

Case Study

Comparative Case Study on Institutionalization of Ruling Parties under Military Authoritarianism: Democratic Republican Party under Park Chung-Hee Regime in South Korea (1961-1979) and Golkar under Suharto Regime in Indonesia (1966-1998)

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Abstract: South Korea and Indonesia have experienced similar military political interventions and coups which brought a long military authoritarian regime. Strong military authoritarian regime with their own ruling parties could last for 18 years in South Korea and 32 years in Indonesia.

In South Korea, Park Chung-hee Regime ended in 1979 when he was murdered by his subordinates, which was followed by the dissolution of the ruling party, Democratic Republican Party.¹ Whereas in Indonesia, the reform movement with socio-political instability by the economic crisis in 1997 resulted the collapse of Suharto's hegemony and authoritarian regime in 1998 while the ruling party, Golkar still exists today.

This study aims to find answers to why there have been differences in the end of both parties, related with the political party institutionalization. And this study would like to show that the Democratic Republican Party failed to be institutionalized while the Golkar Party could survive and win the election again. Thus, this study would like to say that the level of institutionalization must be different in the Democratic Republican Party and the Golkar Party.

Keywords: Institutionalization of political party, Democratic Republican Party, GOLKAR, Military Authoritarian Regime, Ruling Party,

Introduction

a. Background

After World War II, a common phenomenon found in many newly independent Asian countries was military political intervention such as a coup. Due to a lack of democratic political experience and social instability, almost all newly independent countries in Asia have experienced direct political intervention and enormous political influence by the military, and military political dominance has continued in several countries so far.²

¹ Jooshin Jeong, *Democratization and Military Political Withdrawal in South Korea*, Daejeon: Prima Books, 2009, p. 29.

² Howard Handelman, *The Challenge of Third World Development* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 186.

South Korea in Northeast Asia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia have very different environments such as language, religion and race, but both countries have very similar historical backgrounds. In addition to similar experiences in economic development and democratization, these two countries have experienced similar military interventions and military coups that have brought long authoritarian regime.

President Park Chung-hee carried out a military coup in 1961 in South Korea and was elected as the 2nd president in 1963. President Suharto, Indonesia's 2nd president, took supreme political power in 1966 by Supersemar (Eleventh March Order: Sequence Eleventh March), and became president of Indonesia in 1968. The time gap between the two regimes was about five years apart from the start, but there was homogeneity which led to a long authoritarian regime with a strong military background. Through their direct or indirect military coup,

General Park Chung-hee ruled for 18 years and General Suharto ruled for 32 years.³

b. Research Problem

Even if military political intervention in political parties in two countries looked very similar, each ruling party finally had a big difference at the end. When there was a new military coup after the death of Park Chung-hee in South Korea in 1979, the Democratic Republican Party was dismissed by a new military elite group.⁴ However, in Indonesia, President Suharto was able to hand over his presidency to Vice President Habibie in 1998 without collisions between elite groups in the military or massive bloodshed on the streets. Indeed, Golkar could return to normal political party and has survived so far.

³ Angel Rabasa & John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia*, Rand Institute, 2002, p. 7.

⁴ See Jongseok Woo, *Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia. From State Building to Post Democratization* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011); Jian-Chuan Kwok, *Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia*, as a Thesis for getting Master Degree in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (September 2010); Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies (*Journal of East Asian Studies*, 1/2009).

c. Research Question

From the background and the problems that have been presented, the research question is why the military needed political parties after taking power, and how did they institutionalize Democratic Republicans in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia? And when facing the crisis of the regime, how did the political party institutionalization affect ends of the Democratic Republic Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia?

d. Research purposes

This study aims to study differences in political party institutionalization under military authoritarian regime in South Korea and Indonesia and will examine in more detail how these differences in institutionalization affected the sustainability of each political party. The reason for choosing two countries is the military authoritarian regime which began with the same historical background, causing the two ruling political parties, Democratic Republican Parties in South Korea and GOLKAR in Indonesia.⁵

Theoretical Review

Huntington saw the party system develops in four stages. The first step is stage of factionalism, the second one is the stage of the polarization, the expansion phase is the third stage, and the fourth stage is political institutionalization with acquiring the value and stability of the party organization.⁶

Step	Stage	Characteristics
Step 1	Factionalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Political participation and institutionalization is very low. * The absence of detailed modern political organizations. * Lack of homogeneity, very low bonding, lack of permanence. * a small number of people in organizations compete. * Is a group interest at the level of family or relatives.
Step 2	Polarization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Political participation begins to develop. * Polarization with existing factions because of the emergence of new socio-political forces, and polarization in new forces as well. * Formation of political

⁵ Marcus Mietzner, *The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia Conflict and leadership*, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 12.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 217.

		<p>parties, which means the conversion of traditional factionalism into social forces.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Polarization is a signal and the starting point of party politics.
Step 3	Enhancement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Formed political parties attract popularity and public support through effective party composition. * Strong political motivation including regime control and reorganization of the social order. * Expand political participation through internal political struggles. * In a typical pattern of party development in the West, small faction groups developed into larger factions and attracted new supporters into politics. * Expand the formation of political parties and political participation directly through new strength and support competitions.
Step 4	Institutionalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Building a growing party system. * Formation and completion of political party systems: These are divided into three types: the dominant system of one party, the two-party system, and the multi-party system. * From the dominant system of one party, it develops into a multi-party system that can bring together alternatives and control the system. This can replace government policy and private leadership from the dominant one party system. * Do not rely on personal leadership by certain leaders but have several generation replacement candidates in various organizations. * Political stability and political vitality can be secured for a long time.

Huntington defines institutionalization as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. Institutionalization is necessary for political parties to acquire

and sustain value and stability. Huntington argues that the degree of institutionalization of all political systems can be judged by adaptability, complexity, autonomy, coherence of its organizations and procedures. If these elements were identified and measured, the political system could be described as institutionalized systems. It is also possible to measure deepening or weakening of institutionalization of a specific organization.⁷

Criteria	Non-institutionalized party	Institutionalized party
Adaptability-Rigidity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Institutional and organizational permanence is short. * There is little or no case of generation replacement, and the history of generation replacement is short. * The purpose and function of party existence is simple, and it is difficult to adapt to change. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Institutional and organizational permanence have a long lasting. * Generational replacement is common, and generational replacement has a long history. * The purpose and function of party existence vary, and adaptation to change is fast.
Complexity-Simplicity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The organization is simple, there is no functional differentiation, and there is no subdivided subsystem. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Organizations are complex, hierarchical and functionally divided and have subdivided subsystems.
Autonomy-Subordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Non-autonomously, very vulnerable to external influences. * Lack of development of autonomous political organizations and institutions. * Represents the interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * Lack of verification of new political forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Autonomous organization characteristics are not influenced by external factors. * Highly developed political organizations and institutions. * They are very well separated from the interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * There are enough verification steps and candidates for

		new political powers.
Coherence-Disunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Not integrated and fragmented. * It is not autonomous. * The principle of establishing organizational discipline is unclear. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Integrated and strong. * Prevent external interference through autonomy. * It has clear discipline as like one of military.

Methods

This research will be conducted using a type of analytic descriptive research that seeks to describe complex social realities through simplification and classification by utilizing concepts to explain an analytic political phenomenon. In terms of simplifying the complexity of political reality, a qualitative approach in this study is carried out without going through hypothesis testing such as ordinary quantitative research. However, to facilitate understanding and relatively accurate analysis, a general assumption is needed to explain the relationship of the influential variables in this study. Furthermore, this research will be effective when carried out by relying on official data such as statistics and political indicators that are recognized in South Korea and Indonesia. This study is a literature study that collects, classifies, and analyzes data and other materials related to the above problems both in the form of documents, books, journals, periodical scientific magazines, newspapers, magazines, pages on websites and others. others and field research.

Results

1. The Process of Taking Over Power by the Military

1.1 May 16 coup and military government in South Korea

Early on the morning of May 16, 1961, more than 3,500 military forces captured all broadcasting stations, power plants, police stations and major government offices. At 5 o'clock in the morning, there was an announcement of the coup on behalf of the Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-yong. The soldiers who succeeded in carrying out the coup without resistance were the 8th graduates of the Korean Military Academy.

Park Chung-hee's coup represents the ruler type of the political intervention model E. A. Nordlinger, which was mentioned theoretically beforehand.⁸ They asked for two years for the military government. They stated that they would surrender political power to the civilian government within two years after correcting corruption and the inability of society and the state. However, several officers, including Colonel Kim Jong-pil, secretly planned to establish a ruling party to help the military government and take power through general elections. However, their coup was not a military coup as a national institution, but as one faction in the military, and the first priority task was to expel opposition from the military to

⁷ Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 13-24.

⁸ Nordlinger, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-27.

control the military first. This shows that factionalism and internal confrontation within the Korean military have played a leading role in the May 16 Military coup.

1.2 Suharto's Takeover of Sukarno's Power

The end of the Old Order power which was identified with the Soekarno government could not be separated from the G30S / PKI event in 1965. This event not only made the fall of the Soekarno power regime, but also this was done by Suharto to purge the PKI movement and its mass organizations. According to Elson, Suharto's massive actions in following up on the G30S / PKI were motivated by two things. First, the motive for recognition is that the times have changed fundamentally since October 1, 1965. These changes, among others, can be seen from PKI forces that were previously strong, the PKI was also close to Sukarno, after the G 30S / PKI events were in ruin. The second motive is more strategic attention: With the presence of Suharto as Kamtibmas in handling the G 30 S / PKI events, it will attract attention from various groups. Then this attention can create a sense of solidarity which can then increase Suharto's legitimacy. This can be seen when Soekarno signed the March 11 (Supersemar) Order.⁹

On 12 March 1966 the Kostrad Commander / Kopkamtib Commander Maj. Gen. Suharto received a March 11, 1966 Order from Soekarno. The contents of the warrant are mandating Suharto to guarantee the running of the government and maintain the safety of the president. One of the implementations of Supersemar was that Suharto immediately dissolved the PKI and its mass organizations. Suharto's actions received broad support from anticommunist civil forces outside and within parliament. The prohibition and dissolution of the PKI and its mass organizations was then legitimized through the MPRS TAP No. XXV / MPRS / 1966 issued on July 5, 1966. In addition, the MPRS also gave Suharto the authority to support Supersemar to form a cabinet on July 5, 1966. That day, the MPRS revoked Sukarno's title as president for life.

Then on February 20, 1967, Suharto tried to convince Sukarno and his supporters that the power of the Soekarno regime was over and would be replaced by a new regime, the Suharto regime. Finally, on February 22, 1966 Sukarno gave Suharto's executive power. After the surrender of power, the MPRS revoked President Soekarno's power and established Suharto as presidential official. This provision was stated in the TAP MPRS No. XXXIII in 1967. John Roosa in *Pretext for Mass Murder* (2006) said that Suharto used Gestapu (G 30 S / PKI) as a pretext (pretext) to delegitimize Sukarno's power and push himself into the presidency. According to Roosa, Suharto's takeover of state power could be called a creeping coup d'etat (coup crawling). According to Roosa, Suharto finished taking over state power from Sukarno behind the veil of legal procedures, which disguised the coup crawling as an effort

supported by Sukarno on the pretext of preventing a coup by the PKI.¹⁰

2. Strengthening Ruling Ideologies to Keep Power

The military in South Korea which took control of the state through a coup tried to strengthen its ideology with an anti-communism ideology aimed at national security and developmentalism. The military in Korea at that time wanted to institutionalize the ideology with the following arguments: First reason was to secure the legitimacy of the military coup and military government in terms of the security crisis and anti-communism under the structure of the armistice. The Park Chung-Hee regime also tried to strengthen anti-communism education, its relationship with the United States and push forward with the modernization of the army by anti-communism as its basic ideology. Second reason was to create good relations between the United States and Korea. Therefore, Korea needs an anti-communist ideology to consolidate an alliance with the United States.

Besides that, like the military regimes around the world in general, the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea tries to use developmentalism as a basic ideology and actively used it to defend the regime along with the anti-communism ideology. The main purpose of using developmentalism was to secure the legitimacy of the coup and government.¹¹

In Indonesia, ideology tends to be developed as a comprehensive doctrine. The dominant view believed by the government, especially the New Order government, was that Pancasila was the norm and value. Pancasila is a belief system or ideology that determines how things should be. The type of political system and therefore the structure of dominance is also developed from understanding the ideology of Pancasila as this comprehensive doctrine. In Langenberg's words, the New Order was a state and a state system at the same time (executive, military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and court), which since 1965/1996 built a hegemony with the formulation of ideology as its pillar.¹²

The implications of the formulation of the Pancasila ideology as an organic totality are seen, for example, since 1985 all social and political organizations were led by law to accept Pancasila as the only philosophical basis, as a single principle and every citizen who ignores the Pancasila or any social organization that rejects Pancasila as a single principle will be labeled as a traitor or agitator. Pancasila as a result of the crystallization of the Indonesian cultural values, continued its existence in the New Order era by applying the government

⁹ Nugroho Notokusanto dan Isail Saleh, *The National Tragedy of the KUP G 30 S PKI Trial in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), p. 16-23

¹⁰ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 32.

¹¹ Jooshin Jeong, *op.cit.*, pp. 133-141.

¹² Van Langenberg, Michael, "The New Order State: Language, Ideologi and Hegemony" in Arif Budiman (ed), *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, Center of Southeast Asian Studies: Monas Univeristy. p. 123

purely and consequently.¹³ Hence, the government formally also socialized the values of Pancasila through the TAP MPR NO II / MPR / 1978 concerning Guidelines for Living and Practicing Pancasila (P4) in schools and in the community. Students, students, social organizations, and state institutions were required to carry out upgrading P4.¹⁴

3. Military in Parties and the National Assembly

To secure the legitimacy of government decisions and to stabilize governance, Park Chung-hee Regime, which took power through a coup, provided a systematic way for military officers to enter parliament and be active in political recruitment for military officers. In 1963, in the 6th general election, 31 retired generals were elected as 17.7% of the total members of the National Assembly, and that was 21.1% of the total members of the National Assembly from the 7th general election in 1967. In the 4th Republic was formed through amendments to the Constitution in 1972, members of the National Assembly including many military officers were appointed by the president, and members of the National Assembly from the military numbered were 37 people, 16% of the total members of the National Assembly opened after the 10th general election in 1978. Among 172 ministers of the 3rd Republic, 73 were from the military as 42.4%. Of the 142 ministers in the 4th Republic, 45 came from the military as 31.7%. The Deputy Minister, 23 out of 145 people came from the military as many as 15.9% in the 3rd Republic, and 20 from 121 people from the military as many as 16.5% in the 4th Republic.¹⁵

On the other hand, in Indonesia, before the end of the Old Order Era, ABRI had formed a political movement which was a form of disappointment towards the political elite which was considered to have weakened the country. So that the "Middle Road Concept" was born, issued by General A.H. Nasution in 1958 which became known as the "Dual Function" of ABRI. It is very important to note that before the 1971 elections.¹⁶

Military dominance in Indonesian politics after 1965 was changed by the relationship between the military and civilians in general and between the military and scholars and students. This relationship also affected the Indonesian political system at the same time and results from 1971 election. This happens because of the existence of dual function in important positions like a governor, regent and village head in people's lives. The military also had a hierarchical network from province to district. By law, for example, the military didn't need to compete in elections, but they just could order people to

choose a party or organization by its dominant power in local area.¹⁷

The role of the bureaucracy and ABRI in Golkar can be seen in how the semi-formal mechanism in Golkar worked in decision making procedures at all levels. This mechanism is known as the "three lane" semi-formal mechanism, namely A / ABRI, B / Bureaucracy, and G / Golkar.¹⁸ This was done to reduce diversity in Golkar. ABRI also entered various government structures, BUMN: Badan Usaha Milik Negara, and villages with various organizational forms and positions. The bureaucracy was used by the New Order to win Golkar votes. It is then said that ABRI and the bureaucracy were political machines for political mobilization in the Suharto government.

4. Weakening Parliament to Keep Power

In the 1960s, especially the October Restoration regime brought the phenomenon of executive institutions extending the power of the president. Since the 3rd Republic, the military had strengthened executive branch to make a strong regime structure and they built government with people based on personal relationships and the same geographical place. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Security Command had been mobilized to gather information about the entire community and reinforce the president's power. Taking control of these forces and strengthening the government meant that the power and dominance of the president was out of law. To achieve this, the president exercised great control over elections, the media, interest groups, the National Assembly, and the judiciary using force and authority. As a result, although the National Assembly could control the monopoly and dictatorship of the government with legislative powers, authority to review government budgets and the right to supervise, there was no way to regulate power after the parliament was weakened and the government became bigger and stronger.¹⁹

In this period in Indonesia, DPR, National Assembly of Indonesia, was under control of administration. The democratization in Indonesia during the New Order did not go well because the President's power was considered too large and weakened the function of the DPR. The DPR as a legislative body expected to be able to carry out checks and balances was only a decorator of the constitutional structure, which was shown only to strengthen Suharto's position as president.²⁰ During the new order, the DPR and MPR carried out their duties under the shadow of executive power, or only became an extension of the executive and thus turned off the legislative process. The executive power at that time was very strong, making Indonesia an authoritarian state. Executive

¹³ Muh. Arif Candra Jaya, *Implementation of Pancasila in the New Order Period*, (Jember: Skripsi KIP Jember University, 2012), p. 8.

¹⁴ Bunyamin Maftuh, "Internalization of Pancasila Values and Nationalism Through Citizenship Education," in *Journal Educationist* Vol. II No. 2 July 2008, ISSN: 1907-8838, p. 134

¹⁵ Jooshin Jeong, *op.cit.*, pp. 174-178.

¹⁶ Suryadinata, *The Military in Indonesia*, Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Edition No. 61/71, 1971, p. 1

¹⁷ Salim Said, *Growth and Dwifungsi Function: Development of Indonesian Military Political Thought 1958-2000*, (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2002), p. 55.

¹⁸ Syamsudin Haris, *Suing the New Order Politics*, (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1998), pp. 189-190.

¹⁹ Jooshin Jeong, *op.cit.*, p. 209.

²⁰ Afan Gaffar, *Indonesian Politics: Transition Towards Democracy*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999), p. 293.

institutions in the era of Suharto's leadership have a strategic role. The Indonesian parliament in the new order or the DPR-MPR, despite having constitutional authority to co-operate with the executive and the judiciary, failed to implement a check and balance mechanism because the legislature and the judiciary were "forced" to support any executive decision.²¹ In other words, the division of power during the New Order with the concept of Trias Politica did not go accordingly.

5. Weakening of Regimes and Ideological Failures

5.1 Security, economic and political crises in Korea

The move by the United States to withdraw US troops from South Korea is huge security crisis to South Korea. President Nixon of the United States declared his intention to limit US forces stationed in Asia as part of a policy to reduce Congress pressure and defense spending after the Vietnam War. The President of the United States Nixon has announced Nixon's decision as part of Asian policy in July 1969 and announced, "Asia by the Asians Policy". The essence of Nixon's term was to comply with the defense agreement at the alliance and provide a nuclear umbrella, but in the end emphasized the responsibility of the country's own defense first and that Korea must defend itself against the threat of North Korean invasion. Despite strong opposition from the Korean government and the United States parliament for the withdrawal of US troops, and warning of the Korean government on withdrawing Korean troops from the Vietnam War, President Nixon finally made the 7th US military division withdraw from the Korean peninsula.²²

In the process of securing power by creating a Democratic Republican Party to build Park Chung-hee Regime, the government and the Democratic Republican Party, the government party, established economic growth and development as the government's main program. Because severe poverty was continued among Korean people even after the independence, this policy of economic growth efforts was certainly fully supported by the community. The ongoing economic development efforts from the 1960s to the death of President Park Chung-hee initially achieved extraordinary unprecedented achievements. But as development continued, imbalances in growth, inequality, and accumulation of foreign debt occurred. The characteristic of industrialization in Korea was a government-intensive & labor-intensive industry that prioritized exports and focused on supplying capital on large conglomerate.²³

In terms of politics, Park Chung-hee's government in power for a long time caused a failure of the government to exercise power in accordance with the constitution. After the military coup, various policies emerged which reduced the aspirations of the people, namely the seizure and censorship to the mass

media, the declaration of martial law, the formation of the Military Revolution Committee and the Supreme Council, and social purification measures to eliminate democracy through repression and violence. In the end, the failure of the ideology of development also led to the crisis of the Park Chung-hee regime and the Democratic Republican Party. The role of the Democratic Republican Party which used bureaucrats and civilian politicians as instruments of power, could not develop by itself while the military authoritarian regime exercised overall control, and the Democratic Republican Party ideology failed to get full support. A political crisis due to the crisis of the ruling party eventually led to the crisis of all aspects of government.

5.2 Economic, Political and Legal Crises in Indonesia

The Indonesian economic crisis reached its peak in 1998, which was marked by a contraction with economic growth of -13.1%. One of the main impacts of the economic crisis in Indonesia was the occurrence of many fundamental changes in the economic, social, political and cultural order that could determine the direction of state life. This multidimensional crisis was an anticlimax of the success of the Indonesian economy for almost three decades in the New Order government since the launch of the First Repelita: 5-year economic development plan in 1969.²⁴

In addition, the political crisis that occurred in 1998 was mounting due to various political policies issued by the New Order government during its tenure based on implementation of Pancasila democracy in order to maintain the power of President Suharto and his cronies. During the New Order era, political life was very repressive, namely the existence of strong pressure from the government against the opposition or people who think critically.²⁵

The political crisis as a factor causing the reform movement, the public demanded reforms both in people's lives, as well as in the Indonesian government.²⁶ In political life, people assume that government pressure on the opposition is very large, especially seen in the harsh treatment of a person or group who oppose or give criticism of policies carried out by the government.

In the legal field, the government intervened as well, and laws were often used as a means of justifying the rulers. This fact was contrary to the provisions of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which states that the judiciary must be independent to the authority of the government (executive). The implementation of the law during the New Order government had many injustices and was not in accordance with the 1945 Constitution because the power of the judiciary was under executive authority.

²¹ T.A. Legowo, dkk, *DPR in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Formappi, 2005), p. 32

²² Chang-geuk Moon, *Dissension Analysis Between South Korea and U.S.A.*, (Seoul: Nanam, 1994), p. 116.

²³ Yunhwan Kim and Yunhyung Jung, *Economic Deveopoment Process in South Korea*, (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1981), p. 260

²⁴ Elly Karmeli, "Indonesian Economic Crisis," in *Journal of Indonesian Applied Economics*, Vol. 2. No. 2 October 2008, p. 166

²⁵ Eep Saefulloh Fatah, *Notes on the Failure of the New Order Politics*, (Yogyakarta: PT Pustaka Pelajar, 1998).

²⁶ B.J Habibie, *Seconds Determining: Indonesia's Long Way Towards Democracy*, (Jakarta: TCH Mandiri, 2006).

The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) stated that the event was categorized as a gross violation of Human Rights (HAM) committed by Suharto and the New Order regime he led.²⁷ These human rights violations were: Cases of Buru Island 1965-1966, Mysterious Shooting 1981-1985, Tanjung Priok 1984-1987, Talangsari 1984-1987, Military Operations Area (DOM) in Aceh (1989-1998), Papua DOM (1963 -2003), July 27, 1996, Forced Kidnappings and Disappearances 1997-1998, Trisakti Events May 12, 1998 and Riots on May 13-15 1998.

6. Political Challenges and Shifting Power

6.1 Challenges of Opposition Parties and Civil Groups in South Korea

The Democratic Republican Party, which had been solid for 10 years, faced major changes in the 8th general election in 1971. Although the Democratic Republican Party has made every effort to maintain its long-term regime, the opposition party got a lot of votes by focusing on the issue of Park Chung-hee regime's long-term power and undue corruption.²⁸ Another factor in the crisis which the Democratic Republican Party and the government met was civil society which emerged as the core of the demands of democratization along with opposition parties. In the mid-1970s, Park Chung-hee Regime actively launched security issues to maintain power.

As mentioned, Park Chung-hee Regime faced various civil society and student resistance at the end of the leadership. The government considered to mobilize the military to suppress resistance even if it could cause a lot of sacrifice by suppression. However, when the democratization demonstration became severe, civil society grew and opposition parties opposed strongly, Park Chung-hee Regime and the ruling Democratic Republican Party gradually collapsed.

6.2 Suharto's Leadership Weakness in Indonesia

The political crisis that occurred at the end of the New Order government was caused by long authoritarian regime and economy. Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia had stated that "Sovereignty is in hands of the people and fully implemented by the MPR". Basically, de jure (legally) the people's sovereignty was carried out by the MPR as representatives of the people, but de facto (in reality) MPR members were arranged and engineered, so that the majority of MPR members were appointed based on nepotism. These situation and structure resulted emergence of disbelief in government institutions, the DPR and the MPR, which led

reform movement. The reform movement demanded total reform in all fields, including the membership of the parliament.

The demand that President Suharto step down was increasingly voiced by students in various places, and students' movements resulted in clashes with security forces. On May 12, 1998, thousands of Trisakti students held a demonstration against Suharto's re-election as President. They also demanded the recovery of the economic situation in Indonesia which had been hit by a crisis since 1997.²⁹

Suharto was further shocked when his ministers, led by Akbar Tanjung and Ginandjar Kartasasmita, held a meeting and compiled a statement that they were unwilling to take office in the new cabinet and urged the President to step down. Suharto ordered Minister of State Secretary Saadillah Mursjid to immediately prepare for the process of presidency resignation in a constitutional manner. Suharto also ordered that his resignation would be carried out at the Merdeka Palace. On Thursday, May 21, 1998 President Suharto read out his resignation letter which was then followed by Vice President Habibie's succession for the position of President of the Republic of Indonesia.³⁰

7. Changes in Politics and Government Party

7.1 Collapse of the Democratic Republican Party

On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung-hee completed his business trip and held a dinner party with Cha Ji-cheol, President's Guards chief, Kim Ki-hyun, Chief Secretary, and Kim Jae-gyu, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the meal, the debate began between Cha Ji-cheol and Kim Jae-kyu, which eventually led to the end of the regime when Kim Jae-kyu killed President Park Chung-hee who was unexpectedly shot in the middle of the meal. President Park Chung-hee's sudden death brought political chaos to the Democratic Republican Party and authoritarian regime.

In Huntington's theory of political party institutionalization, institutionalized political parties have regular succession procedures, and there are succession plans at certain times through a systematic selection and successor training process.³¹ However, Park Chung-hee and the Democratic Republican Party showed the most difficult in choosing a successor as one of institutionalization. After the general election on June 8, 1967, the main internal issue in the Democratic Republican Party was the internal struggle over successors after the Park Chung-hee era.

After Park Chung-hee's political vacuum, civil society and political parties showed confrontations about democratization. When new military officers took over military power after the 1212 incident, Choi Gyu-ha, acting president, was paralyzed by the military. This situation was immediately followed by the expansion of martial law on May 17 in 1980, which led to a

²⁷ Tempo.co, "National Human Rights Commission: Five Severe Human Rights Violations in Suharto's Period," access from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/38767/komnas-ham-lima-pelanggaran-ham-berat-di-masa-soeharto>

²⁸ The 7th presidential election in South Korea was a direct election held on April 27, 1971, and Park Chung-hee won Kim Dae-jung by a margin of 900,000 votes. However, later officials and experts analyzed that Kim Dae-jung would have gone ahead of a million mark if there was no illegal election.

²⁹ Sumitro Usman, *Why do the Indonesian people support President Suharto?*, (Jakarta: C.V Jakarta, t.t), p. 9

³⁰ G. Forrester, *The Fall of Suharto*, (Australia: C. Hurst & Co Ltd ISBN.174, 2002), p. 174.

³¹ Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1968, p. 13.

military authoritarian regime again. As a result, the internal divisions of the Democratic Republican Party and the leadership crisis have given the military elite new reasons for political intervention.³²

The Democratic Republican Party was not autonomous from the government as well. New military officers led by General Chun Doo-hwan arrested former regime officials for the corruption of Park Chung-hee's regime. After Kim Jong-pil was arrested, including high-ranking officials, he was released after resignation with dedicating his wealth to the country. Kim Jong-pil left the Party on June 14, 1980 and resigned from the chairman of the party. In this way, the Democratic Republican Party accelerated decline of the party in the party's internal and external crises. It failed to overcome the power struggle with the new military elites, and finally was dissolved.

8.2 Golkar in the era of democratic transition

The challenge arose after the end of the New Order power. There was a lot of encouragement from the public and interest groups to dissolve Golkar, and they pointed Golkar was not suitable party with the trend of reform in all societies.³³ Golkar was considered part of Suharto's New Order regime, and many people thought Golkar had to be dissolved to make the reforms proceed correctly. The insistence on the dissolution of Golkar was stated from the grassroots level, and clashes often occurred in masses from organizations to other political parties. Golkar's flags were burned by parties on behalf of reformist groups, and several Regional Representative Council (DPD) offices were burned by the mob. Events held by Golkar were not protected from mass attacks.

Facing huge crisis of the party, Golkar tried to change people's concept that Golkar was the same body with the New Order regime, trying to make itself as more public political party. With a new flag called the Golkar Party, although the pressure for dissolution was still high, the Golkar Party could become a participant in the 1999 elections.

The leadership of the transitional Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung tried to adjust to changes, then the party proclaimed new Golkar, which was in line with the ideals of reform. The party tried to convince the public that this new Golkar would fight for ideals of reform and would not restore glory of the previous New Order.

According to Aulia Rachman,³⁴ Golkar turned into a political party as a form to prove to the public that new Golkar is not like old Golkar, new Golkar became more reformative and had new visions: 1. Open, 2. Independent, 3. Democratic, 4. Moderate, 5. Solid, 6. Rooted and Responsive.

In an effort to realize its vision and platform, Golkar made missions: First is reinforcing the commitment to absorb, integrate, articulate, and fight for the aspirations & interests of the people, especially those in marginal positions that have

received little attention and were often victims of development. Second is recruiting qualified cadres through a system of achievement to be chosen by the people to occupy political positions or public positions. Third is improving the process of education and political communication, which is dialogic and participatory, namely opening to various thoughts, aspirations and criticisms of the public.

Under the pressure to dissolve Golkar, finally in the 1999 election which was the 1st democratic election after the fall of Suharto, many people predicted that Golkar would lose a lot of votes because throughout the new order Golkar's government got votes from the bureaucracy and ABRI's assistance in mobilizing the community to vote for Golkar. The reform period made bureaucrats and ABRI unable to support Golkar back in the election. With unexpected results, in the 1999 elections Golkar was in second place under PDI-P, the party which was always in the last rank during the election of the new order. PDI-P won 35,689,073 votes or 33.74 percent with 153 seats while Golkar won 23,741,758 votes or 22.44 percent with 120 seats.

With a large vote and second place even without support from bureaucrats and the military, this showed that Golkar was still rooted and had fanatical voters who continued to vote for Golkar. In the next election in 5 years, Golkar proved that it was still a major party by winning elections in 2004 with 24,480,757 (21.58%) votes or 128 (23.27%) seats in the DPR-RI. The Golkar Party became the only major party which experienced increase in votes among all parties in the election: the Golkar Party's vote increased by 719,355 votes.

The victory of the Golkar Party could not be separated from the leadership of the Golkar Party in the transitional era, which succeeded to get glory again like the Suharto era. The modern Golkar Party does not use power of the government or military for its victory, but Golkar uses party structures and working programs that can steal people's hearts to win the election.³⁵

While a lot of ruling parties in other countries had difficulty in surviving from decline or dissolution when the authoritarian government collapsed, survival of the Golkar Party from pressures on dissolution and winning votes were an extraordinary achievement. The Golkar showed different adaptability unlike the Democratic Republican Party.

Conclusion

In South Korea, President Park Chung-hee's sudden death caused collapse of the government and ruling party: The Democratic Republican Party. In this sense, the party's organization and political position are maintained only by President Park Chung-hee's leadership. The failure to institutionalize the Democratic Republican Party was caused by the will of the supreme ruler who obsessed maintaining long-term regime only. Chaos in the party happened due to sudden death of the president who always pressured opposition parties, civil society groups and civilian politicians insisting

³² Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

³³ Hamka Hendra Noer, *The neutrality of Indonesian Bureaucracy*, (Jakarta: PT. Elex Media Komputindo, 2014).

³⁴ Aulia A Rachman, *The image of the public about Golkar*, (Jakarta: PSAP, 2006).

³⁵ Ogi Ahmad Fauzi, *Golkar Party Leadership in Maintaining Existence in the Transition Era Towards Democracy*, (Thesis: UI Depok, 2015), p. 2

the change of power, which led to the collapse of the Democratic Republican Party. The reason for this phenomenon can be explained by loss of legitimacy of the military authoritarian regime, lack of institutionalization and ideological failure of the ruling party.

Meanwhile, in the leadership of the Golkar Party, the era of transition emerged a new political culture. The Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung underwent a transformation from an organization that relied on power with the help of bureaucrats and Indonesian military to a modern organization that relied on institutionalized party structures and new visions to win in elections. It is not easy to change an organization from the ruling party of the military authoritarian regime into an independent public party.³⁶

Regarding institutionalization of political parties, Samuel P. Huntington argued that institutionalization is the process to have value and stability of the party. Facing similar crises of leaders' absence, Golkar showed outstanding adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to survive from collapse of the Suharto regime while the Democratic Republican Party must be dismissed due to insufficient institutionalization in adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence after Park Chung-hee's sudden death.

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³⁶ Akbar Tanjung, *The Golkar Way: Survival of the Golkar Party in the Midst of the Political Turbulence of the Transitional Era*, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008).

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