Comparative Analysis of Local Government in Zambia Between 1991-2010 And 2011-2020
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Abstract:
In this article the author undertakes a comparative analysis of local government in Zambia between the periods 1991-2010 and 2011-2020. The author examines the motivations and objectives of the decentralisation reform measures undertaken during the two periods. After examining the motivations and objectives of the reforms the author proceeds to undertake a comparative analysis of the performance of decentralisation policies and reforms during the two periods using the parameters he develops in the conceptual and theoretical section of the paper. For most of the period under discussion (since 2002), devolution has been the preferred focus of the decentralisation reforms. Apart from the launch of the Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP) in December 2009, there was no progress with regard to the devolution of functions to the local level during the period 1991-2010. By and large, the districts in Zambia during the period 1991-2010 remained unaccountable and unresponsive to the needs of the local populations. Local government during this period continued facing the same problems that limited its capacity in the pre-1991 period to deliver local services and play any meaningful role in fostering local democracy and local development. The period 2011-2020 has witnessed more progress than the previous period with regard to preparatory work for devolution. For instance, several devolution plans have been prepared. However there has been little progress with regard to implementation except for one devolution plan that has been implemented. With regard to performance, Local government during the period 2011-2020 has continued to face the same problems that limited its capacity in the previous periods. The author cautions against neglecting the issue of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity when designing decentralisation reforms. He argues that previous decentralisation reforms in Zambia have failed because the reforms have treated local authorities as a homogeneous group and prescribed one-size fits all solutions. He emphasises that Local Authorities are not homogeneous but heterogeneous. They differ in, inter alia, economic/resource base, population, geographical base, local responsibilities and institutional capacity. Thus Local Authorities should be graded according to their capacity and devolution be undertaken in a phased approach and follow readiness of Local Authorities using the capacity criteria.

In conclusion the author points out that there is need to address the issue of capacity assessment of Local Authorities as an essential component of the process of devolution. He also points out that there is need to address the shortcomings that have been identified in the approved Devolution Plans. The author observes that the shortcomings, challenges and factors that have accounted for Zambia’s unsuccessful attempts at decentralisation since independence and dismal performance of local government with regard to fostering development are well known and have been well documented. He advises that these shortcomings, challenges and factors will have to be addressed and resolved in an honest and objective manner in order for decentralisation reforms to have any realistic chance of succeeding to achieve the intended objectives.
Introduction:
In this paper the author undertakes a comparative analysis of local government in Zambia between the periods 1991-2010 and 2011-2020. The author examines the motivations and objectives of the various reform measures undertaken during the two periods. After examining the motivations and objectives of the reforms the author proceeds to undertake a comparative analysis of the performance of decentralisation policies and reforms during the two periods using the parameters he develops in the conceptual and theoretical section of the paper. For most of the period under discussion (since 2002), devolution has been the preferred focus of the decentralisation reforms in Zambia.

Determining The Parameters Of Comparison:
Conceptual Background:
In this section the author will define the concepts of decentralisation and local government since the two concepts are closely coupled and not easy to discuss either of the two concepts without reference to the other.

Decentralisation:
The concept decentralisation has been defined differently by various scholars. In this section we will look at three common definitions of the concept decentralisation. The first one is that advanced by Mawhood, who defines decentralisation as the “creation of bodies separated by law from the national centre, in which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public matters (1983: 1-2)”. The second definition is that given by Kasfir (1983) who defines decentralisation as the formal (i.e., legal) transfer of power and authority to autonomous local bodies that are separate by law from the central state. The definitions of Mawhood and Kasfir which are similar focus more on the political considerations of decentralisation. The third common and widely used definition of decentralisation is that given by Rondinelli which largely defines the concept in administrative terms. Rondinelli conceived decentralisation as: “the transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions, from the central government and its agencies, to field organisations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development authorities, functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or, non-governmental organisations” (Rondinelli, 1981: 137). Just like there are several definitions of decentralisation, several forms of decentralisation have been identified by different scholars. The forms of decentralisation identified by various scholars have ranged from two to five forms. For instance, Oyugi (2000) identified two dimensions of decentralisation, namely: political decentralisation and administrative decentralisation; Balogun (2000) identified three forms, namely: deconcentration, devolution and delinking; Meenakshisundaram (1994) and Olowu (1995) identified four forms, with Meenakshisundaram (1994) identifying deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation and Olowu (1995) identifying political, economic, administrative and fiscal dimensions; and Haque (1997) identified five forms, namely: deconcentration, delegation, devolution, intermediation and privatisation. The above mentioned forms of decentralisation have been defined and explained as follows:

(i) Deconcentration: It involves “the shifting of workload from central government ministries headquarters to staff located in offices outside of the national capital…the staff may not be given the authority to decide how those functions are to be performed” (Rondinelli, 1981: 137). It is the most limited form of decentralisation. However, it should be noted that a more extensive form of deconcentration can be achieved through a strengthening of the field administration. As Rondinelli and Cheema (1983: 19) observe, the “creation of a system of field administration implies the transfer of some decision-making discretion to field staff, allowing them some latitude to plan, make routine decisions, and adjust the implementation of central directives to local conditions within guidelines set by the central ministry”. Deconcentration is “also referred to as administrative or bureaucratic decentralisation” (Reddy, 1999: 16).

Delegation: It refers to “the transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities or a variety of
activities within specific spatial boundaries – to an organisation that is technically, and:

(ii) administratively capable of carrying them out” (Rondinelli, 1981: 138).
(iii) Intermediation: Entails the transfer of functions to self-help organisations (Haque, 1997: iii-xxiii).
(iv) Privatisation: It entails “passing all responsibility for functions to non-governmental organisations or private enterprises independent of the government” (Meenakshisundaram, 1994: 11).
As pointed out by Smoke (1994: 37), “[t]he increasing interest in privatisation of local public services in developing countries is based on concerns about the weaknesses of the public sector and its ability to provide services efficiently”. Privatisation is also referred to as economic decentralisation.
(v) Delinking: Refers to the delegation of responsibilities to semi-autonomous state agencies (Balogun, 2000: 153-173)
(vi) Fiscal decentralisation: It involves transferring some authority over expenditure responsibilities and financing from national to sub-national to sub-national government units (Bird and Freud, 1994). As Godana and Mukwena (2004: 87) observed, it means a shift of power, expenditure responsibility and resources from central government to lower levels of government.
(vii) Devolution: This is by far the most ambitious form of decentralisation. In the first place, it entails giving autonomy and independence to local units (such as local governments) which are allowed to exist as separate levels over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control. The local units so created must have “clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions” (Rondinelli, 1981: 138). It implicitly implies that corporate status and the power to raise sufficient resources to perform specified functions must also be given to the local units created. Devolution is also referred to as political decentralisation. In his previous writings on decentralisation and local government, this author advocates for a broader view of decentralisation, arguing that in practical instances of government decentralisation reform programmes, the administrative and political components are frequently closely coupled and the various forms and aspects of decentralisation are embraced together as a package of the same decentralisation reforms (Mukwena, 1998, 2004 and 2008). Further, the case for a broader view of decentralisation is more appealing because the countries involved in decentralisation often themselves use the concept “much more loosely to refer to any transfer of powers or functions of government from national level to any sub-national level” (Conyers, 1981: 108).

Local Government:
As Stanyer (1976: 29) observed four decades ago, “local government belongs to that sector of the machinery of government that is normally called decentralisation”. From the foregoing, it can thus be deduced that the definition of local government is integral to the manner in which decentralisation is conceived. It should however be pointed out, from the outset that it is not possible to define local government in exact terms because what the term local government refers to can vary markedly among different countries (Mukwena 1998). Local government has been defined as local democracy exercised through locally elected councils whose major object is to provide or administer social services, with as great a degree of local independence as modern circumstances allow (Mawhood 1991). In order to achieve further clarity on the meaning of local government it is important to explain how the term local government differs from the terms local authority and local council. While the term local government usually refers to a “system of local authorities” (Maddick 1963: 23), the term local authority refers to “a sub-unit of government, controlled by a local council which is authorised by the central government to pass ordinances having a local application, levy local taxes or exact labour, and, within limits specified by the central government, vary centrally decided policy in applying it locally” (Maddick 1963: 23). And the term local council usually refers to the governing body of a local authority, which is usually elected or otherwise locally selected (UN 1962). Despite being closely interrelated, local government and decentralisation are not synonyms. While local government always represents some
form of decentralisation, decentralisation does not always have to represent a form of local government. As can be deduced from the several forms of decentralisation highlighted above, decentralisation can take other forms different local government. It is also important at this stage to dispel a common belief that local government represents the highest form of decentralisation (i.e. devolution). As Mukwena (2014) has observed, contrary to common belief that local government represents the highest form of decentralisation (i.e. devolution), local government may, on the contrary, take another form of decentralisation such as deconcentration. Indeed, in situations where local governments operate as agents of central government rather than as instruments of local democracy, this represents deconcentration and not devolution (Mukwena 2014).

**Objectives of Local Government Policies:**
The objectives of any local government policy are anchored on the reasons for establishment of local government. There are two main reasons why local government exists. The first reason relates to service-rendering and the second reason relates to democracy (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer 1997). According to Ismail, Bayat and Meyer (1997), service-rendering entails efficient and effective rendering of services to citizens. In the opinion of this author, service-rendering to citizens refers to functions of local authorities that relate to direct improvements in the living standards of the local residents in general and those which create an enabling environment for development in the local areas. For example, functions which local councils perform such as those to do with public health, sanitation, consumer protection, social services, water provision, and roads have a direct bearing on the living standards of residents under a local authority’s jurisdiction. Other functions such as the establishment and maintenance of abattoirs, provision of public transport, control of cultivation, and control of the movement of livestock contribute to the creation of an enabling environment, for productive activities in a local area (Mukwena, 1998: 39 and Mukwena, 2004: 111). In a democratic society, decentralisation and local government cannot be separated from democracy in that ‘local government is local democracy exercised through locally elected councils’. Ideally, “…decentralised political decision-making and management, is the level of democracy that is closest to the people and allows the local populace to actively participate in affairs which affect them directly” (Reddy 1999: 13). This second reason for the existence of local government deals with the values of participation, representation, local autonomy, responsiveness and fairness (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer 1997).

**Principles for successful operation of Local Government:**
For successful operation of local government there are certain principles which should be followed. These principles are numerous. The list includes the following:

(i) Local governments are agents of the central government. This principle is based on the understanding that every country is one nation with one government which has the final authority.

(ii) Local authorities are creatures of the law (statutes). They are legal entities whose existence, powers, duties and functions are conferred and conditioned by the law. They have a quality known as perpetual succession, which means that they continue to exist despite changes in their membership. They are also subject to the legal doctrine of ultra vires, which means that they only do what the law permits them to do.

(iii) Local residents should participate in the democratic election of their representatives in the local councils. Further, they should participate in the affairs of the local authorities. This means that local government is an instrument of popular participation since it makes possible the participation of the residents of a locality in the planning, execution and management of projects and provision of services required by the community.

(iv) Local government should be development orientated. This means that local authorities should be concerned with the business of development and not merely regulating the lives of people. This entails involvement in physical development as well as facilitating human development (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer, 1997: 9).

(v) Local government must operate on the basis of partnership relationship between the politician/councillor and the professional/officer.
The officers must respect councillors and accept their position as policy makers. On the other hand, the councillors must respect and accept the role of officers as their advisers on policy matters and implementers of policy decisions.

(vi) Local government must promote fairness, reasonableness and impartiality and have no bias (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer, 1997: 9). This means that all members of the community should be treated equally and with respect.

(vii) Local government must be accountable to the electorate. As pointed out by Ismail, Bayat and Meyer (1997: 10), “this means providing the public with an explanation of their actions and/or lack of actions or any other matter which demands public explanation”.

(viii) Local government must promote transparency and supply the public with timely and sufficient information (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer, 1997: 10)

(ix) Local government must be broadly representative of the communities they serve (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer, 1997: 10). The above stated principles are critical to the operations of local government. Their non-observance would render the operations of local authorities ineffective. For instance, it would be difficult for local authorities to effectively address the needs of their communities if the people in the communities do not meaningfully participate in the affairs of those authorities. Equally, where there is no fairness, impartiality, reasonableness, accountability and transparency in the operations of local government, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for local authorities to efficiently and effectively provide services to the communities.

Local Government Structure:
Usually, local government is the second level of government deliberately created to bring government closer to the local communities as well as give these communities a sense of involvement in the political processes that control their daily lives. It should be noted here that in countries where there is provision for regional governments, such as in the case of Namibia (Mukwena, 2004), local government is the third level of government with regional government occupying the second level. Patterns of field administration and local government in most developing countries can be classified as follows:

(i) Comprehensive Local Government System:
In this system most Government Services at the local level are administered through multi-purpose local authorities. A concept of substantial unity of purpose among representatives bodies at all levels underlies this system. Local authorities perform some functions pursuant to general statutory authority and others on behalf of the central ministries. The distinguishing feature of this system is that local authorities render all or almost all, direct agricultural, educational, health and social welfare services that reach the individual.

(ii) Partnership System:
Under this system direct services are rendered by field units of central agencies and others by local authorities. The local authorities perform some functions more or less autonomously, pursuant to general statutory authority, and they perform others on behalf of and under the technical supervision of central ministries. This system permits use of either field administration or local authorities according to the needs of the particular function or situation.

(iii) Dual System:
This is a system in which central ministries administer technical services directly, with local authorities having autonomy legally to perform local services and to do what they can to foster local development but actually performing few if any technical services, either directly or on behalf of central agencies. Separateness and conflict rather than unity or cooperation characterise relationships between Central Government and Local Authorities. Local Government under this system is more an instrument of political decentralisation than of social and economic development.

(iv) Integrated Administrative System:
This is a system in which central government agencies directly administer all technical services, with Central Government area coordinators or district administrators responsible for field coordination. Any local authorities that may exist have little control over Government activities and staff in their areas (UN 1962). In the case of
Zambia, Act No. 2 of 2019, which took effect on 11th April 2019 provides for an integrated local government system. The Zambian version of integrated local government system is the same as the comprehensive local government system described in the above mentioned four common systems of local government. Zambia has a single-tier system of Local Government comprising three types of multi-purpose local authorities namely: City, Municipal and Town Councils. Ironically the local government system that existed between 1981 and 1991 which had fused the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) local structures into the District Councils was also called Integrated Local Government System by the then ruling UNIP.

**Local Government Management Models:**

The most common unit of local government in democratic states is the multi-purpose local authority governed by a locally elected council. There are several local management models used across the globe. In this section the author will highlight some of the commonly used models in democratic states. The following are the commonly used local Government Models:

(i) **The Strong Mayor-Council model** – under this model you have a popularly elected full time Mayor and elected councilors. The committee system is an important feature of this model. There are variations of this model across the globe. For instance in the United States of America, the Mayor under this model is a full time politician who has a policy platform and programmer to implement. In the USA, the strong Mayor is the Chief Administrative Officer who sits at the top of the Council bureaucracy with powers to hire and fire high-level administrators. S/he can veto a Council resolution and plays a major role in preparing the city or town budget. It should be pointed out here that in some variations of the Strong Mayor-Council model, the Mayor is required to share some of his/her powers with councilors. In the Zambian version of the model, the Mayor is a popularly elected full time politician but without the extensive powers of the USA Strong Mayor and does not sit at the top of the Council bureaucracy as Chief Administrative Officer. Under the Zambian version of the model the Town Clerk sits at the top of the Council bureaucracy. The Zambian version of Strong Mayor-Council has been in practice since September 2016. This model provides clear local leadership at the top of the district, town or city that is directly elected by the local residents and can therefore be held accountable for lack of development in the entire city, town or district.

(ii) **The Weak Mayor-Council model** – under this model you have an elected council with a weak mayor who is not full time but the first among equals. The Weak Mayor cannot veto council resolutions or appoint administrative staff and has no major role to play in budget formulation. The weak Mayor is a titular figure who chairs council meetings but cannot make decisions and plays ceremonial roles such as cutting ribbons. The committee system is an important feature of this model. Decisions are processed through the various council committees. It should be pointed out here that in some variations of the Weak Mayor-Council models the Mayor may be given some powers and additional responsibilities to strengthen his/her role. For instance, in the French Communes (councils), the Mayor who is elected from among councilors, is an important figure who, apart from being the principal local politician, also acts as an agent and representative of the national government. As an agent of the national government, the Mayor ensures the execution of the laws and directives emanating from Paris, acts as official registrar of births, deaths and marriages and also has responsibility for collecting some official statistics on behalf of the government. Prior to September 2016 Zambia used the Weak Mayor-Council model where the Mayor was elected by councilors from among themselves. This model does not provide clear local leadership at the top of the city, town or district that can be held directly accountable by local residents for lack of development in the entire city, town or district.

(iii) **Council-Manager model** – mostly practiced in the USA, this model seeks to separate politics from administration. Under this model, the Mayor (popularly elected or elected by councilors from among themselves), has only ceremonial powers. The powers lie in the council who appoint a Manager to serve as the professional chief administrator of the council subject to council removal. The Manager is allowed to appoint
his/her departmental heads. Since power lies in the council as a collective body, it is very difficult for local residents to hold any one individual politician accountable for lack of development in the entire district. And since the Manager is answerable to the council, it is not easy for local residents to hold the Manager accountable for lack of development or for poor service delivery in the city, town or district.

(iv) Mayor-Manager model – this model is mostly used in the large cities of the USA where a popularly elected strong Mayor is assisted by one or two deputies. The Mayor appoints a professional who serves at his pleasure and direction. This model also provides clear local leadership at the top of the district, town or city that is directly elected by the local residents and can therefore be held accountable for lack of development in the entire city, town or district.

**Funding of Local Government:**
The sources of local authority revenue are numerous. In this section I will only outline those that are common to most local authorities in the world. A first step in looking at the sources of local government revenue is to distinguish between local (internal) and external sources of revenue.

Local sources of revenue can be broken into three:

(i) Locally collected taxes (e.g., property taxes, council tax, personal levy);

(ii) User charges and benefits (e.g., school lunches, hospital services, public housing rents, water charges, local parks, transport charges);

(iii) Other locally raised revenues such as license (e.g., motor vehicle and operator licenses, dog license, firearms license and trading licenses), fees (e.g., levies on agricultural produce and agency fees), penalties, stamp duties and earnings from commercial ventures (e.g., liquor undertaking, shops and markets, poultry, rest houses and motels). The external sources of local financing are transfers (grants or shared taxes) from higher-level governments and borrowing. Local authorities can borrow from higher governments or financial institutions. In most countries, local governments are forbidden from borrowing money or receiving grants from a foreign government or foreign organizations. Grants may be given by central government for specific services such as roads, health and education. In Zambia the central government is exempted from paying property tax but pays to local authorities grants-in-lieu-of-rates.

**Staff Recruitment And Deployment:**
The quality of human resources is very critical to the operations of local authorities. Most developing countries are afflicted by several problems in the area of human resource management which include shortage of qualified staff, inexperienced staff, unattractive conditions of service, demotivated staff, lack of clearly defined and objective promotion policies and nepotism in recruitment. There are three basic approaches in the world to staff recruitment and deployment, namely, Integrated, Unified and Separate personnel systems.

(i) **Separate Personnel System:**
Under this system each local government authority has a separate personnel system but certain aspects are regulated by central government. Under such arrangement, conditions of employment might be uniform between local authorities, but the opportunity for transfer would be unlikely.

(ii) **Unified Personnel System:**
This is a system where the local government staff are separate from the central government staff but under the control of an interior or local government ministry. One important feature of this system is the existence of a Local Government Service Commission which exercises oversight over recruitment and related matters in the local government service.

(iv) **Integrated Personnel System:**
Under this system Central government and local authorities come under a single civil service. Recruitment, compensation, promotion, transfer, dismissal, retirement and other benefits are the same (UN 1962).

**Can Local Government Performance Be Measured?:**
Presence of accepted performance measures is crucial to the success of any organization. Unfortunately, as Mokena (1999: 45) observed, “it is generally difficult to measure the performance of a public institution such as local government”. According to Mokena, this is mainly due to two reasons – firstly is the fact that a “public institution exists to provide public services and goods which
cannot be easily measured using an objective criterion, such as the conventional ‘profit-loss’ or the efficiency and effectiveness criteria” (1999: 45). Secondly, Mukwena (1999: 45) points out that in the context of a developing country, constraints such as “lack of resources required to assemble the necessary data, poor monitoring, reporting and record keeping systems” make it difficult to measure local government performance. Despite the difficulties mentioned above, there are several approaches that can be used to measure local government performance. Local government performance can be assessed in terms of the officially stated objectives of local government (Mukwena 1999: 45). In this case successful implementation of local government reforms can be assessed by evaluating the extent to which the stated objectives for the reforms have been met. And at the level of the local authority success can be defined in terms of the extent to which the local authority deals with stated economic, social, or environmental objectives within the available expenditure levels (Rappand and Patitucci 1977). It can also be assessed in terms of the ability of a local authority to mobilise substantial resources and provide a reasonable level of services relative to other local authorities in the same country (Olowu and Smoke 1992: 4-5). According to Olowu and Smoke, indicators of ability to mobilize resources should embrace the following:

(i) The budget balance sheet – a successful local government should have more surpluses than deficits over the previous five years.

(ii) Major local revenue sources (direct local taxes, user charges or intergovernmental transfers) should generally show growth relative to inflation and population.

(iii) Local expenditures, both recurrent and capital, should support a range of significant social and infrastructural services and grow at a reasonable rate. With regard to indicators of service provision, Olowu and Smoke (1992) point out that these should hinge on the quantity and quality of services provided. Another key performance indicator in measuring local government performance is time. As Henderson-Stewart observed three decades ago, “the key performance indicator for many council services is how promptly the service is provided – for example the average time taken to respond to to fire calls, to determine planning applications, to relet council houses, or to undertake repairs” (1990: 111). Although it is not easy to do so, local government performance can also be measured by looking at the key performance dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency. Performance is effective according to the degree to which a stated condition is achieved. On the other hand, performance is more or less efficient depending on the quantity and quality of resources expended in the effort to achieve a desired condition. Thus, optimal local government performance must combine effectiveness and efficiency (Rapp and Patitucci 1977).

**Historical Background:**

In line with the new political dispensation following the attainment of independence, the new Government had to extend local democracy to the whole country and its entire population by enacting the Local Government Act, 1965. The Act came into operation on 1st November 1965. The first local government elections under the 1965 Act were held in September 1966 (Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 1966). The Act provided for three types of local authority, two urban (municipalities and townships) and one rural. The municipalities and township and rural councils were divided into wards, each of which elected a single councillor. It should be noted here that these wards existed for the purpose of local government elections only.

While the enactment of the 1965 Act was a major development in terms of the democratisation of the newly independent country and the development of local government, some of the reforms and amendments that followed later worked to undermine local democracy and local government. It should be pointed out here that there were other problems which right from attainment of independence hampered the operations of local authorities rendering them ineffective in serving as vehicles for local development. These problems included the appointment of ill-qualified staff and political interference in council operations.

In November 1968, President Kaunda launched a new package of ‘decentralisation’ measures which took effect in January 1969. In his 1969 reforms, President Kaunda greatly increased political control and gave it an even firmer institutional base by appointing at the district level a politician (the
district governor) to be the politico-administrative head of the district. The district governor was given overall responsibility for the good administration of the district as well as its political management. He was personally appointed by the president and was made formally accountable to the provincial minister (though remained informally accountable first and foremost to the president). The district governor was to be the chief government coordinating officer in the district, with particular reference to the tasks of political and economic development. He replaced the UNIP regional secretary as chairman of the district development committee (DDC) and other committees at the district level. Administratively, the district governor was served by the district secretary, who advised him on policy questions at that level, assisted in policy formulation and saw to it that the decisions taken were implemented. The 1969 reforms which increased political controls at the provincial and district levels through the appointment of the provincial cabinet ministers and district governors as politico-administrative heads at those levels with responsibility to supervise, direct and coordinate the activities of all government agencies (including popularly elected district councils) worked to undermine local government. This intensification of political controls through the 1969 reforms undermined the role of district councils as units for local democracy and development in that the provincial minister and district governor could at will intervene in the activities of district councils and or interfere in their operations. In 1970, the local government system underwent a major change, which undermined local democracy and the development of local government, when the 1965 Act was amended to give the minister of local government powers to appoint the mayor (and deputy mayor) of every municipal council and the chairman (and vice chairman) of every township and rural council from among those persons who were councillors. On 13 December 1972, local democracy and local government were dealt a major blow when the country was declared a one party state (ushering in the Second Republic), thereby granting UNIP constitutional paramountcy over all administrative machinery, including local government. This move narrowed down the democratic space and choices at the local level. Before the country was declared a one party state, it was governed under a multi-party democratic system (i.e., from 1964 to 1972). The period from 1964 to 1972 when Zambia operated under multi-party democracy was known as the First Republic. Following the introduction of the one-party system, party membership and loyalty became very important considerations in appointments to senior local government positions, resulting in the appointment of ill-qualified and incompetent staff to key local government positions. The supremacy of the party over the administrative machinery also opened avenues for rampant political interference in council operations and financial mismanagement. This led to a decline in the capacity of councils to provide essential services to the communities they served (Mukwena 1999: 106). Although the capacity of councils had been in decline since independence, the introduction of the one-party system in 1972 and the setting-in of the economic crisis in the mid-1970s led to an intensification of this decline in local government capacity and further reduced the effectiveness of local authorities as instruments of democracy and development at the local level. In 1980 President Kaunda announced administrative reforms which aimed at integrating the party, central government departments and local authorities into one body (the District Council). These reforms were embodied in the Local Administration Act of 1980 which was passed in December 1980 and took effect on 1st January, 1981. Under the 1980 Act, a presidential political appointee, the District Governor, became the chairman of the council, with responsibility for the overall administration of the council and in particular for: “… the supervision of the day-to-day functions of the council; … the efficient and proper operation of all public institutions and parastatal organisations in the district (Zambia, 1980: 106). The imposition of inappropriate local government structures under the 1980 Act further worsened the institutional capacity of local authorities in Zambia, shattering any remaining hope that local authorities could play any meaningful role in fostering local democracy and development. The 1980 Act led to a further intensification of the several constraints that had been hampering the operations of local authorities from the immediate post-independence era. For instance, the merging of the local party structure with the local council opened avenues for rampant financial mismanagement and diversion of
council resources to party activities; it also institutionalised political interference in the day-to-day operations of local authorities (Mukwena 1999: 106). Service provision by local councils further deteriorated.

Analyzing The Period 1991-2010:
Following the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in December 1990, a new Local Government Act (the Local Government Act of 1991) replaced the Local Administration Act of 1980 in December 1991. The 1980 Act was incompatible with a multi-party system of government, and therefore, it had to be replaced by the 1991 Act which was compatible with a multi-party system of government (Mukwena, 2001: 46; Zambia, 1991a). The new system was certainly more democratic than the system it replaced. Democratically elected councils and local government elections were re-introduced and the Mayor /Council Chairperson replaced the District Governor, while Town Clerk/Council Secretary replaced the District Executive Secretary. The democratic principle of universal adult suffrage was re-introduced affording every citizen who is a registered voter an opportunity to stand for, or vote for the candidate of his/her choice, irrespective of political affiliation (Zambia, 1991b). The 1991 Act was a progressive piece of legislation in that it embraced one of the major principles required for successful operation of local authorities - namely, the free participation of local residents in the democratic election of their representatives. The 1991 Act entailed major changes to both local government and provincial and district government. It also had effects on the operations of field administration. In this paper the focus is on changes to Local Government. The major changes that came with the 1991 Act were the clear institutional divorce of party structures from the Council, the abandonment of the integrative role of the district councils and the reintroduction of representative local government based on universal adult suffrage (Mukwena and Lolojih, 2002: 218). Although not provided for under any legislation, the Town Clerk or District Council Secretary was assigned the task of coordinating the activities of Sector Ministries at the district level (Zambia, 2013: 3). However, the councils remained body corporate and operated independent of the district field administration (Zambia, 2013: 3). District administration remained fragmented like in the previous system and lack of coordination among the various agencies operating at the district level continued to adversely affecting developmental programmes at that level. Vertical lines of command and communication continued to be very strong, with various departments and agencies dealing directly with Lusaka or their ministry’s provincial headquarters. Further, local authorities also continued to report directly to their parent ministry - Local Government and Housing. With this fragmented administrative structure, difficulties in coordinating developmental activities at the district level continued. With regard to the personnel system, local government moved from the separate personnel system to the unified personnel system with the establishment of a Local Government Service Commission (LGSC). However, the Local Government Service Commission that was established had reduced powers. Local Authorities appointed their staff subject to confirmation of the same by the LGSC; the same arrangement applied to promotions. At the same time, the responsible Minister had sweeping powers to intervene in appointments and promotions in the interest of local government. It was however not defined what was meant by ‘in the interest of local government’. The involvement of three players (local authorities, LGSC and the Minister) in appointments and promotions in local government led to confusion. Thus in April 2010 a proper unified personnel system with a local government service commission that had normal and not reduced powers was introduced. However, the new Local Government Service Commission faced challenges in its operation due to inadequate funding. Further, the Local Government Service Commission had difficulties in attracting qualified staff due to unattractive conditions of service. Among other changes, in 1992 the 1991 Act was amended by Parliament to make elected members of parliament (MPs) automatic councillors in their districts. This move contributed to the weakening of local democracy. Local councillors found it difficult to freely engage in combative debates in council chambers with their party superiors who in some cases happened to be Republican Vice President, Minister of Local Government and other ministers. As this author observed in another paper, this amendment...
enhanced political control of local councils by national politicians (Mukwena 2001: 46). Further, the 1991 Act gave the Minister of Local Government excessive powers over local authorities. For instance, under the 1991 Act the Minister had powers to suspend and dissolve local councils and appoint in their place Local Government Administrators. There were several cases of dissolution of local councils by the Minister for long periods resulting in disenfranchisement of citizens and undermining of local democracy. Although the return to multiparty democracy opened up the political space and increased choices at the local level, the November 1992 local government elections were marred by countrywide voter apathy and 402 MMD candidates (out of 1,190 council seats) went through unopposed. And average voter turnout was around 10% (CSO 1993: 11); this was the lowest voter turnout in the history of the country (Maipose 1999: 271). The situation was worse in 1995 when, following the expiry of the statutory mandate, the country could not hold local government elections due to lack of funds (Maipose 1999: 271). The failure to hold local government elections in 1995 greatly undermined local democracy. This failure to conduct elections abrogated one of the major principles for successful operation of local government which require the holding of elections for councillors. It should be pointed out here that some of the changes that were made to the governance system after the return to multi-party democracy worked to stifle local democracy and undermine local government. Such changes include the introduction of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 1995. The introduction of the CDF has, instead of boosting local governance worked to undermine the role of local government. Under the CDF arrangement, government allocates development funds on an annual basis to all constituencies. As Mukwena (2001: 46) observed: in theory, the CDF was supposed to enhance local development. But in practice, it appears that its introduction was driven more by political concerns than economic considerations. Indeed, since its introduction many MPs have sought to divert the funds to projects that further their political careers to the detriment of other, more useful projects. If central government were concerned with genuinely decentralising local development funding, it would have been desirable if the constituency funds were channelled through local councils. This could have boosted the finances of local councils and enhanced their role in local development”. In 1995, through Cabinet Circular No. 1 of 1995, the government introduced District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) and Provincial Development Coordinating Committees (PDCCs) to coordinate development activities in the districts and provinces. The key function of the DDCCs was to “provide a forum for dialogue and coordination on developmental issues between the local authority, line departments, donors and NGO in the district” (Cabinet Circular No. 1 of 1995). The DDCCs were chaired by Town Clerks/Council Secretaries until 1999 when the District Administrators took over the chairmanship. The DDCCs were similar in structure as the old District Development Committees (DDCs) which existed before the enactment of the Local Administration Act 1980. The new DDCCs faced the same problems that the old DDCCs faced. The DDCCs lacked control over funds as well as executive authority to enable them effectively coordinate developmental activities in the districts. The line ministries in the districts control their own budgets and council budgets are separate from those of line ministries making it difficult for the DDCCs to coordinate development activities at the district levels. With regard to the sub-district level, it should be pointed out here that, the lack of a legally recognised participatory structure at that level has been one of the factors that have accounted for the low level of participation by local residents in affairs affecting their lives. The sub-district level was demarcated into wards, under the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1991. The wards were used for purposes of local government elections only. The failure to provide for a legal framework for citizen participation at the local level was contrary to the principle for successful operation of local government which envisages local government to be an instrument of popular participation at the local level. The village productive committees (VPCs), ward councils (WCs) and ward development committees (WDCs) that existed during the Second Republic were abandoned in 1991 by the MMD government when they took over the reins of power. In the place of VPCs, WCs and WDCs, the MMD government introduced Area Development
Committees (ADCs) and Resident Development Committees (RDCs). The ADCs and RDCs were established to incorporate community participation in the local development process; these committees were formed by residents and councillors sat on the committees as ex-officio members. However, councillors influenced who got elected to these committees. A group of RDCs fell under an ADC. Thus, the ADC was the apex body. While in most urban areas these committees existed, in most rural areas, these committees were non-existent because village communities generally lack organisational skills. These committees were not effective because, among other reasons, their operations were not backed by any legislative framework. The 2001 tripartite general elections resulted in a change of government in Zambia, although the same political party (MMD) retained power. President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa took over from President Fredrick Chiluba since the latter was ineligible for re-election as he had served the mandatory two terms in office. Following the ascendancy of Levy Mwanawasa to the Office of President, there was an immediate major policy shift towards decentralisation, culminating into the adoption of a new decentralisation national policy in November 2002 titled “National Decentralisation Policy: Towards Empowering the people” (Zambia, 2002). In its new Decentralisation Policy, Mwanawasa’s ‘New Deal Government’ spelt out its vision on decentralisation as follows:

“The long term vision of Government is to achieve a fully decentralized and democratically elected system of governance characterized by open, predictable and transparent policy making and implementation process, effective local community participation in decision – making development and administration while maintaining sufficient linkages between central government and the periphery (Zambia, 2002)” The major aspect of the National Decentralisation Policy was the government’s stated commitment to transfer not only functions to the districts but also matching resources. The policy also highlighted the government’s commitment to increased participation of citizens through the creation of sub district structures. The current decentralization policy, whose thrust is towards devolution, is on paper one of the most ambitious reforms adopted in Zambia since independence in 1964. Despite several official pronouncements committing itself to devolving functions to the local level, the Mwanawasa government seemed to drag its feet in implementing its new policy. Whatever the reasons were for dragging its feet in implementing the new Decentralisation Policy, the stark truth is that the MMD government never made any reasonable progress in implementing its Decentralisation Policy. It took Seven (7) years after the adoption of the Decentralisation Policy for the MMD government to come up with a Decentralization Policy Implementation Plan (DIP) in December 2009. It should be noted here that by this time Zambia had a new government, the Rupia Banda government, following President Rupia Banda’s victory in the 2008 Presidential bye election which was necessitated by the passing on of President Mwanawasa in 2008. The timeframe for the DIP was 2009-2013. The DIP contained, inter alia, the main components of the decentralisation plan, main strategies for implementing decentralisation plan and the institutional framework for implementation of decentralisation policy (Zambia 2009b). Less than two (2) years after releasing the DIP, the MMD lost power to the Patriotic Front (PF) in the September 2011 general elections. By and large, the districts in Zambia during the period 1991-2010 remained unaccountable and unresponsive to the needs of the local populations. Most people polled in Zambia do not have much interest in the activities of local councils regarding these institutions as irrelevant to local residents’ wellbeing. The majority polled in Zambia view local authorities as being unaccountable to local residents and not reflecting the views of the residents (Moomba 2002: 29; Lolojih 2003: 16). They also view local authorities as untrustworthy (Afrobarometer Network 2002). Accountability is one of the key principles required for successful operation of local government. Where accountability is absent or perceived to be absent it is very difficult to operate an effective local government system. Despite the opening up of the political space through the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, citizen participation in the activities of local authorities has remained limited in the Third Republic, due to, among other reasons, local residents viewing local authorities as unaccountable, untrustworthy and irrelevant to their needs. To make it more accountable, political
decentralisation should be accompanied by fiscal decentralisation and capacity building so that the local authorities are empowered to provide the local services that residents view as important to their wellbeing and thus directly connect the local authorities to their communities and arouse local interest and participation in the activities of the local authorities. Local government during the period 1991-2010 continued facing the same problems that limited its capacity in the pre-1991 period to deliver local services and play any meaningful role in fostering local democracy and local development. These problems included inadequate or absent capital equipment, poor councillor-officer relations in some councils, inadequate financial resources and insufficient numbers of skilled staff. For instance, the funding to local authorities continued to be very limited to the extent that most of these authorities have had difficulties to provide basic local services and even pay staff salaries. There were numerous reports of many local authorities failing to pay staff salaries for several months, in some cases even for periods ranging from one to three years (Lusaka Times, 23 July 2003; 20 July 2010). A Service Delivery Survey conducted in nine (9) districts of Southern Province by the Local Government Association in 2006 confirmed inadequate service provision (LGAZ 2006). In a situation where local authorities have serious challenges to provide even basic local services, it becomes difficult to embrace one of the key principles on which successful local government should be anchored, namely local government being development oriented. Poor councillor-staff relations in some councils (Mukwena and Lolojih 2002) also went contrary to one of the principles for successful operation of local government relating to the need for partnership relationship between councillors and officers. Audit findings by the Auditor General for the Financial Years ended 31st December 2006 and 31st December 2008 confirmed poor performance by local authorities in financial management and service provision as summarised in Tables 1 and 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to submit expenditure returns in respect of grants</td>
<td>All the 72 councils failed to submit expenditure returns for grants received totalling K8,820,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of progress report on retrenched council workers</td>
<td>No progress reports produced to show the names and total numbers of retrenched employees in each of the councils that were paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to submit expenditure returns in respect of Constituency Development Funds (CDF)</td>
<td>All the 72 councils failed to submit expenditure returns for CDF totalling K9,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to utilise CDF</td>
<td>Matero Constituency in Lusaka failed to utilise CD Funds totalling K156,510,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misapplication of CDF</td>
<td>K21,390,000 CDF was misapplied in Mandevu in Lusaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for CDF</td>
<td>K8,657,500 meant for purchase of building materials in Chifunabuli in Luapula could not be accounted for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to provide receipts and disposal details</td>
<td>In Bangweulu in Luapula there were no receipts and disposal details in respect of 520 roofing sheets and ridges costing K42,927,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionable expenditure</td>
<td>In Livingstone K10,000,000 was released for electrification of a building meant for a poultry project but the building was not electrified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary Of Audit Findings For 2006:
Source: Zambia, 2007

Table 2 Summary Audit Findings For 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>AMOUNT INVOLVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to undertake works at markets after release of funds in 2008 – Lundazi District Council</td>
<td>K80,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for funds – Chama District Council</td>
<td>K12,398,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchases made without obtaining competitive quotations – Chama District Council</td>
<td>K166,714,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overpayment of audit fees – Chama District Council</td>
<td>K5,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to submit expenditure returns involving 19 District Councils in respect of establishment of new fire stations</td>
<td>K494,202,001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zambia 2009a

The problems summarised in Tables 1 and 2 above combined by other factors discussed in the section above inhibited local authorities from providing quality service delivery and development in their respective communities.

Analyzing The Period 2011-2020

Revision Of National Decentralisation Policy:
The new PF Government had to revise the National Decentralisation Policy in order to take on board its thoughts on local government and decentralisation (Zambia, 2013). The revised policy, while maintaining the thrust towards devolution has embraced some of the areas that were not in the previous policy document, such as:
(a) The role of chiefs in the government system; and
(b) An increased number of functions to be devolved from Central Government to Councils (Zambia 2013: i).

The revised National Decentralisation Policy was launched on 16 July 2013 (Times of Zambia, 17 July 2013). Following the lapse of the timeframe for the previous DIP and in view of the fact that the policy has been revised, the PF Government had to prepare and launch another DIP.

Circular Number 10 Of 2014:
The pace of implementation of the New Decentralisation Policy had hitherto been unsatisfactory, prompting the Patriotic Front (PF) Government to speed up the process by issuing Circular Number 10 on 10th December 2014. In the said Circular, Government directed that functions be devolved to all Councils in three phases, with Phase 1 commencing on 1st January 2015.
With regard to Phase 1, Government directed that the following be devolved to all functions with effect from 1st January 2015:
(a) Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Management under the Office of the Vice President;
(b) Extension Services under the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock;
(c) Primary and Early Education as well as Adult Literacy under the Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Childhood Education;
(d) Primary Health Care, Social Welfare and Community Development under the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health;
(e) Local Tourism and Cultural matters under the Ministry of Tourism and Arts
(f) Urban and Regional Planning under the Ministry of Local Government and Housing; and
(g) Community Management of HIV/AIDS and TB Programmers under the National HIV/AIDS/TB/STI Council (Cabinet Office, 10 December 2014).
To date, with the exception of Community Management of HIV/AIDS and TB Management, the above functions have not been devolved to Councils. The functions are still under the respective line ministries and the officers earmarked for devolution are yet to be transferred to the Local Government Service Commission. It should be noted here that the devolution of Community Management of HIV/AIDS and TB Management has not been accompanied by transfer of financial
resources. Thus the devolution of this function will be difficult to implement. The progress that is worth noting here is that of the passing of the Urban and Regional Planning Act Number 3 of 2015 which was assented to by His Excellency the Republican President on 14th August 2015. Act Number 3 of 2015 seeks to extend planning authority to District Councils (Zambia 2015a). This is a progressive move and necessary accompaniment to devolution as it will help Local Authorities increase their accountability and responsiveness to the local populations. At the moment the province under the Provincial Planning Officer is the planning authority for District Councils. The Provincial Planning Officer reports to the Director Physical Planning and Housing at Ministry of Local Government and Housing headquarters.

In the opinion of this author, devolving the above seven functions to all councils at once without due consideration of the fact that most councils in Zambia are struggling at the moment in terms of capacity to undertake their current functions is not realistic and is likely to put a heavy burden on these councils and derail the pace of the decentralisation process. It should be noted here that from past experience in Zambia, East Africa, Asia and Latin America, decentralisation has failed when too many functions have been devolved to local authorities without first improving their capacity to receive such functions and without matching financial resources (Rondinelli 1981; Mukwena 1998). The working definition of capacity in relation to local authorities is the combination of resources, practices and authority which permits an organisation to achieve its goals (Mukwena and Drake, 2000: 14). Resources include human, financial, material and information resources. Practices include the structure and management of the organisation. Authority refers to the legal status and powers of an organisation and to its moral authority as represented by its standing in the community and its relationship with other organisations with which it has dealings (Mukwena and Drake, 2000: 14). Human resources refers to elected councillors and appointed officials. Financial resources refers to sources of funding and financial base. And material resources include, inter alia, offices; transport; computers; internet infrastructure; photocopiers; printers; equipment for road maintenance, and telephones.

Before assessing the capacity of the local authority, the starting point is to look at its goals, that is, its functions and the services it is required to render to its community. The next stage is to assess the adequacy of its existing resources, practices and authority as compared to those needed to achieve its goals and provide the expected services. In this regard, the question that needs to be answered is as follows: Does the local authority have adequate resources, practices and authority to undertake their current functions and provide the expected services to their communities? The next stage that follows is to assess whether the local authority has adequate resources, practices and authority to undertake additional functions over and above current functions and taking into account existing capacity. Devolving functions without addressing the issues of existing gaps and anticipated gaps will render the devolution process futile from inception. At this point it is important to highlight one resource that is always neglected in the process of decentralisation in Zambia, namely information. The local data base should be comprehensive and include, among others, accurate and current demographic, socio-economic, agricultural, health, literacy and education information for the entire district. Accurate and adequate sources of information are essential for effective planning and decision making. At the moment, no local authority in Zambia has access to a comprehensive local data base. Given the limited capacity of local government in Zambia, it is necessary that a Local Government Capacity development programme accompanies the process of devolution. The Local Government Capacity development programme envisaged here should include the training and retraining of human resources, improvements in, inter alia, funding arrangements, financial management systems and processes, general management systems and structures, materials management, legal frameworks, and information management systems. The issue of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity should not be neglected when designing decentralisation reforms. One of the reasons why previous decentralisation reforms in Zambia have failed is because the reforms have treated local authorities as a homogeneous group and prescribed one-size fits all solutions. It should be emphasised here that Local Authorities are not homogeneous but heterogeneous. Local Authorities
differ in, inter alia, economic/resource base, population, geographical base, local responsibilities and institutional capacity. Thus Local Authorities should be graded according to their capacity and devolution be undertaken in a phased approach and follow readiness of Local Authorities using the capacity criteria. In the case of the seven (7) functions under Phase 1, it is worrisome that the functions were earmarked for movement to councils while their budget lines were to remain at the line ministries. Such an arrangement is likely to slow down or derail the process of devolution. As noted in earlier studies by this author, the tendency to decentralise functions from the centre to the local levels without matching financial transfers has in the past hampered implementation of decentralisation and local government reforms in Zambia (Mukwena 2014). As for the newly created District Councils, it should be noted that some of them are not yet functional. For instance, some of the newly created councils have as few as two councillors and thus have no committee structures needed to provide the required governance. One wonders how these newly created councils will handle the devolved functions without first capacitating them to manage existing local government functions. Also, the arrangement where, due to limited office space at councils, the “devolved staff” such as the District Education Board Secretary (DEBS) and agriculture extension officers will continue operating from offices of line ministries would pose coordination challenges that were likely to negatively affect the pace of the decentralisation process. With the poor state of ICT infrastructure at the headquarters of most, if not all councils, it will be difficult to coordinate the day to day activities of various offices scattered around the district. As pointed out by several local government scholars, lack of coordination is one factor that can derail decentralisation reforms and has indeed hampered previous decentralisation reforms in several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Mathur, 1983; Mwape, 1991; Rondinelli, 1983; Mukwena, 1998). Further, according to Circular Number 10, other infrastructure currently used to provide devolved functions, such as clinics and primary schools shall be transferred to Councils which shall assume immediate responsibility for their maintenance and security. In the view of this author, it will be difficult for Councils to assume such a responsibility in the absence of an immediate transfer of matching financial resources. Decentralisation of functions without matching financial transfers is likely to result in unsuccessful implementation of decentralisation as was the case with previous decentralisation efforts in East Africa, Zambia, Asia and Latin America (Rondinelli 1981; Mukwena 1998). One other challenge that is likely to negatively affect the pace of the process of decentralisation is the limited guidance and supervisory capacity of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. In its current state, the Ministry is not expected to effectively supervise the functions earmarked for devolution such as agriculture extension, primary and early education and primary health care. There is certainly no capacity at Ministry of Local Government Headquarters to supervise the foregoing functions. It should be noted here that limited capacity at the Ministry of Local Government has in the past negatively affected the implementation of decentralisation efforts (Zambia 1994; Zambia/ODA 1995; Mukwena 1999).

Under Phase 2, the following four (4) functions were to be devolved with effect from 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2016:

(a) Infrastructure Development and Management under the Ministry of Transport, Works, Supply and Communications;

(b) Land Allocation and Utilisation together with Management and Conservation of Natural Resources under the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection;

(c) Cultural Affairs under the Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs; and


Given that there was a backlog of seven (7) functions to be devolved from 2015, it was not surprising that the above four (4) functions could not be devolved to local authorities in 2016 and are yet to be devolved to date.

Phase 3 envisages devolving the following four (4) functions to Councils with effect from 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2017:

(a) Sports Development, Community Sport and Youth Development under the Ministry of Youth and Sport.
Further comments on progress in the implementation of the Decentralisation Policy

Some sector devolution plans are ready while others are still under preparation. The Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) which is a key Ministry in the process of devolution only had its devolution plans approved in May 2016. In the absence of sector devolution plans, it will be difficult to move the decentralisation process to the next stage.

To date the following are the only sector devolution plans that are ready (approved in May 2016):

(a) Ministry of Health sector devolution plan;
(b) Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock sector devolution plan;
(c) Ministry of Local Government and Housing physical planning sector devolution plan;
(d) Ministry of Works and Supply infrastructure development sector devolution plan;
(e) National AIDS Council HIV/AIDS/STI sector devolution plan;
(f) Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare: Social Welfare sector devolution plan; Community Development sector devolution plan; and
(g) Ministry of General Education: Early Childhood Education sector devolution; Primary Education sector devolution plan; and Adult Literacy sector devolution plan (Zambia Daily Mail, 20 June 2016).

With the exception of the National Aids Council HIV/AIDS/STI sector devolution plan, the above mentioned devolution sector plans are yet to be implemented. The ministries and institutions that have not yet prepared devolution plans were urged by the Secretary to the Cabinet to accelerate and finalise the devolution plans in readiness for implementation by 2017 (Times of Zambia, 8 August 2016).

In the case of the Ministry of Health, the following are the specific functions earmarked for devolution to councils:

(a) Control of communicable diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera, dysentery, sexual transmitted diseases (condom distribution), HIV/AIDS, VCT and counselling services;
(b) Control of Malaria through Indoor Resident Spray (IRS) and distribution of Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs);
(c) Child Health programme (Immunisation);
(d) All vaccinations including Yellow Fever;
(e) Environmental sanitation;
(f) Maternal health (antenatal and post-natal services);
(g) Family Planning (counselling and dispensing of family planning commodities);
(h) Nutrition (demonstrations and food supplements distribution);
(i) Health education;
(j) Curative Services (treatment of common illnesses); and
(k) Rehabilitation Services (Physiotherapy, Occupational Therapy) (Times of Zambia, 8 August 2016).

The Ministry of Health will retain the following responsibilities:

(a) General and legislative policy formulation for the health sector,
(b) Monitoring and evaluation;
(c) Provision of advice to Councils on delivery of infrastructure development functions;
(d) Quality assurance and setting national performance standards; and
(e) Maintenance of a strong working relationship with the health services department in the Councils (Times of Zambia, 8 August 2016).

In the case of the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare the specific functions earmarked for devolution to councils are:

(a) Identification and implementation of community development projects and programmes;
(b) Facilitation of women development programmes;
(c) Facilitation of functional literacy and survival skills development;
Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare will retain responsibilities for general and legislative policy formulation and setting national performance standards. For the Ministry of General Education, the functions to be devolved are Early Childhood Education; Primary Education; and Adult Literacy (Zambia Daily Mail, 20 June 2016). The Ministry of General Education with retain responsibilities for general and legislative policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, quality assurance and setting national performance standards. This author has had an opportunity to access and read only three (3) devolution plans, namely: (a) National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB Council Devolution Plan; (b) Fisheries Devolution Plan; and (c) Health Sector Devolution Plan. In the view of this author, the aforementioned devolution plans have reasonably been well crafted.

With regard to the National Aids Council Devolution Plan, the functions to be devolved to the local authorities and those to remain at the National Aids Council (NAC) Headquarters have been clearly defined. The financial implications of devolution and the plan for transfer of funds from NAC to local authorities up to December 2015 were also clearly spelt out (National Aids Council 2014). However, it has not been spelt out in the devolution plan how the local authorities or central government will fund the devolved functions beyond December 2015. Furthermore, with regard to the devolution of functions from the National Aids Council (NAC), the following were appropriately undertaken and well-articulated:

(a) Assessment of Organisational Structure implications on NAC and the councils;
(b) Assessment of Human Resource implications of devolution on NAC and the councils;
(c) Assessment of Financial and Assets implications;
(d) Assessment of Policy and Legal implications of devolution on NAC and the councils.

With regard to the assessment of Organisational Structure implications, the NAC devolution plan has clearly outlined the reporting lines and provided clear job descriptions for devolved positions (NAC 2014). Despite the NAC Devolution Plan being well articulated, there are, in the view of this author, two shortcomings in the document which need to be addressed. Firstly, the plan has not determined the increased maintenance costs on the part of the local authorities that will arise from increased assets as a result of devolution. Secondly, the plan has not determined the additional office space that will arise from increased staffing in local authorities as a result of devolution.

For the Fisheries Devolution Plan, this author also found the functions to be devolved to the councils and the functions to be retained at the ministry headquarters clearly defined. The author also found the assets to be devolved to the councils to have been clearly identified. Furthermore, this author also found the policy and legal implications of devolution to have been well articulated (Zambia 2016b). The author however found the Fisheries Devolution Plan to have more shortcomings than the NAC Devolution Plan. For instance, the Devolution Plan does not clearly articulate the implications of devolution on the human resources and organisational structures of the Ministry and the councils. The plan just gives recommendations on what should be done and outlines the possible general and specific implications of devolution on the human resources and organisational structures of the Ministry and the councils. With regard to fiscal decentralisation, the Fisheries Plan has determined the amounts of funds to be transferred to the councils without determining the financing arrangements upon devolution. The plan just makes general recommendations on the financing arrangements. In the view of this author one major weakness in the devolution process for the fisheries and livestock sector is the absence of a national Fisheries and Livestock Policy. The Policy, which is supposed to provide the much needed guidance to the sector and to the devolution process for the sector is still being finalised.

In the view of this author, the Health Sector Devolution Plan is a more complete and solid document than the other two devolution plans highlighted above. The Plan has the following strengths:

(a) The functions to be devolved to the councils and those to remain with the Ministry of Health have been clearly defined;
(b) The implications of devolution on the organisational structures of the councils have been clearly outlined;
The organograms of the proposed Departments of Health Services for the three categories of Local Authorities have been clearly outlined; the Primary Health Care departments and units to be devolved to the councils have been identified; the Human Resource implications of devolution on the councils and Ministry of Heath have been clearly determined; the assets attached to the functions to be devolved have been determined (Zambia 2016c).

In the view of this author, the Ministry of Health Devolution Plan has the following shortcomings which need to be addressed:

(a) The financial arrangements that will ensue upon devolution have not been determined;
(b) The financial implications on the maintenance budgets of councils arising from increased assets upon devolution have not been determined.

It should also be pointed out here that all the three devolution plans discussed above failed to determine the office shortfalls that will arise in the councils upon devolution.

One other achievement worth noting with regard to devolution is the finalisation in 2014 of the organisation structures for City, Municipal and District Councils (Zambia, 2014a). The new organisation structures were approved and ready for implementation (Permanent Secretary Management Development, 3 May 2016). The new organisation structure for City Councils comprises of nine departments and one section (Audit). The departments are:

(a) Finance and Commercial;
(b) Engineering and Infrastructure Development;
(c) Human Resources and Administration;
(d) Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources;
(e) Planning and I.M.S

The City and Municipal Councils will continue being headed by Town Clerks while District Councils will continue being headed by Council Secretaries.

Implication Of The Relocation Of Decentralisation Secretariat From MLGH To Cabinet Office:

The relocation of the Decentralisation Secretariat from MLGH to Cabinet Office in 2015 is a positive development that will improve the Secretariat’s role in the implementation of devolution. It will enhance the process of implementation in that directives and guidance will now come from the office of the Secretary to the Cabinet, whose office supervises all line ministries. Prior to this relocation, it was not easy for MLGH to give directives to other line ministries as they were at the same level.

Guidelines On The Implementation Of Circular Number 10 Of 2014:

One significant achievement of the Decentralisation Secretariat since its relocation to Cabinet Office is the issuance on 31st August 2015 of the Guidelines on the Implementation of Circular Number 10 of 2014. These guidelines give clarity to the general and specific activities and steps required to be undertaken in order to successfully implement the New Decentralisation Policy. The Guidelines outline nine (9) steps which should be followed to effect the devolution process. The steps are given hereunder:
Step 1 – All Councils adopt the New Organisation structures in readiness for the devolution of functions and appropriate staff from Central Government to Councils.

Step 2 – Permanent Secretaries in Devolving Ministries and institutions in liaison with the relevant Service Commissions, identify and register all staff performing functions earmarked for devolution in each district within their ministries/institutions.

Step 3 – The Permanent Secretaries in the Devolving Ministries and Institutions will prepare and submit registers of staff performing functions earmarked for devolution in their ministries/institutions to relevant service commissions. Copies of the staff registers will be availed to the Public Service Management Division (PSMD) for purposes of notification and verification on existence of the officers. All service commissions will then submit the staff registers to the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) for verification of all positions identified in the registers and confirmation of the availability of matching positions in each Council under the new Organisation Structures and advise PSMD accordingly.

Step 4 – Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) verifies all positions identified in the registers and confirms the availability of matching positions in each Council under the new Organisation Structures and advises PSMD accordingly.

Step 5 – Ministry, provincial and District Devolution Task Forces undertake sensitization campaigns to inform affected personnel about the devolution process in order to prepare them for their transfer.

Step 6 – On the advice of PSMD, affected service commissions generate and convey letters of transfer to all affected staff and simultaneously, transfer their files to the Local Government Service Commission to facilitate their appointment under the new Organisation Structures.

Step 7 – On the advice of PSMD, the LGSC (upon receipt of staff files) generates and issues letters of appointment posting affected staff to various positions in Councils within their respective districts (unless in special cases) based on new Organisation Structures, new Job Descriptions, Job Specifications as well as Terms and Conditions of Service.

Step 8 – Upon receipt of the letters of appointments, the affected officers immediately cease technical reporting to the District Administration and Line Ministries respectively and commence formal reporting to the Council. The Town Clerk/Council Secretary becomes the responsible officer for all technical reporting to line Ministries/Institutions in respect of functions which have been devolved to the Council. The Town Clerk/Council Secretary also assumes responsibility to the LGSC for human resource management over all staff performing devolved functions.

Step 9 – Town Clerks and Councils Secretaries file periodic staff returns to appraise PSMD and the LGSC about the progress of staff transfers (Zambia, Republic of, 2015b: 3-4).

The above guidelines are well crafted and if implemented as outlined, the devolution process will be put on the right track. What is required at this stage is to take stock of the progress that has been made in implementing the guidelines.

Implications Of The Constitution Of Zambia, Act 2016 On Decentralisation:
The Constitution of Zambia, Act 2016, which was assented to by the Republican President on 5th January 2016, has presented the country with an opportunity to strengthen local democracy and further the devolution process. The removal of Members of Parliament (MPs) from councils will go a long way in strengthening local democracy in that under the previous arrangement where MPs were also councillors, their presence in councils stifled and undermined local democracy (Mukwena 2014). There was a tendency by MPs especially those that were also ministers to dominate proceedings in the councils. The provision which allows councils to invite persons to participate in the deliberations of the council if utilised appropriately will go a long way in improving the quality of council policies. The introduction of Executive Mayors and Chairpersons also has the potential of strengthening local democracy in that it will provide clear executive leadership at the local level which has the electoral mandate of the local populace. Such leadership is critical in the implementation of the Decentralisation Policy at the local level. There is however one provision in the new constitution (membership of chiefs on councils) that has the potential of undermining local democracy. In chiefdoms where traditional institutions are very strong, councillors might not be free to debate with their chiefs in the council.
chamber. In such chiefdoms, chiefs might use their traditional authority to dominate other councillors.

**The Local Government Act, 2019:**
The Local Government Act, 2019 (Act No. 2 of 2019) came into effect on 11th April 2019. This Act repealed and replaced the Local Government Act, 1991. The Local Government Act, 2019 was enacted to: “provide for an integrated local government system; give effect to the decentralisation of functions, responsibilities and services at all levels of local government; ensure democratic participation in, and control of decision making by the people at the local level; revise the functions of local authorities; provide for review of tariffs, charges and fees within the area of a local authority; provide for the proceedings of the council and committees; provide for the role of traditional leadership in democratic governance…” (Zambia 2019a: 5).

Local Government Act 2019, has only been in existence for a short period, and therefore it is too early to assess its implementation. However, it should be pointed out here that the new Act does not embrace the devolved functions contained in the current Decentralisation Policy. Further, in the view of the Local Government Association of Zambia, the new Act appears to be giving more recourse to ministerial approvals, a move which has the potential of enhancing central controls over local authorities instead of promoting local democracy (LGAZ Executive Secretary, 27th May 2019). In the view of this author, the best approach to the complex issue of central government controls is to clearly indicate in the Local Government Act decisions/actions that local authorities can take without reference to central government and which decisions/actions should be referred to Ministry of Local Government for final decision or endorsement. It should also be indicated in the Local Government Act which decisions/actions or documents should be sent to Ministry of Local Government for information only. Central government controls are necessary given that local government operates within one nation that has one central government with final authority and the fact there is need for the central government to ensure compliance to national standards in the provision of certain services.

At the local level in the form of ward development committees. On another positive note, the new Act has continued with the Strong Mayor-Council Model of Local Government which provides clear political leadership at the local level and a centre of authority local residents can hold accountable for lack of development in the entire city, town or district.

**Personnel System:**
The country has continued with the Unified Personnel System. The problems faced by the Local Government Service Commission in the previous period have continued in the current period.

**Overall Assessment Of The Period 2011-2020:**
Local government during the period 2011 to 2020 has continued to face the same problems that limited its capacity in the previous periods to deliver local services and play any meaningful role in fostering local democracy and local development. These problems include inadequate financial resources and insufficient numbers of skilled staff. For instance, the funding to local authorities quality continues to be very limited to the extent that most of these authorities have difficulties to provide basic local services and even pay staff salaries. Reports have continued of many local authorities failing to pay staff salaries for several months, in some cases even for periods ranging from one to three years (Lusaka Times, 19 March, 27 September, 2 December, 16 December 2013; 12 March 2014; Lusaka Voice, 27 September 2013; Muvi TV News, 17 March 2014; Zambia Online, 31 January 2011; ZNBC 1900 hrs News, 4 June 2014).

During an audit, covering thirty-five (35) local authorities, by the Auditor General for the financial years ended 31st December 2014, 2015 and 2016 poor performance was noted in revenue collection, financial management, stores management, record keeping and other performance areas as indicated in the Table 3 below (Zambia 2018). The total number of local authorities in the country at the time of the above mentioned audit was one hundred and nine (109).

**Table 3: Summary Of Audit Findings For 2014, 2015 & 2016:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>AMOUNT (KWACHA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Collect Revenue</td>
<td>4,098,455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Failure to Follow Procurement Procedures & 548,916 
Failure to Insure Assets & 199,474,423 
Failure to Remit Statutory Contributions and PAYE & 411,597,888 
Failure to Pay Staff Obligations & 225,811,615 
Irregular Payment of Allowances & 1,512,320 
Misapplication of Funds & 8,995,732 
Misapplication of Equalisation Funds & 14,913,913 
Missing Payment Vouchers & 3,839,319 
Non-Recovery of Salary Advances & 93,395 
Overpayments & 748,934 
Questionable Payments & 1,670,673 
Unaccounted for Revenue & 1,367,019 
Unaccounted for Stores & 18,467,255 
Unapproved Payments & 254,668 
Undelivered Stores & 147,378 

Source: Zambia, 2018

The above mentioned problems contained in the audit findings which relate to governance, operational and financial matters inhibit local authorities from providing quality service delivery and development in their respective communities. It should also be noted here that of the thirty-five (35) local authorities covered by the above mentioned audit, twelve (12) local authorities failed to prepare financial statements for the period under review. The failure by the local authorities to prepare financial statements renders assessment of performance of the concerned local authorities a futile exercise. The Audit findings highlighted in Table 3 above are the same as the audit findings for another audit undertaken by the Auditor General which covered thirty-two (32) for the financial years ended 31st December 2015, 2016 and 2017 (Zambia 2019). The summary of the audit findings of the aforementioned audit are summarised in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Summary Of Audit Findings For 2015, 2016 And 2017:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>AMOUNT (KWACHA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Remit Statutory Obligations and Other Obligations</td>
<td>423,641,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Settle Staff Obligations</td>
<td>152,081,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misapplication of Funds</td>
<td>12,891,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsupported Payments</td>
<td>27,020,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unapproved Payments</td>
<td>1,048,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unretired Accountable Imprest</td>
<td>2,876,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for Revenue</td>
<td>502,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspent Funds</td>
<td>699,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Collect Revenue</td>
<td>33,672,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Follow Procurement Guidelines</td>
<td>527,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to Insure Assets</td>
<td>36,560,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Payment of Allowances</td>
<td>3,073,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Payment Vouchers</td>
<td>14,334,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overpayments</td>
<td>163,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionable Payments</td>
<td>120,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for Stores</td>
<td>23,075,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zambia, 2019b

In addition to the above mentioned audit findings, the other problems discovered at the local authorities covered by the audit included lack of updated valuation rolls, lack of title deeds, failure to maintain properties, failure to adhere to the provisions of the Environmental Management Act, and poor waste management. Further, thirteen (13) of the thirty-two (32) local authorities covered by
the above mentioned audit did not prepare financial statements for the period under review (Zambia 2019b). As earlier pointed out, failure to prepare financial statements makes it difficult to assess the performance of such local authorities.

**Conclusion:**

As observed in this paper, it is not easy to assess the performance of decentralisation and local government reforms or indeed the performance of local authorities due to poor record keeping and failure by many local authorities to prepare financial statements. However, when one weights the achievements recorded against the challenges being faced and enabling factors neglected in the implementation of the decentralisation policy during the period under discussion, it can be concluded that the process of decentralisation is not moving at the right pace to be able to significantly contribute to accelerated development. The challenges and factors that have accounted for Zambia’s unsuccessful attempts at decentralisation since independence and dismal performance of decentralised structures with regard to fostering development are well known. These challenges and factors have been well documented in the past and some of them have been sufficiently articulated by Mukwena (2014) and by various reports of the Auditor-General. They have included, among others:

(i) inadequate funding;
(ii) tendency to decentralize functions without matching financial transfers;
(iii) tendency to decentralize functions without careful consideration of the capacities of various categories of local authorities;
(iv) weak capacity at Ministry of Local Government Headquarters;
(v) insufficient numbers of trained staff;
(vi) lack of coordination at the local level;
(vii) politicization of local government and district administration;
(ix) tendency for decentralization policies to be viewed by both central elites and their local clients primarily in terms of patronage objectives;
(xi) lack of political will to decentralise powers on the part of national politicians;
(xii) ambiguities in the decentralization and local government legal framework;
(xiii) failure to support coordination mechanisms and citizen participation arrangements with appropriate legal framework (Mukwena 2014: 61-62);
(xiv) misapplication of funds;
(xv) financial mismanagement;
(xvi) poor internal controls;
(xvii) unaccounted for stores; and
(xviii) failure to collect revenue (Zambia 2018 and 2019b).

For decentralisation to move at the right pace and be placed on the right footing to play an effective role in enhancing development, the above mentioned challenges and factors will have to be addressed and resolved in an honest and objective manner. Indeed, as this author has observed in the past, “to enable decentralised structures play an important role in the development process, any transfer of functions to these units should be matched with commensurate transfer of financial resources” (Mukwena 2014: 63). Similarly, as Mukwena (2014: 63) further observed, “the transfer of functions and financial resources to the local level should be matched with adequate availability of skilled human resources at that level”. Furthermore, political will to decentralise powers is also needed for the decentralisation process to move at the right pace.

Given its potential benefits, decentralisation is the best vehicle for accelerating development in Zambia. And, if measures are undertaken to resolve the challenges that usually hamper the decentralisation process, decentralisation will move at the right pace and will, therefore, stand a realistic chance of having the desired impact on local development.

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