political processes and political change in any country by offering concepts and references points from a broader perspective. Thus, this exposesthe comparative politicsfield into diverse intellectual enterprises. While Peters (1998) regards this heterogeneity as both a strength and weakness of comparative politics, Verba (as quoted by Peters, 1998:9) argues that this heterogeneity of the field will prolong its vitality, and it is a source of strength rather than of weakness. According to Verba, the openness of the field to various theories and methodologies helps to maintain its vitality and its capacity to cope with realities in a rapidly changing political world. So, the practical analyst of comparative politics needs to know not only what political reality (ontology) is, but also

how to begin to know and explain it, (epistemology), before even addressing the particular problem under investigation (methodology). Landman (2003:16) discusses ontology, epistemology and methodology as terms that occur in the discussion of the philosophy of science and distinctions between them often become indistinct in the comparative literature. Thus, these three concepts provide a 'directional dependence' among each other. Whereas ontology establishes what is knowable, epistemology discusses how it is knowable and methodology how it is acquired systematically. In a sense, different broad ontological and epistemological positions inform different methodological orientations or preferences (Marsh and Stoker, 1995:14). Drawing a link between methodology and ontology, Hall (2003) argues that, 'if methodology consists of techniques for making observations about causal relations, an ontology consists of premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which analysis begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense.'This author argues further that, ontology is ultimately important to methodology because the suitability of a particular set of methods for a given problem turns on assumptions about the nature of the causal relations they are meant to discover.

'Ontology'in comparative politics refers to theory of being, or a metaphysical concern. Itrelates to what can be studied, what can be compared, and what constitutes Comparative Politics.Hall (2003) defines ontology as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of causal relationships within that world. It is the character of the real world as it actually is (Ibid). Incomparative politics, ontology is relevant to our study of the 'what' of - countries, events, actors, institutions, and processes that is observable and in need of description or analysis. While we may have a lot to analyze in comparative politics, Peters discusses at least five types of studies that are classified as being components of comparative politics. The first unit of analysis according to Peters is a single country' descriptions of politics in X, whatever X may be. While this is a most common form of analysis in the discipline, it has the least assert to advancing the scientific status of comparative politics. The obvious weakness of this approach is that it is not really comparative but rather an explication of politics 'someplace else' (Ibid).A second unit of analysis in comparative politics is processes and institutions. This can be a selection of a small number of instances that appear similar or comparable in some significant ways; those instances are then used to clarify the nature of either the process or the institutions itself, or the politics of the country within which it occurs. This method does not describe and implicitly compare whole systems, but rather to develop lower-level comparisons of a particular institution or political process. Example of this can be a comparative analysis of public

policy formulation and implementation. A third way of approaching comparative politics is typology formation, where political comparativists develop classification schemes of countries or different components of the political party systems. This form of analysis was used to analyze politics in various countries by comparing their actual performance with the conceptual model. A fourth variety of analysis is regional statistical analysis. The purpose of this approach is to test some proposition about politics within the specific region. The initial goal of this approach is to make generalization only about that region, and if successful, then the ultimate goal is to extend that analysis to be a proposition about politics more generally. Example of this can be studies of the welfare state in Western Europe and North America. The final option discussed by Peters is global statistical studies. This does for the entire world what the regional studies do for a subset. Example of this can be the World Development Reports or Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.

Epistemology in social sciences expresses a view about how we know, what we know and in particular about what constitutes an adequate explanation of a political event or process. Positivism and historicism are among the two significant modes of thought that have greatly influenced contemporary social science (Chilcote, 2000:32).Positivism (and its empiricist epistemology), in particular, has indeed dominated the discipline of comparative politics and social science at large for a number of decades. Positivism has a very long history in social science (Smith et al, 1996) with the early theorists, such as Auguste Comte, David Hume, and Herbert Spencer. Comte in particular, is the one who coined the word ‘positivism’ and ‘sociology’ in early 19thcentury (Chilcote, 2000; Smithet al, 1996; Neufeld, 1995). His major aim was to develop a science of society based on the methods of natural sciences. According to Comte, the positivist approach would give in a methodologically unified conception of science which would give true, objective knowledge, in the form of causal laws of phenomena, derived from observation (Neufeld, 1995).Comte’s view was very significant in the development of the social sciences during the 19thcentury, fundamentally influenced writers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and Émile Durkheim (Smith et al, 1996; Neufeld, 1995). Nonetheless, Comte’s view suffered from a number of ambiguities and even internal challenges which gave way to logical positivism which arose in 1920s in Austria (The Vienna Circle), German (The Berlin School) and Poland. This approach claimed radically that science was the only true form of knowledge. Hence, it became very dominant and perhaps the most influential variant in social science, dating from the first half of the 20thcentury (Neufeld, 1995).The logical positivists located many of the problems and uncertainties of science in general and social sciences in particular

with the unclear use of language. The proponents of this variant argue that, in order to avoid production of meaningless statements, scientific language must be governed by strict rules of meaning. They appeal to the certainty of empirical sense-perception in an effort to stabilize scientific and social scientific categories (Hall et al, 1995). However, logical positivism was discredited as a philosophy of science especially after World War II. Its epistemology and ontology became increasingly challenged throughout the social and behavioural science in the 1950s and 1960s, thus giving rise to post-positivism (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).

Post-positivism, on the other hand, was a response to the widely discredited maxims of positivism, whereas many of its doctrine were in direct opposition to those of its fore runner. Post-positivism believes that a research is influenced by the values of investigators as well as the theory or hypotheses are used by investigator. Moreover, it believes that the nature of reality is based on the fact that our understanding of reality is constructed (Ibid).The post-positivist objective is not to reject the scientific project altogether, but identify the need to understand properly what they are doing when engaged in any form of research (Fischer, 1998). Post-positivism can thus be explained as an attempt to understand and reconstruct that which already is being done when engaged in scientific inquiry. For post-positivist, the central debates in politics are not often over data as such, but pretty over the underlying assumptions that organize them (Ibid). Tashakkori and Teddlie noted that, since these tenets reflect common understandings regarding both the 'nature of reality' and the conduct of social and behavioral research, they are widely shared by both qualitatively and quantitatively oriented researchers.

Comparative Studies in the United States: In Perspective

Comparative politics emerged as a distinct field of political science in the United States in the late 19th century and the subsequent evolution of the field was driven largely by research associated with US universities. The influence of US academia certainly declined from its high point in the two decades following World War II. Indeed, by the late 20th century, comparative politics was a truly international enterprise. Yet the sway of scholarship produced in the US, by US- and foreign-born scholars, and by US-trained scholars around the world, remained undisputable. The standard for research in comparative politics was set basically in the US. In sum, a large part of the story of comparative politics has been, and continues to be, written by those who work and have been trained within the walls of US academia. Here we look at the past and present of comparative politics in the US. The discussion is organized around three issues: the definition of the field's subject matter, the role of theory, and the use of methods. These three issues are the basis

for an identification of distinct periods in the history of comparative politics and for assessments of the state of the field. Attention is also given to the link between comparative politics, on the one hand, and other fields of political science and other social sciences, on the other hand, and, more briefly, to political events and the values held by scholars of comparative politics.The argument presented here is as follows. Since the institutionalization of political science as an autonomous discipline, a process initiated in the late 19th century, the evolution of comparative politics was punctuated by two revolutions: the behavioral revolution, that had its greatest impact on comparative politics during the immediate post–World War II years until the mid-1960s, and the second scientific revolution, that started around the end of the Cold War and is still ongoing. On both occasions, the impetus for change came from developments in the field of American politics and was justified in the name of science. However, the ideas advanced by, and the impact of, these two revolutions differed. The behavioral revolution drew heavily on sociology; in contrast, the second scientific revolution imported many ideas from economics and also put a heavier emphasis on methodology. Moreover, though each revolution centrally involved a tension between traditionalists and innovators, the current revolution is taking place in a more densely institutionalized field and is producing, through a process of adaptation, a relatively pluralistic landscape. Beyond this characterization of the origin and evolution of comparative politics, concerning the present, it stresses that scholars of comparative politics—comparativists, for short—have accomplished a lot and produced a vast amount of knowledge about politics, but also have fallen short of fulfilling the field's mission to develop a global science of politics due to some serious shortcomings. Specifically, the lack of a general or unified theory of politics, and the failure to produce robust, broad empirical generalizations about world politics, are highlighted. Concerning the future of comparative politics, it is suggested that potentially paralyzing or distracting divisions among comparativists, which hamper progress in the field, will only be overcome inasmuch as comparativists appreciate both the depth of the roots of comparative politics in a humanistic tradition and the vital importance of its scientific aspirations.

Going further, in his article "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government," Roy Macridis (1968) seems to consolidate his previous position which focused primarily on three issues. First, he believed that any serious study of comparative politics should demonstrate a clear investigation for interest configuration in a country. What he means by "interests" is a kind of seasonal agreements between various factions and groups in a society and not simply latent unexposed interests (Interest Group). However, he doesn't reveal any sort of class analysis in connection with the interest analysis. His stands here are quite similar to those pluralists such as Truman Mills

and Dahl. Secondly, he emphasized the role of ideology. For him ideology corresponds with the political culture. He disagrees with Marxist who believes that ideology is false conscious. Finally, he proposes the study of government bureaucracy along with the formal process of decision making. Macridis tends to draw a line between what is political and what is not. In my judgment in most cases, if not all, this line is artificial and difficult to defend. Macridis, however, takes the opposite direction when he highly dichotomized between the various segments of life. To my understanding what he adopts in this regard is a sort of traditional Laissez-Fair liberalism. He argued; "In most cases and for most of the time, the great host of social, economic and interpersonal relations has no actual relevance to politics and therefore the discipline. He went further when he contended, that it is even a sign of superficiality to attempt to link a "non-political variable such as income" with a political variable such as "voting." Because of these stands he condemned behaviorism for its tendency to transcend the formal barriers between social sciences. He rather proposed the traditional studies of the governmental legal and bureaucratic structures. Like many social scientists, Macridis advocated clear distinction between "facts" and "values." In my opinion, because of their subject matter, political scientists have to take a clear position for the problem under investigation. Isolating the so-called "facts" from "values" is like isolating the language from its contents "perceptions." Moreover, the clear ideological or political position of the author will prevent the student from getting confused while searching for the author's ideological preference. In his "Comparing Government," Angelo Codevilla advanced comparative politics by reviewed four works on comparative politics including Beer and Ulam(1973),Macridis and Ward (1972), Dragmich and Rasmusser(1974),Blondel (1972) and Neumann (1968). Almost all of them were written in the 1970's (relatively updated), they deal primarily with four European countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union in order. With the exception of Blondel(1972), they tended to stick to the traditional domain of studying comparative politics, namely they confine their analysis to the Western democracies. Blondel's, however, takes a different direction, though within the traditional framework. He examines mostly party formation loyalties and competitions with a given judicial system. Moreover, Blondel exhibits a considerable interest in the Estonian paradigm of input-output mechanism in the study of political systems. Codevilla maintains that the works of Beer, Ulam, Berger and Goldman are characterized by four basic concepts serve as a framework of analysis: They are "pattern of interests," "pattern of power," undertaken by certain organizations with different levels. Codevilla, finally, reveals that the authors tend to provide a general description of the Soviet Union, while they do not demonstrate the fundamental disparities and similarities, if any, between the

Soviet Union and other countries. The article by Norman Furniss (1974) deals mainly with the conventional lines of thought revealed throughout the various texts of comparative politics. He starts by reviewing the different definitions of comparative politics as they are found in the various catalogs and syllabuses of the American schools of political science. These demarcations of comparative politics range from one such as "the study of all governments except one's own "to Gwendolyn Carter's definition which emphasizes the study of "major foreign powers." Furniss' own position, however, is that the study of comparative politics should be limited not nationally but substantively. Moreover, he argues that our focus should be on the structure of government along with the political elites. In light of these considerations, Furniss likes to see in any serious text sufficient information about the constitution, the relationship between the legislative executive and judicial powers. Besides, he also likes to see a geographical description to any country under study. The main strength of Furniss' article, in my opinion, is that he highly emphasizes the significance of critical thought towards any text. He rightly suggests that we should always be prepared to offer a kind of alternative explanation. This could be acquired by formalizing the "major theme of the book. For example in practical political terms there are some differences between the two parties in Germany, but they are not as significant as between the English conservatives of labor parties. However, Codevilla sees the most interesting feature of contemporary German government is the Federal Constitution of Court, which is an attempt to transplant the American judicial practices. Finally, Codevilla reviews the Soviet Union's section in the four textbooks. He starts by treating the concept of state in Marxism thought. According to a couple of quotations from Engels and Lenin, Codevilla deduces that "the Soviet Union is not a state but an anti-state'—because Friedrich Angeles sees it as a traditional phenomenon which must be made use of in the revolutionary struggle in order forcibly to crush our antagonists." Here again we come to the controversy of definitions to the term democracy. Aspturian, for example, argues that "in their eyes… Western democracy is a dictatorship over the working masses, while Soviet democracy is a dictatorship over the former capitalist working class." Moreover, in Lenin's perception "democracy excludes freedom" because democracy is the rule of one class over the other for the interest of the former.Codevilla maintains that the Soviet Union has always exercised a kind of attraction for the Western intellectuals in as much that many Western scholars tend to study the Soviet Union by the same theoretical tools applicable to the Western societies. For example, Neumann tells us that the Soviet Union is no more than a "pluralistic" society in which all governmental functions were decline of certain classes. The four texts under review have revealed detailed information about the structure of the French Parliamentarism in

comparison with other types of European Parliamentary democracy. As they maintain, French politics is characterized by the "presidential" system and separation of power. Section IV of the paper is dedicated to the treatment of German politics. It is now widely perceived that the emergence of Nazism in Germany was a direct production of European democracy. Nazism came to power in Germany through an electoral system, by a valid constitution and motivated by devastating economic troubles. Despite the experience of Nazism in Germany, Karl, Deutsch, among others, is quite solicitous about the degree of democracy's roots in Western Germany. Deutsch proposes fourteen points against which students of comparative politics can check whether a country is democratic. Some of those points are really concerned with the features of a democratic society rather than the democracy itself. Most notable are those points such as the respect of privacy, equality, sense of being in charge of people's lives, etc. Moreover, Goldmann notes that Nazism was far from being conservative. It was a radical revolutionary movement which, in the short time it had, abolished most of the social, economic, and even psychological foundations of its predecessor regimes. The pattern and mode of public participation in Germany is changeable from one constitutional stage to the other, e.g., from Weimer Republic to the Fifth Republic. As in England, the major two parties in Germany determined, considerably here that the aforementioned works don't really deviate from the dominant literature on British politics. They revolve around the traditional issues such as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. As Finer, Beer and Ulam and Newmann have pointed out, traditionalism is essential in understanding British politics, because it has preserved through many political forms (e.g., the monarchy). However, almost all of the authors under review, including Codevilla, tend to hold that the traditional political system is undergoing a severe decay which is manifested in many political institutions such as the Parliament, the parties, and the law-making bodies. Codevilla devotes the third section of his essay to the examination of the French politics in the works of the aforementioned authors. Prior to his analysis on the subject, Codevilla observes that "whereas when discussing the Soviet Union every one of our textbooks makes at least some effort to relate what goes on there to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, their discussion of France generally does not explain the ideas of Revolution and fail to put French politics into the perspective of democratic governments paradoxical task." This accusation, however, is not always correct. Macridis does mention the impact of the Revolution, although he believes it made no essential difference. The only difference he sees is a symbolic one such as the proposition, "The people are always right" after it. It is interesting to note here that Macridis tends to offer a class analysis to the French politics, namely the French political parties. He predicts the decline of the

center parties in terms of socio-economic data on what evidence is mustered to support it? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the argument?" Also, one of his strengths is that he was able to compute statistically the frequency of those texts which receive more currency in the basic courses in comparative politics, for example Almond and Powell Comparative Politics: A Development Approach (26%), Almond and Verb, The Civic Culture (175), Macridis and Ward, Comparative Political System(8.6%), and so forth. The major weakness of Furniss, in our opinion, is that first he tends to overlook the significance of class and social formation in the study of comparative politics. Second, whereas he plays .up the geographical factor, he offers no significance to the historical factors. Finally, he seems to argue within the domain of legal traditional paradigm when he outlines the importance of the descriptive approach to the structure of government. In this connection, he obviously oversees the theoretical substance in the analysis of comparative politics.

The Constitution of Political Science as a Discipline, 1880–1920

Political science, which had to be constituted as a discipline before the subfield of comparative politics could be formed, can trace its origin to a number of foundational texts written, in many cases, centuries ago. It can date its birth back to antiquity, and thus claim to be the oldest of the social science disciplines, in light of the work of Greek philosophers Plato (427–347 BC), author of The Republic (360 BC), and Aristotle (384–322 BC), author of Politics (c. 340 BC). In the modern era, important landmarks include the Italian Renaissance political philosopher Nicolo Machiavelli's (1469–1527) ThePrince (1515) and French Enlightenment political thinker Baron de Montesquieu's (1689–1755) The Spirit of Laws (1748). More recently, in the age of industrialism and nationalism, political analysis was further developed by European thinkers who penned the classics of social theory. Political thought in the United States, a new nation, necessarily lacked the tradition and the breadth of European scholarship. Indeed, significant contributions; from The Federalist Papers (1787–88), written by Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), James Madison (1751–1836) and John Jay (1745–1829), to the writings by German émigré Francis Lieber (1800–72), the first professor of political science in the US, did not match the broad corpus of European work. In addition, the relative backwardness of the US was apparent in higher education. Many teaching colleges existed in the US, the oldest being Harvard, founded in 1636. But the first research university, Johns Hopkins University, was not established until 1876, and a large number of Americans sought training in the social sciences in Europe, and especially in German universities, the most advanced in the world at the time, during the period 1870–1900. Yet, as a result of a series of innovations carried out in US universities, the US broke new ground by constituting political science as a discipline and hence opened the way for the emergence of comparative politics as a field of

political science. The clearest manifestations of the process pioneered by the US were various institutional developments that gave an organizational basis to the autonomization of political science. One new trend was the growing number of independent political science departments. Also critical was the formation of graduate programs, the first one being Columbia University's School of Political Science, founded by John W. Burgess in 1880—the event that opens this period in the history of political science—and hence the expansion of PhDs trained as political scientists in the US. Finally, a key event was the founding of the discipline's professional association, the American Political Science Association (APSA), in 1903. These were important steps that began to give the new discipline a distinctive profile. This process of autonomization involved a differentiation between political science and history, the discipline most closely associated with US political science in its early years. Many of the departments in which political science was initially taught were joint departments of politics and history, and APSA itself emerged as a splinter group from the American Historical Association (AHA). Moreover, the influence of history, but also the desire to establish a separate identity vis-à-vis history, was evident in the way political scientists defined their subject matter. Many of the founders of political science had been trained in Germany, where they were exposed to German Staatswissenschaft(political science) and historically oriented Geisteswissenschaft(social sciences). Thus, it is hardly surprising that, much in line with German thinking at the time, the state would figure prominently in attempts to define the new discipline's subject matter. But since history, as an all-encompassing discipline, also addressed the state, they sought to differentiate political science from history in two ways. First, according to the motto of the time that "History is past Politics and Politics present History," political scientists would leave the past as the preserve of historians and focus on contemporary history. Second, they would eschew history's aspiration to address all the potential factors that went into the making of politics and focus instead on the more delimited question of government and the formal political institutions associated with government This way of defining the subject matter of political science bore some instructive similarities and differences with the way two other sister disciplines—economics and sociology—established their identities during roughly the same time. The birth of economics as a discipline was associated with the marginalist revolution and the formation of neoclassical economics, crystallized in Alfred Marshall's (1842–1924) Principles of Economics (1890); that is, with a narrowing of the subject matter of Smith's, Ricardo's and Mill's classical political economy. In contrast, sociologists saw themselves establishing a discipline that explicitly represented a continuation of the classical social theory of Comte, Tocqueville, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx,

Weber, Pareto, Mosca, and Michels; and, proclaiming an interest in society as a whole, defined sociology as the mother discipline, the synthetic social science. Thus, like economists, and in contrast to sociologists, political scientists defined their discipline by betting on specialization and opting for a delimited subject matter. But the way in which the subject matter of political science was defined differed fundamentally from both economics and sociology in another key way. These sister disciplines defined themselves through theory-driven choices: economics introducing a reorientation of classical theory, sociology seeking an extension of classical theory. In contrast, the process of differentiation of political science vis-à-vis history was largely a matter of carving out an empirically distinct turf and involved a rejection, rather than a reworking, of European grand theorizing and philosophies of history. In sum, political science was born out of history and as a result of efforts to distinguish the study of politics from the study of history. But the birth of this new discipline also entailed a break with, rather than a reformulation of, the classical tradition. The way in which political science was born had profound implications for the research conducted during the early years of political science. Most critically, the discipline was essentially bereft of theory, whether in the sense of a meta-theory, that sought to articulate how the key aspects of politics worked together, or of mid-range theories, that focused just on one or a few aspects of politics. Indeed, the formal-legal approach that was common in the literature of this period was largely theoretical, in that it did not propose general and testable hypotheses. Research also addressed a fairly narrow agenda. Political scientists studied the formal institutions of government and presented arguments that largely reflected the prevailing consensus about the merits of limited democracy, on the institutional questions of the day, such as the reforms adopted in the US after the Civil War and the constitutional changes in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In terms of methods, the US reaction to what was seen as the excessively abstract and even metaphysical aspects of European philosophies of history had the positive effect of grounding discussion in observables, that is, in empirical facts. But most of this work consisted mainly of case studies that offered detailed information about legal aspects of the government, at best presented alongside, but not explicitly connected to, more abstract discussions of political theory. Moreover, it tended to focus on a fairly small set of countries and not to provide systematic comparison across countries. The limitations of the early research done by political scientists in the US notwithstanding the establishment of political science as an autonomous discipline, was a critical development that prepared the ground for its future growth. In Europe and elsewhere, the strength of sociology, an imperialist field by definition, worked against the establishment of a discipline focused on the

study of politics. Thus, in breaking with the more advanced European tradition by establishing political science as a distinct discipline with its own organizational basis, the US opened a new path that would allow it to catch up and eventually overtake Europe.

The Behavioral Revolution, 1921–66

A first turning point in the evolution of US political science can be conveniently dated to the 1921 publication of a manifesto for a new science of politics, which implied a departure from the historical approach embraced by many of the founders of political science in the US, by the University of Chicago professor Charles Merriam (1874–1953) (Merriam 1921). This publication was followed in 1923, 1924, and 1925 by a series of "National Conferences on the Science of Politics," which were important events for the discipline. It was also followed by the formation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the world's first national organization of all the social sciences, based largely on Merriam's proposal to develop the infrastructure for research in the social sciences. And it signaled the rise of the Chicago school of political science, an influential source of scholarship in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the impact of Merriam's agenda on the study of comparative politics would not be felt in full force until the behavioral revolution swept through the field in the 1950s and 1960s. One reason why the impetus for a new approach to political science was temporarily muted was that it was centered in, but also restricted to, the study of American politics. Initially, political science was conceived as practically synonymous with the study of comparative politics or, as it was usually called in those days, comparative government. Indeed, Burgess and other founders of political science were strong proponents of a "historical-comparative" method. But as the boundaries between political science and other disciplines were settled, another process of differentiation, leading to the formation of fields within political science, began to unfold. This secondary, internal process of differentiation reflected the increased weight of US-trained PhDs and cemented the view that the study of American politics was a distinct enterprise within political science. In turn, more by default than by design, comparative politics was initially constituted as a field that covered what was not covered by American politics, that is, the study of government and formal political institutions outside the US. This would be an extremely consequential development, whose effect was noted immediately. Even though Merriam's ideas were embraced by many in the field of American politics, the new structure of fields insulated comparativists from these new ideas. Another reason why the impact of Merriam's agenda was not felt at once had to do with timing and, specifically, the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the onset of World War II. On the one hand, due to these events, a considerable number of distinguished European and especially German thinkers emigrated to the US and took jobs in US

universities. These émigrés reinserted, among other things, a greater emphasis on normative political theory in political science. On the other hand, many Americans who proposed a recasting of political science joined the US government and participated in the war effort. This produced a general hiatus in political science research and put any revolution in the discipline on hold. This transitional period came to a close with the end of World War II and the ushering in of the behavioral revolution. As in the 1920s, the impetus for change came from the field of American politics and was led by various members of the Chicago school. But this time around the proponents of change had a more ambitious statement of their agenda and also controlled greater organizational resources, including the Committee on Political Behavior established within the SSRC in 1945.16 Moreover, the calls for change were not been limited, as before, to the field of American politics. Rather, through a number of key events— an SSRC conference at Northwestern University in 1952, several programmatic statements and, most importantly, the creation of the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics chaired by Gabriel Almond during 1954–63— behavioralism spread to comparative politics. Behavioralism in comparative politics, as in other fields of political science, stood for two distinct ideas. One concerned the proper subject matter of comparative politics. In this regard, behavioralists reacted against a definition of the field that restricted its scope to the formal institutions of government and sought to include a range of informal procedures and behaviors—related to interest groups, political parties, mass communication, political culture, and political socialization—that were seen as key to the functioning of the political system. A second key idea was the need for a scientific approach to theory and methods. Behavioralists were opposed to what they saw as vague, rarified theory and theoretical empirics, and argued for systematic theory and empirical testing. Thus, behavioralists sought to bring about major changes in the established practices of comparative politics. And their impact on the field would be high. Behavioralism's broadening of the field's scope beyond the government and its formal institutions opened comparative politics to a range of theoretical influences from other disciplines. The strongest influence was clearly that of sociology. Indeed, Weberian-Parsonian concepts played a central role in structural functionalism (Parsons 1951), the dominant meta-theory of the time, and some of the most influential contributions to comparative politics were written by scholars trained as sociologists.Moreover, anthropology had some influence on structural functionalism, as did social psychology on the literature on political culture (Almond and Verba 1963). Thus, behavioralists helped political science overcome its earlier isolation from other social sciences and this reconnection to other disciplines was associated with a salutary emphasis on theorizing.

The central role given to theory was counterbalanced, however, by some shortcomings. The redefinition of the field's subject matter instigated by the behavioralists led comparativists to focus on societal actors and parties as intermediary agents between society and the state. Nonetheless, to a large extent, behavioralists focused attention on processes outside of the state and offered reductionist accounts of politics. The state was treated as a black box and, eschewing the possibility that the constitution of actors and the ways in which they interacted might be shaped by the state, politics was cast as a reflection of how social actors performed certain functions or how conflicts about economic interests were resolved politically. In other words, politics was not seen as a causal factor and a sense of the distinctiveness of comparative politics as a field of political science was thus lost.Another shortcoming of this literature concerned the approach to theorizing as opposed to the substance of theories. The most ambitious theorizing, well represented by Almond and James Coleman's (1960) edited volume The Politics of the DevelopingAreas, sought to develop a general theory of politics. Yet the key fruit of these efforts, structural functionalism, had serious limitations. In particular, for all the talk about science among proponents of structural functionalism, much of the literature that used this meta-theory fell short of providing testable propositions and testing hypotheses. Another strand in the literature, more concerned with mid-range theorizing, did generate testable hypotheses and conduct empirical testing. An example was Seymour Lipset's (1960) Political Man, which included Lipset's (1959) widely read American PoliticalScience Review article on the link between economic development and democracy. But this mode of theorizing lacked precisely what structural functionalism aimed at providing: a framework that would offer a basis for connecting and integrating mid-range theories—that is, for showing how the various parts connected to form the whole. These mid-range theories tended to draw on meta-theories other than structural functionalism; for example, a Marxist notion of conflict of interests played a fairly prominent role in the works of political sociologists. Yet these meta-theories were less explicitly and fully elaborated than structural functionalism. In sum, though these two literatures were parts of the same modernization school that sought to come to terms with the vast processes of socioeconomic and political change in the post–World War II years, their meta-theories and mid-range theories were not linked together and hence the twin goals of generating general theory and testing hypotheses were not met. In terms of methods, behavioralism also introduced notable changes. Though the dominant form of empirical analysis continued to be the case study and the small-N comparison, comparative analyses became more common and the scope of empirical research was expanded well beyond the traditional focus on big European countries. More attention was given to

small European countries. Interest blossomed in the Third World, as comparativists turned their attention to newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and the long-independent countries of Latin America. Moreover, comparativists studied the United States and thus broke down the arbitrary exclusion of the US from the scope of comparative politics. Another key methodological novelty was the introduction of statistical research. Such research included fairly rudimentary cross-national statistical analyses, as offered in the pioneering survey-based study The CivicCulture, by Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). And such research was associated with efforts to develop large-N cross-national data sets on institutional and macro variables, a key input for quantitative research, through initiatives such as the Yale Political Data Program set up by Karl Deutsch (1912–92). Comparativists could rightly claim to be engaged in an enterprise of truly global empirical scope. All in all, the stature of US comparative politics grew considerably in the two decades after World War II. Despite its shortcomings, the field had become more theoretically oriented and more methodologically sophisticated. Moreover, the identity and institutional basis of the field was bolstered by developments such as the expansion of SSRC support for fieldwork and research, the creation of an area studies infrastructure at many research universities, and the launching of journals specializing in comparative politics and area studies. Comparative politics in the US was maturing rapidly. And its new stature was evident in the new relationship established between comparativists working in the US and scholars in Europe. In the 1960s, comparativists in the US began reconnecting with classical social theory, and collaborating with European scholars. But now, unlike before, the US had a model of comparative politics to export.

The Post-Behavioral Period, 1967–88

The ascendancy of behavioralism in comparative politics came to an end in the mid-1960s or, more precisely, in 1966. Critiques of behavioralism started earlier, in the mid-1950s, and behavioral work continued after 1966. Moreover, elaborate meta-theoretical formulations by leading voices of the behavioral revolution were published in 1965 and 1966 (Easton 1965a; 1965b; Almond and Powell 1966). But these works signaled the culmination and decline of a research program rather than serving as a spur to further research. Indeed, the initiative quickly shifted away from the system builders who had taken the lead in elaborating structural functionalism as a general theory of politics. The publication one year later of Lipset and Stein Rokkan's (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments" marked the onset of a new intellectual agenda.The authors who contributed to the new scholarship were diverse in many regards. Some were members of the generation, born in the 1910s and 1920s, which had brought behavioralism to comparative politics. Indeed, some of the most visible indications of change were publications

authored by members of that generation, such as Lipset's collaborative work with Rokkan, Samuel Huntington's (1968) Political Order inChanging Societies and, later, Giovanni Sartori's (1976) Parties and Party Systems. But rapidly the early works of the next generation began to reshape the field with their analyses of consociationalism (Lijphart 1968), corporatism (Schmitter 1971), the military (Stepan 1971), authoritarianism (O'Donnell 1973) and revolution (Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979). Thus, the new literature was spawned both by members of an established generation and a generation that was just entering the field. These authors were also diverse in terms of their national origin and the values they held. The shapers of the new agenda included several foreign-born scholars working in the United States and, for the first time, these were not only Europeans primarily from Germany. Moreover, the political values of many of these authors departed in a variety of ways from the broadly shared liberal outlook of the previous period. The experience of fascism and World War II continued to weigh heavily on the minds of many scholars. But the US civil rights movement (1955–65) and the Vietnam War (1959–75) had given rise to conservative and radical positions concerning democracy in the US and US foreign policy. And, outside the US, the urgency of questions about political order and development made democracy seem like a luxury to some. This diversity makes it hard to pinpoint the novelty and coherence of the new period in the evolution of comparative politics. On the one hand, though the emergence of a new generation was in part behind the move beyond behavioralism, the shift did not coincide solely with a generational change. Part of the new literature was authored by members of the generation born in the 1910s and 1920s and some authors, such as Lipset, had even been closely associated with the behavioral literature. Moreover, many of the younger generation had been trained by behavioralists. Thus, the new literature evolved out of, and through a dialogue with, the established literature, and not through a clean break. On the other hand, the decline in consensus around liberal values was not replaced by a new consensus but rather by the coexistence of liberal, conservative, and radical values. This lack of consensus did introduce an element of novelty, in that many of the key debates in the literature confronted authors with different values and in that the link between values and research thus became more apparent than it had been before. But these debates were not organized as a confrontation between a liberal and a new agenda. Indeed, the difference between conservatives and radicals was larger than between either of them and the liberals. Hence, the new literature cannot be characterized by a unified position regarding values. Yet the novelty and coherence of the body of literature produced starting in 1967 can be identified in terms of the critiques it made of the modernization school and the alternatives it proposed. The most widely shared critique focused on the behavioralists' reductionism, that

is, the idea that politics can be reduced to, and explained in terms of, more fundamental social or economic underpinnings. In turn, the alternative consisted of a vindication of politics as an autonomous practice and an emphasis on the importance of political determinants. The new literature, it bears noting, was not authored by system builders but rather by scholars who rejected the work done by the system builders of the behavioral period. Indeed, the new literature did not propose an equally elaborate and ambitious alternative framework for the study of comparative politics and hence it is most appropriate to label the new period in the evolution of the field as "post behavioral." But the changes introduced by the new literature were extremely significant. The centrality given to distinctly political questions implied a redefinition of the subject matter of comparative politics. This shift did not entail a rejection of standard concerns of behaviouralists, such as the study of political behavior and interest groups. But issues such as interest groups were addressed, in the literature on corporatism for example, from the perspective of the state. What was new, as ThedaSkocpol (1985) put it, was the attempt to "bring the state back in" as an autonomous actor and thus to see state-society relations in a new light. The new literature also brought back the formal institutions that had been cast aside by behavioralists. After all, if politics was to be seen as a causal factor, it made sense to address the eminently manipulable instruments of politics, such as the rules regulating elections, the formation of parties, and the relationship among the branches of government. In short, the critique of behavioralism led to a refocusing of comparative politics on the state, state-society relations, and political institutions.The approach to theorizing also underwent change. Theorizing during this period was less geared to building a new meta-theory that would replace structural functionalism, as mentioned, than to developing mid-range theories. Meta-theoretical questions were debated, and a large literature on theories of the state was produced. But the frustrations with the adaptation of Parsonian categories to the study of politics led to a certain aversion to top-heavy grand theorizing that precluded the elaboration of ambitious and encompassing frameworks, and certainly no meta-theory was as dominant as structural functionalism had been in the previous period. Hence, efforts at theorizing were not seen as part of an attempt to generate an integrated, unified theory and thus produced unconnected "islands of theory" (Guetzkow 1950). But the freedom from what was seen, by many, as a theoretical straightjacket opened up a period of great fertility and creativity. Old questions, about interest groups, political culture, and the military, continued to be studied. New questions, on matters such as state formation and revolution, varieties of authoritarianism and democracy, democratic breakdowns and transitions, democratic institutions, social democracy, and models of economic development, garnered much

attention. Moreover, research on these questions did much to advance theories and concepts that brought political processes to life and to address the question of political change, a feat particularly well attained in Juan Linz's (1978) TheBreakdown of Democratic Regimes and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. In sum, the knowledge base of comparative politics was rapidly expanded and was increasingly shorn of reductionist connotations.The story regarding methods is more complicated. To a large extent, research during this period relied on case studies and small-N comparisons. These were the staples of area studies research, which sought to capitalize on in-depth country knowledge gained usually while conducting fieldwork. In addition, the use of statistics, introduced in the previous period, continued. As before, attention was given to survey research and the generation of data sets. Moreover, a quantitative literature started to develop on issues such as electoral behavior, public opinion, and democracy. Thus, even as structural functionalism as a meta-theory was largely abandoned when the field of comparative politics altered course in the mid-1960s, the methodological dimension of behavioralism—its emphasis on systematic empirical testing—lived on. But a methodological schism was also starting to take root. Indeed, during this period, quantitative research was not at the center of the agenda of comparative politics and, to a large extent, was ignored by scholars working within the dominant qualitative tradition. Hence, though comparativists began to take an interest in quantitative analysis in the 1960s, in tandem with political science as a whole, thereafter they started to fall behind other political scientists and especially Americanists in this regard. Precisely at a time when a concerted push to develop quantitative methods suitable for political science, and to expand training in these methods, was taking off,comparativists followed a different path. The relatively low impact of the quantitative literature that went by the label of "cross-national" research during this period was not due to a lack of emphasis on methods in comparative politics. In the first half of the 1970s, comparativists produced and discussed a series of methodological texts about case studies and small-N comparisons. This was, relatively speaking, a period of heightened methodological awareness in comparative politics. Rather, the standing of quantitative research was due to certain limitations of this literature. As the debate on the political culture literature based on survey data shows, comparativists frequently had serious reservations about the theoretical underpinnings of much of the quantitative research. In addition, the quantitative literature did not speak to some of the most pressing or theoretically relevant issues of the day. Largely due to the lack of data on many countries, quantitative research was most advanced in the study of functioning democracies, precisely at a time when most of the countries in the world were not democracies and issues such as

elections, democratic institutions, and even citizen attitudes were simply not germane. The rationale for this segregation of quantitative research from the mainstream of the field notwithstanding, it had important consequences for the field's evolution. Within comparative politics, this situation led to the development of two quite distinct research traditions—quantitative and qualitative—that did not talk to each other. In turn, within political science, it led to a growing divide between comparativists and Americanists. Comparativists were largely aloof of advances spurred primarily by scholars in the neighboring field of American politics, where the sophistication of quantitative methods was steadily developing (Achen 1983; King 1991; Bartels and Brady 1993). Indeed, comparativists were not only contributing to this emerging literature on quantitative methodology; they hardly could be counted among its consumers. The question of common methodological standards across fields of political science was becoming a source of irrepressible tension.

The Second Scientific Revolution, 1989–Present

A new phase in the evolution of comparative politics began with a push to make the field more scientific, propelled in great part by the APSA section on Comparative Politics, constituted in 1989 with the aim of counteracting the fragmentation of the field induced by the area studies focus of much research. This emphasis on science, of course, was reminiscent of the behavioral revolution and statements about the limitations of area studies research even echoed calls made by behavioralists. Moreover, as had been the case with the behavioral revolution, this second scientific revolution in comparative politics was not homegrown but, rather, the product of the importation of ideas that had already been hatched and elaborated in the field of American politics. Nonetheless, there were some significant differences in terms of the content and impact of the behavioral revolution that swept through comparative politics in the 1950s and 1960s and the new revolution that began to alter the field in the 1990s. The advocates of this new revolution shared the ambition of the behavioralists who aspired to construct a general, unified theory. But they also diverged from earlier theoretical attempts to advance a science of politics in two basic ways. First, the proposed meta-theories drew heavily on economics as opposed to sociology, which had been the main source of the old, structural functionalist meta-theory. This was the case of the game theoretic version of rational choice theory, as well as of rational choice institutionalism, a related but distinct meta-theory that introduced, in a highly consequential move, institutions as constraints. Second, the new meta-theories did not lead to a redefinition of the subject matter of comparative politics, as had been the case with behavioralism. That is, while behavioralists proposed a general theory of politics, which had direct implications for what should be studied by comparativists,

rational choice theorists advanced what was, at its core, a general theory of action. Indeed, rational choice theory offers certain elements to study decision making under constraints, but these elements do not identify what is distinctive about political action in contrast to economic or social action. In effect, rational choice theory is seen as a unifying theory, which can integrate theories about action in different domains, precisely because it is not held to apply to any specific domain of action. In turn, with regard to methods, the drive to be more scientific took two forms. One, closely linked with rational choice theorizing, was the emphasis on logical rigor in theorizing, which was taken much further than had been the case before with the advocacy of formal theorizing or formal modeling as a method of theorizing. The other, much more of an outgrowth of the methodological aspirations of behavioralists and the maturation of political methodology, centered on the use of quantitative, statistical methods of empirical testing. The impact of this new agenda with three prongs—rational choice, formal theory, and quantitative methods—has been notable. Some rational choice analyses in comparative politics had been produced in earlier years. But after 1989 the work gradually became more formalized and addressed a growing number of issues, such as democratization (Przeworski 1991, 2005), ethnic conflict and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 1996), voting (Cox 1997), government formation (Laver 1998) and economic policy (Bates 1997). An even more formidable shift took place regarding quantitative research. Political events, especially the global wave of democratization, made the questions and methods that had been standard in the field of American politics more relevant to students of comparative politics. Moreover, there was a great expansion of available data sets. New cross-national time series were produced on various economic concepts, on broad political concepts such as democracy and governance, and on a variety of political institutions. There was also a huge growth of survey data, whether of the type pioneered by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes' (1960) The American Voter—the national election studies model—or the broader and explicitly cross-national surveys such as the regional barometers and the World Values Survey. And, as the infrastructure for quantitative research in comparative politics was strengthened, the number and the sophistication of statistical works increased rapidly. Some of this statistical research, such as Adam Przeworski et al.'s (2000) Democracy and Development, revisited olddebates about the determinants and effects of democracy. Yet other works focused on electoral behavior and citizen attitudes, and the legislative and executive branches of government, issues that had long been concerns within American politics. Also, going beyond the kind of cross-national, statistical analysis familiar to comparativists since the 1960s, this quantitative research began to use within-country, statistical analysis, a standard

practice in the field of American politics. Moreover, though much of this work was not linked or at best poorly linked with formal theorizing, even this gap was gradually overcome, especially in the work of economists who began to work on standard questions of comparative politics (Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2003).However, in spite of the significant change brought about in the field of comparative politics by this new literature, the agenda of the second scientific revolution did not bring about as profound a transformation of comparative politics as the behavioral revolution did in the 1950s and early 1960s. The effect of this agenda was limited due to opposition from the so-called Perestroika movement, a discipline-wide reaction to the renewed emphasis on scientific approaches to the study of politics. But another key factor was the existence of other well-established approaches to theory and methods. Indeed, the post-1989 period has lacked anything as dominant as structural functionalism or the modernization school had been during the behavioral period, and is best characterized as a period of pluralism. The new revolution in comparative politics triggered a heightened awareness about issues of theory and methods among a broad range of comparativists, which has led to real diversity and a relatively healthy interaction among scholars holding different views. The most polarizing issue has been the status of rational choice theory. There is undeniably something to claims that many comparativists have blindly rejected the ideas of rational choice theorists and, likewise, there is a basis for the worries expressed by some regarding the hegemonic aspirations of rational choice theorists (Lichbach 2003). But the polemics surrounding rational choice theory have actually diverted attention away from a core problem. The introduction of rational choice theory in the field has had a salutary effect, because it has forced scholars to sharpen their proposals of alternative views and helped to structure theoretical debates. Indeed, the contrast between rational choice theory and structural approaches, and between institutional and cultural approaches, has helped to frame some of the thorniest theoretical issues faced in the field. Nonetheless, as rational choice theorists began to include institutions in their analysis, and as debate centered on rational choice institutionalism (Weingast 2002) and historical institutionalism (Thelen 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002) as the two main alternatives, it became hard to detect precisely what was distinctive about these meta-theories. The convergence on institutions has served to highlight that rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism face a common issue, the fact that the institutions seen as constraints on politicians are themselves routinely changed by politicians or, in other words, that institutions are endogenous to the political process. But these different meta-theories have not proposed well-defined solutions to this core issue in the analysis of political action, failing to distinguish clearly and to link theories of statics and dynamics.

Moreover, these meta-theories fail even to differentiate appropriately among issues related to a general theory of action as opposed to a general theory of politics. Hence, despite much talk about paradigms, the basis for either a debate among or an attempt at synthesis of, these different meta-theories remains rather clouded. A different situation developed concerning methodology. Along with the increased use of quantitative methods mentioned above, there was a reinvigoration of qualitative methodology. This process was initiated practically single-handedly by David Collier with a critical assessment of the state of the literature (Collier 1991; 1993). His work was fueled by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Verba's (1994) influential Designing Social Inquiry and various critiques of small-N research. And it was consolidated with important new statements about qualitative methodology (Brady and Collier 2004; George and Bennett 2005).60 In addition, this revival of interest in qualitative methodology was associated with various efforts to build bridges among different methodologies, whether through an exploration of the link between statistical, large-N methods and qualitative, small-N research (Brady and Collier 2004); the use of case studies as a tool to test formal theories, a proposal advanced by advocates of "analytical narratives" (Bates et al. 1998; Rodrik 2003); and the possibility of "a tripartite methodology, including statistics, formalization, and narrative," an option articulated by David Laitin (2002, 630–31; 2003). Thus, the debate about methods, in contrast to the debate about theory, has led to a clear sense of the potential contributions of different methods and hence to the identification of a basis for synthesis. In terms of substantive research, the influence of rational choice theory has no doubt increased the influence of ideas from economics in comparative politics and this has opened new avenues of research (Miller 1997). But unlike in the 1950s, the new scientific revolution of the 1990s did not bring a major shift in the focus of empirical research. Rather, there is a great degree of continuity with regard to the mid-range theorizing that had been done during the previous fifteen to twenty years. And it is noteworthy that, at this level of theorizing, cross-fertilization among researchers from different traditions is not uncommon. Thus, though charges of economic imperialism have been made and in some instances might be justifiable, the relationship between economics and comparative politics has been a two-way street. Some economists have taken comparative politics seriously, drawing in particular on the insights about political institutions offered by comparativists. The work of economists has been used by comparativists to revitalize research on central issues such as the state and citizenship (Przeworski 2003). And economists have revisited debates launched by classics of comparative historical analysis, such as Barrington Moore's (1966) Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy, and of area studies research, such as Fernando Cardoso and EnzoFaletto's (1979)

Dependency and Development in Latin America. Indeed, when it comes to substantive research, the cleavage lines between rational choice theorists and the rest, between formal and verbal theorists, and between quantitative and qualitative researchers, lose a large degree of their force. This disjuncture between the programmatic statements that, since 1989, have so often emphasized divisions regarding issues of theory and methods, and the actual practices of comparativists, is attributable to many factors; The lack of clarity regarding the differences among meta-theories, and the fact that methods are after all only tools, are surely contributing factors. But this disjuncture is also probably associated with the values held by comparativists. Since 1989, consensus among comparativists concerning democracy as a core value has been high enough to override divisions rooted in contentious issues such as neoliberalism and globalization. And, given this consensus, passions usually inflamed by conflicts over political values, a feature of the previous period in the history of comparative politics, have been channeled instead into debates about theory and methods. As a consequence, research in comparative politics has lost something, due to a relative lack of value-driven engagement of comparativists with politics. But the field has also gained something, as attested by the production of a rich and rigorous literature, many times drawing on different traditions, on big and pressing questions.

Conclusion

Generally, the historical analysis of comparative politics has manifested to a large extent "expansion of politics" beyond the local boundary. Needless to say, the bright line separating domestic and international politics has been rubbed out by the complex set of cross-border economic, cultural, technological, and relations that constitute the contemporary global order. Hynes (2003) notes that, as a consequence of globalization, states are now subject to a multiplicity of external influences and must make policy in a world characterized by both vague and shifting power structure. As pointed out by Sartori, politics results objectively bigger on account of the fact that the world is becoming more politicized and globalized. In contrast, politics is subjectively bigger in a sense that political focus and/or attention has paradigmatically shifted from local to global. Consequently, the 21st century is racked by turmoil caused by globalizing capitalism, new wars, renewed search for meaning in life and the discovery of newly critical knowledge. As Kesselman laid it, there is a danger of entrapping ourselves in worlds of our own making. Such an outlook has inevitably acknowledged the essentiality of states for the continued promotion of social, political and economic development. Nevertheless, instead of fading away, a state in the so called 'the era of globalization' remain indispensable to upholding a stable international

system and a thriving political economy both in developed and developing nations. The basic argument that has been entertaining in this paper is that, “an effective and autonomous state enables a society to participate and benefit fully in the international political economy and to resist pressures emanating from it”.Munck explores a conception that, “…the global is dynamic and fluid while the local is embedded, static, and tradition-bound”. That said, without a strong state, a country will not be able to compete in a globalizing world. Whilst capital is global, exists in the space of flows and lives the instantaneous time of computerized networks, labour lives in the local, exists in a ‘space of places’ and lives by the clock time of everyday life. As Munck suggests, we might now consider reversing the 1970s slogan of “Think Globally, Act locally” to “Think Locally, Act Globally”. However, from the analysis made earlier in the paper, it is difficult to escape the feeling that in order for the state to function properly in the contemporary era of globalization, it is subjected to redefinition of its roles, to take into account the emerging global political, economic, social, environmental and cultural challenges. However, one of the greatest contributions on comparative politics that came from the United States of America is the work done by Chilcote in his book; Comparative Politics: A Search for a New Paradigm. In this book, Chilcote improves the methodology of comparative politics from amandine analysis of comparing governments to giving scholars the best political analysis tool to discover the similarities and difference between governments globally through looking at political culture, class analysis, political economy, elitism etc.

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